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SUMMARY 
 
As coastal communities become increasingly exposed to the risks posed by sea-level change, 
understanding their beliefs and responses becomes more important. While studies have identified 
differences in lay and expert understandings of climate change, little research has investigated how 
these groups understand sea-level change. This thesis uses a mental models approach to explore 
and compare expert and public perceptions of sea-level change on the Severn Estuary, a threatened 
coastal environment in the southwest of the United Kingdom.  
A three-phase methodology is adopted.  First, expert perceptions are investigated through semi-
structured interviews, probability elicitations and cognitive mapping with experts in the field of 
sea-level change on the Severn Estuary (N=11). Second, public perceptions are investigated 
through mental models interviews that include a semi-structured discussion, a picture sorting task, 
and a cognitive mapping session (N=20). Third, perceptions raised during public interviews are 
explored by way of a wider survey of members of the public living around the Severn Estuary 
(N=359). These perceptions are then compared and contrasted. A grounded approach is utilised 
to explore themes emerging from expert and public qualitative interviews, while regression analyses 
explore the relationships between themes explored in the quantitative public survey.  
Results show areas of public understanding consistent with expert understandings: most public 
respondents think that sea levels will rise, leading to increased flooding and property damage. 
However, the Severn Estuary public does not feel well informed about sea-level change, and there 
are a number of key differences between expert and public perceptions. For example, there is low 
public salience of some of the key drivers of sea-level change and its indirect impacts. Perceptions 
are influenced by many factors including information sources, the ways in which individuals think 
about the future, and the biases that they hold. Many findings are consistent with climate change 
research more generally. For example, respondents tend to express low concern about sea-level 
change in relation to other matters such as the economy; they feel detached from the issue, seeing 
it as something that will happen in the future to other people; and they perceive that neither the 
causes of nor responses to sea-level change are their responsibility.  
From an applied perspective, the study fills a research gap in how the Severn Estuary public 
perceives sea-level change in their region, and provides insights into how it might best be 
communicated. From a methodological perspective, the study illustrates the utility of using mixed 
methods, interdisciplinary approaches for investigating public and expert perceptions of specific 
climate change risks. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
‘Appropriate and timely risk communication is critical for effective 
adaptation and disaster risk management’ (IPCC, 2012, p. 15),  
 
It has been known since the 19th Century that heat-absorbing gases in the atmosphere can influence 
the Earth’s temperature (Arrhenius, 1896), and there is now overwhelming expert consensus that 
the world is warming because of the gases that humans emit (Anderegg, Prall, Harold, & Schneider, 
2010; Cook et al., 2013; IPCC, 2013). This warming causes water in the oceans to expand and land-
based ice to melt into it, leading to a rise in global mean sea level. In coastal regions sea-level rise 
(SLR) increases risks such as erosion, flooding and salt-water contamination. Ten percent of the 
world’s population live in such regions1 (McGranahan et al., 2007), and the number of people 
exposed to the risks associated with SLR is expected to grow (Nicholls et al., 2008). The impacts 
are expected to be significant; the 21st century alone may see the forced displacement of up to 187 
million people (Nicholls et al., 2011b). One coastal region at risk is the Severn Estuary, in the 
southwest of the UK. With one of the largest tidal ranges in the world and habitats of great 
ecological significance (Severn Estuary Coastal Group and ATKINS, 2010d), this unique 
environment is the focus of this study. Many of the Estuary’s2  features are reminiscent of other 
low-lying vulnerable settings, thus the findings of this study may also be applicable to other regions.  
As threatened communities such as those around the Severn become increasingly exposed to the 
risks posed by sea-level change (SLC), understanding their beliefs and responses will become ever 
more important in order to develop more constructive forms of communication. Knowledge of 
SLC and its related facets is important, for example in reducing deaths from its immediate impacts 
such as flooding (Jonkman & Kelman, 2005)3, facilitating informed adaptation responses, and in 
encouraging engagement with its major cause, climate change (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & 
Whitmarsh, 2007). Research shows that experts and lay publics often diverge in their conception 
and assessment of risks (Cox, Pidgeon, Lake, & Poortinga, 2005; Morgan, Fischhoff, Bostrom, & 
Atman, 2002), but while studies have identified differences in lay and expert understandings of 
climate change (e.g. Bostrom, Morgan, Fischhoff, & Read, 1994; Reynolds, Bostrom, Read, & 
Morgan, 2010), little research has investigated how these groups understand SLR. This thesis aims 
                                                   
1 Coastal regions are in this case defined as areas beside the sea within ten metres elevation of sea level 
(McGranahan, Balk, & Anderson, 2007).  
2 ‘The Estuary’ refers to the Severn Estuary, and is used throughout the thesis for brevity. 
3 Whilst flood-related deaths have occurred on the Estuary (Bryant & Haslett, 2007), deaths from flooding are rare 
in the UK (Kovats, 2008) and it is more likely that impacts on the Estuary will be through other means such as 
damage to property and economic losses. 
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to fill this gap by using a mental models approach to explore and compare expert and public 
perceptions of SLC, with a view to the future design of risk communications on the Estuary. The 
mental models approach (Morgan et al., 2002) is chosen for its emphasis on public perceptions in 
developing risk communications, and for its structured methodology in eliciting these perceptions.  
The mental models approach has traditionally focused on knowledge-based perceptions of risks. 
However, perceptions are determined by a great many factors in addition to a person’s knowledge 
(Baumann & Sims, 1978; Kahan et al., 2012), and it is wrong to assume that if a person knows 
about a risk they will respond with adaptive coping strategies rather than with maladaptive ones 
(Smith, Horrocks, Harvey, & Hamilton, 2011). Indeed, a lack of knowledge is just one of many 
barriers to engaging with climate change (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). Therefore, as well as investigating 
public knowledge of SLC, this thesis also investigates other factors that might influence responses, 
including factors that may predispose an individual to make a given decision, and factors that may 
influence their perceived ability to cope.  
Thesis structure 
The purpose of this study is to investigate perceptions of SLC on the Severn Estuary in order to 
improve risk communications. To do this, it asks three core questions:  
1. How do ‘experts’ perceive the risks of SLC on the Severn Estuary?  
2. How does ‘the public’ perceive the risks of SLC on the Severn Estuary?  
3. What implications do these perceptions have for risk communications on the Estuary?  
The study uses a mixed-methods design, answering the above research questions by way of three 
empirical phases. The first is an Expert Perception Phase (EPP), which develops an expert model 
of the risks to later compare with public risk perceptions. The model is developed through a review 
of the literature and elite interviews with experts in the field of SLC on the Severn Estuary (N=11). 
The second phase, Public Perceptions Phase One (PPP1), explores public risk perceptions through 
qualitative mental models interviews with members of the public living around the estuary (N=20). 
The third, Public Perceptions Phase Two (PPP2), investigates the prevalence of these risk 
perceptions, and the relationships between factors, through an online quantitative survey of a larger 
sample of the Severn Estuary population (N=359). The empirical research structure is shown in 
Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Empirical Research Phases 
 
 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides the rationale for the thesis and its structure, 
supported by a review of the literature regarding SLC, the Severn Estuary and risk perceptions. 
The methodology and results of the three empirical phases are organised into two main parts; the 
expert phase first, followed by the public phase. Chapters 3 and 4 present the methodology and 
results of the Expert Phase (EPP). Chapter 5 presents the methodology of both public phases 
(PPP1 and PPP2). The results of these public phases are discussed alongside each other in Chapters 
6, 7 and 8, organised by themes. The thesis is concluded in Chapter 9, followed by references and 
appendices. 
Chapter 2. Rationale and literature review provides the rationale for the thesis, supported 
by a review of the literature.  
Chapter 3. Expert perceptions: Methods presents the methodology of the EPP, including 
its overarching rationale and limitations.  
Chapter 4. Expert perceptions: Results presents and discusses the two main outputs of the 
EPP: an expert model of the risks of SLC on the Severn Estuary, and probability 
elicitations of future SLC. While Chapter 4 provides a summary of what the expert model 
contains, it is too long to contain within the main structure of the thesis. The notes to 
accompany the model are therefore appended (Appendix O). 
Chapter 5. Public perceptions: Methods details the rationale behind the two public phases 
(PPP1 and PPP2) and discusses the methods and limitations of each.  
Chapter 6. Public results: Orienting dispositions is the first of three chapters presenting 
and discussing the results of PPP1 and PPP2. This chapter discusses the factors that might 
predispose an individual to make risk appraisals.  
Expert Perceptions Phase 
(EPP)
creating an expert model 
of the risks 
•Literature review 
•Expert interviews  (N=11)
•Semi-structured interviews
•Probability elicitations
•Cognitive mapping
Public Perceptions Phase 
One (PPP1)
scoping public perceptions 
•Public interviews (N=20)
•Mental models interviews 
•Picture sorting task 
•Cognitive mapping 
Public Perceptions Phase 
Two (PPP2)
investigating the 
prevalence of and 
relationships between 
public perceptions 
•Quantitative online survey 
(N=359)
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Chapter 7. Public results: Risk appraisal is the second of three chapters discussing the 
results of PPP1 and PPP2. It addresses the factors that comprise a public risk appraisal of 
SLC: the appraisal of the threat, and the appraisal of ability to cope with the threat.  
Chapter 8. Public results: responses and relationships firstly discusses public responses 
(both active and inactive) to SLC. It then presents and discusses the results of statistical 
regression analyses (PPP2) on factors influencing SLC risk perceptions. 
Chapter 9. Conclusions completes the thesis with a discussion of the theoretical, 
methodological and applied implications of this research for the Severn Estuary and 
elsewhere, and with suggestions for future research. It includes recommendations for 
future communications on the Estuary, drawing on results from all three empirical phases.  
 
Appendices A to N contain methodological details and data tables.  
Appendix O contains notes to accompany the expert model developed during the EPP.  
Important definitions  
Public. While the existence of multiple ‘publics’ rather than a single homogenous ‘public’ is 
recognised, this thesis tends to use the term ‘public’ by way of convention and consistency with 
other public perception research (as per Whitmarsh & O'Neill, 2011). Throughout the discussion, 
‘public’ refers to people living around the Severn Estuary, not the wider Welsh and English 
population; further research is needed to investigate whether the perceptions of Severn Estuary 
residents are representative of other groups.  
Public perceptions of sea-level change. Public perceptions are defined as ‘people’s beliefs, 
attitudes, judgements and feelings, as well as the wider cultural values and social dispositions people 
adopt’ (Pidgeon, Hood, Jones, Turner, & Gibson, 1992, p. 89). This thesis is interested in these 
factors with relation to sea-level change.  
Public responses to sea-level change. Public responses are defined as reactions to sea-level 
change. They can be active, such as engaging with sea-level change by taking adaptive actions, or 
inactive such as denying or ignoring the issue.  
Engagement with sea-level change. Engagement is defined as it is by Lorenzoni et al. (2007) to 
be a personal state of connection with the issue of sea-level change, including caring about it and 
being motivated to take adaptive and mitagative action. 
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2 RATIONALE & LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
 
This chapter provides the rationale for the thesis and its structure, supported by a review of the 
relevant literature. It explains the reasoning behind the research and behind the methods chosen 
to answer the research questions, beginning with a discussion of the Severn Estuary and the reasons 
why it is important to understand public perceptions of SLC there. It then presents the mental 
models approach through which these perceptions are examined, before considering limitations of 
the approach, particularly its emphasis on the knowledge deficit model of risk perceptions. It then 
outlines non-knowledge factors that affect risk perceptions, such as sources of risk information, 
emotions and perceived coping capacity. The chapter concludes by presenting the aims and 
hypotheses that drive the research. 
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2.1 Sea-level change as a risk 
Risk is a ‘concept used to give meaning to things, forces, or circumstances that pose danger to 
people or to what they value’ (Stern & Fineberg, 1996, p. 215). It is usually defined in terms of the 
likelihood of an undesired event occurring and the consequences of the occurrence (Brooks, 2003). 
Risk perception research is interested in the ways in which people think about risks. It can be 
defined as ‘people’s beliefs, attitudes, judgements and feelings, as well as the wider cultural values 
and social dispositions people adopt’ (Pidgeon et al., 1992, p. 89). This thesis is interested in how 
people think about the risks posed by sea-level change. Despite the large amount of media and 
policy attention paid to terrorist attacks, economic downturns and other global risks, natural 
disasters still have the greatest potential for disruption (Dezenski, 2012). Sea-level rise has the 
potential to increase the incidence and severity of such disasters. But it is a ‘critical and uncertain 
climate change risk’ (Schaeffer, Hare, Rahmstorf, & Vermeer, 2012), and one of the least 
understood impacts of anthropogenic climate change (ACC) (Hansen & Sato, 2012). 
To understand the risks posed by SLC, it is necessary to first understand climate change, a major 
driver of sea level fluctuations. The climate naturally varies according to the amount of radiation 
emitted from the sun and changes in the Earth’s axis and orbit around the sun (Milankovitch 
Cycles)4. The Earth’s climate also naturally varies according to atmospheric factors (e.g. changes in 
gas concentrations), oceanographic factors (e.g. changes in ocean currents) and terrestrial factors 
(e.g. volcanism, orogeny5 and changes in albedo6) (Burroughs, 2007). As well as these natural 
variations, the Earth’s average temperature is currently undergoing secular change due to human 
activities, principally the emission of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide and methane 
through burning fossil fuels like coal and gas (IPCC, 2007, 2013). As these greenhouse gases build 
up in the atmosphere, they decrease the amount of thermal radiation that can escape into space, 
and raise the temperature of the Earth’s surface and atmosphere. Over the past decades, this 
process has caused global average surface temperatures to increase, especially since about 1950 
(Solomon et al., 2007).  
The rate and extent of future ACC is unknown. However, a mean warming of around 1.3oC above 
pre-industrial levels is estimated from the combustion of fossil fuels by existing infrastructure alone 
between 2010 and 2060 (Davis, Caldeira, & Matthews, 2010), so warming can be expected to 
exceed this as world population and energy use increase. It is now recognised that global 
temperatures may rise by as much as 4oC by 2100 (New, Liverman, & Anderson, 2009; New, 
                                                   
4 Milakovitch cycles are orbital changes that drive ice age cycles: obliquity (Earth’s axial tilt), precession (Earth’s 
wobble on its axis) and eccentricity (shape of Earth’s orbit around the sun). 
5 Orogeny is mountain building 
6 Reflectivity of the Earth’s surface  
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Liverman, Schroder, & Anderson, 2011), and ‘the uncertainty is not whether the world will 
experience climate change but how its impacts will be felt’ (Foresight, 2011, p. 10). While impacts 
remain uncertain, the southwest of the UK is likely to be affected by ACC in a number of ways, 
including sea-level rise.  
2.1.1 Terminology: sea-level rise and sea-level change  
The term ‘sea-level rise’ is used to describe a rise in the average level of the sea at the coast. This 
thesis uses the term ‘sea-level change’ as well as sea-level rise, for three reasons. First, although it 
is considered extremely unlikely that sea-levels will fall on the Severn Estuary in the foreseeable 
future, it remains a possibility; and over very long timescales, a probability. Second, the term sea-
level change was used in all public interviews to prevent leading participants and biasing responses. 
The third reason is related to the processes at work on the Severn Estuary. While sea-level rise 
immediately evokes connotations of gradually rising waters, sea-level change is open to 
interpretation as changes caused by more everyday factors such as tides and waves, and more 
dramatic changes in sea level due to storm surges and tsunamis.  
2.1.2 The causes, rates and impacts of global sea-level change  
The causes, rates and impacts of SLC are considered only briefly here on account of a fuller 
description constituting a large proportion of the expert model (Appendix O). Global sea levels 
have varied by hundreds of metres over geologic time due to land movements, and due to eustatic7 
changes as the amount of water held in the cryosphere8 has waxed and waned. During the last 
glacial maximum around 20,000 years ago, average global sea level was about 130m lower than it is 
at present (Clark et al., 2009). During the Pliocene around three million years ago, when 
atmospheric CO2 concentrations were about the same as today, the sea level is thought to have 
been 15 to 25m higher than present (Raymo, Grant, Horowitz, & Rau, 1996; 2011). 
 ‘Global sea-levels rose 17cm through the twentieth century, and are likely to 
rise more rapidly through the twenty-first century when a rise of more than 1m 
is possible’ (Nicholls, 2011, p. 114).  
 
Sea-level measurements from tide gauges, satellites and proxy data show that global mean sea level 
rose during the 20th century and is continuing to do so (Gehrels et al., 2007; IPCC, 2013; Solomon 
et al., 2007). As the world continues to warm, mean global SLR is inevitable (Nicholls et al., 2011a) 
                                                   
7 Eustatic changes are large scale (global or ocean-level) changes in sea-level. 
8 The cryosphere is the portion of the Earth’s surface where water is frozen, including snow, ice and permafrost. 
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through thermal expansion (changes in water volume due to temperature change )9, glacio-eustacy 
(changes in water volume due to additions from melting land-ice) and changes in atmospheric 
surface pressure and ocean circulation. 
The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) estimated future SLR of between 18cm and 59cm 
by the end of the 21st Century (Solomon et al., 2007). While these estimates have been highly cited, 
other studies -some using semi-empirical models10- show that AR4 projections may have been 
much too low (e.g. Nicholls et al., 2011b; Rahmstorf, Foster, & Cazenave, 2012). For example, 
Nicholls et al. (2011b) suggest that if temperatures rise by around 4oC, sea levels could rise by 
between 0.5m and 2m by 2100. Indeed, the AR4 acknowledged that ‘because understanding of 
some important effects driving sea level rise is too limited, [the report did not] assess the likelihood, 
nor provide a best estimate or an upper bound for sea-level rise’ (IPCC, 2007, p. 45). Most notably, 
AR4 estimates did not include the full effects of changes in ice sheet flow due to a lack of 
understanding of ice sheet dynamics (IPCC, 2007).  
Ice-sheet dynamics have been included in the latest IPCC report (AR5), together with an improved 
physical understanding of sea-level components and increased agreement between process models 
and observations. This has meant that the confidence in global mean sea-level projections has 
increased since the publication of AR4 (IPCC, 2013). Indeed, while the process-model based SLR 
estimates in the AR5 are lower than those produced by semi-empirical models, the AR5 does 
project higher SLR estimates than the AR4 (IPCC, 2013). These projections are for a likely global 
mean SLR11 of between 0.26m (low RCP2.6 estimate12) and 0.98m (high RCP8.5 estimate) by the 
year 2100, relative to the 1986-2005 baseline. In all RCPs, thermal expansion is the largest 
contributor (accounting for 30-55% of SLR), followed by glaciers (15-35%)13 (IPCC, 2013). 
Estimates of future SLR tend to focus on the 21st century (e.g. IPCC, 2007, 2013), but studies that 
do look further ahead project very large rises indeed. For example, Lenton (2006) calculates that 
sea levels will still be rising at the end of this millennium, and that the combined effects of thermal 
expansion and the melt of the Greenland ice-sheet will cause up 11.4m SLR by the year 300014. 
                                                   
9 Thermal expansion (or thermosteric SLC) occurs because as water gets warmer, the molecules spread out causing 
the volume of the water to increase.  
10 Semi-empirical models use historical and present relationships between temperatures and SLR to predict future 
SLR from projections of future warming. This is different to process models, which aim to mathematically represent 
the various processes that contribute to SLR. For a discussion, see Rahmstorf (2007) and Nicholls et al. (2011b).  
11 Estimates shown here are for the 5-95% range of model results.  
12 AR5 uses Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) instead of the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios 
(SRES) scenarios used in AR4. RCPs are identified by their approximate total radiative forcing in the year 2100 
relative to 1750; 2.6 watts per square metre (W m-2) for RCP2.5, 4.5 W m-2 for RCP4.5, 8.5 W m-2 for RCP8.5 and 
so on. 
13 The Greenland ice sheet is expected to make a net positive contribution to SLR, while the Antarctic ice sheet is 
expected to make a net negative contribution (due to increased snowfall on the continent); changes in outflow from 
both ice sheets combined will likely make a contribution to SLR of between 0.03m and 0.20m by 2100 (IPCC, 
2013). 
14 These figures exclude contributions from Antarctica, which could add many more metres.  
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The latest IPCC report also states that beyond 2100, it is virtually certain (99-100% probability) 
that SLR will continue for many centuries (IPCC, 2013). For the RCP2.6 scenario, SLR is not 
expected to exceed 1m above pre-industrial levels by 2300 (IPCC, 2013), but for higher CO2 
concentrations, the rise is expected to be substantially greater; potentially more than 3m by 2300 
for RCP8.5 (IPCC, 2013). AR5 projects that over a millennium or more, sustained warming will 
lead to ‘near-complete loss’ of the Greenland ice sheet, leading to global mean SLR of up to 7m 
(IPCC, 2013, p. 20).   
SLC is expected to have a number of physical and socio-economic impacts. Physical impacts 
include immediate impacts like flooding, submergence and saltwater intrusion into surface water, 
and lagged impacts such as changes in water tables and wetland loss. Socio-economic impacts range 
from inconvenience like not being able to get to work, displacement and property damage, through 
to injury and death. More information about the impacts of SLC and their inter-relationships, as 
well as the factors that affect vulnerability, are provided in the expert model notes (Appendix O). 
2.2 The Severn Estuary, an environment threatened by sea-
level change 
The Severn Estuary is important for many reasons, not least because of its high ecological 
significance (Severn Estuary Coastal Group and ATKINS, 2010d) and being home to around one 
million people (Severn Estuary Partnership, 2011). It is also the site of major industry, transport 
and energy infrastructures, and may in future become a key source of renewable energy (DECC, 
2010). The estuary’s response to SLC is therefore critical for the environment, the people who live 
there, and the people who otherwise depend on it, now and in the future. This section outlines the 
estuary’s physical and social characteristics that make it suitable for particular attention, before 
discussing SLC at this regional scale.  
2.2.1 Physical environment of the Severn Estuary 
An estuary is the lower section of a river where saline sea water is diluted with fresh water 
(Nordstrom, 2009). Estuaries are vitally important ecosystems, with habitats provided by a range 
of features such as sub-tidal mudflats, marshes, creeks and beaches. They are also inherently 
dynamic because they are constantly subject to changes in conditions due to tides, surges, runoff 
and sediment inputs. In one sense, these fluctuating inputs of water, nutrients and material have 
made estuaries resilient: estuarine organisms are highly tolerant to rapid changes in temperature 
and salinity (Nordstrom, 2009), and estuaries have generally maintained their attractiveness for 
wildlife despite extensive industrialisation and land claim (Elliott & McLusky, 2002). However, the 
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complex nature of estuaries may also mean that they are particularly vulnerable to ACC: they are 
likely to be affected through a number of pathways including SLR, altered river flows, shifts in 
storminess, and ecological changes.  
Definitions of the geographical area covered by the Severn Estuary are broad. Gloucester is often 
used as the upper boundary -as it is in this thesis- because it is the limit of tidal influence; but the 
placement of the seaward edge is more variable due to the various ways in which estuary boundaries 
can be defined (Elliott & McLusky, 2002). For example, the Second Shoreline Management Plan 
(SMP2)15 sites the boundary between Lavernock Point (south of Penarth) on the Welsh side and 
Anchor Head (north of Weston-Super-Mare) on the English side (Severn Estuary Coastal Group 
and ATKINS, 2010b), whilst the Severn Estuary Partnership boundary is further west, roughly 
between Llantwit Major on the Welsh side and Minehead on the English side (Severn Estuary 
Partnership, 2009); a delineation that includes part of the inner Bristol Channel. For this thesis, the 
westernmost boundary of the Severn Estuary is taken to be roughly between Hinkley Point 
(Somerset) and Barry (Vale of Glamorgan). This delineation includes the nuclear infrastructure at 
Hinkley, the location of a potential tidal barrage, and the vulnerable low-lying Bridgwater region. 
Hereafter, ‘Severn Estuary’ will refer to this coastline and a 10 mile zone around it (Figure 2). This 
zone is chosen because it includes much of the low-lying plains surrounding the Estuary, including 
important transport infrastructure and settlements, while not being so large as to be perceived as 
irrelevant to interviewees and survey respondents.  
The Severn is Britain’s second largest estuary with an area of 557km2 (IMCORE, 2011). Its classic 
funnel shape, which is unique in Britain, is in part the cause of its famous tidal range: after Canada’s 
Bay of Fundy, it has the second highest tides in the world, with an average mean tidal range of 
6.5m at neaps and 12.3m on springs (Langston, Jonas, & Millward, 2010). Tidal range increases 
further up the estuary, and high spring tides reach as far as Tewkesbury in northern Gloucestershire 
when river flows are low (Environment Agency, 2006). The whole of the Estuary is dominated by 
tidal processes, but fluvial (river) influence becomes appreciable further up (ATKINS, 2009). The 
Estuary has one of the largest catchments in the UK, and the rivers that flow into it (particularly 
the Wye, Avon, Usk and Severn) supply a vast amount of sediment (Severn Estuary Coastal Group 
and ATKINS, 2010c). This sediment is highly mobile (Kirby, 2010), with an estimated 10 million 
tonnes of suspended sediment carried during spring tides (Environment Agency, 2006). Much of 
it is deposited as mudflats, which comprise 93% of the Estuary’s 100km2 intertidal area 
(Environment Agency, 2006).  
                                                   
15 The SMP2 was developed by a partnership of the Environment Agency (EA), local authorities, conservation 
authorities and internal drainage boards around the estuary. It sets out recommended coastal management for the 
Severn Estuary over the next 100 years, split into ‘epochs’ of 20 years, 50 years and 100 years.  
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Figure 2: Map showing the location of the Severn Estuary in the UK, with ten mile zone included in analyses 
 
The Severn Estuary’s intertidal habitats are the first line of defence against coastal flooding. They 
also support considerable biodiversity, and the Estuary contains the largest aggregation of salt 
marsh habitat in the south and south-west (Severn Estuary Partnership, 2011). Such intertidal 
habitats are vulnerable to SLR, particularly through coastal squeeze, a process by which coastal 
environments are trapped between rising sea levels and fixed landward boundaries (Environment 
Agency, 2006). The importance of the Severn Estuary’s ecology and its high conservation value 
have been recognised through a number of designations: the SMP2 study area includes seven 
Natura 2000 sites, over 50 Sites of Special Scientific Interest, four National Nature Reserves and 
one Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (Severn Estuary Coastal Group and ATKINS, 2010c). 
The Estuary’s international importance for wildlife was recognised in 1995 with its declaration as 
a Special Protection Area, and separately as a Ramsar site (an international wetlands designation). 
It was also made a Special Area of Conservation under the European Council Directive 
92/43/EEC on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and of Wild Flora and Fauna (European 
Parliament, 1992).  
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2.2.2 Socio-economic environment of the Severn Estuary 
People have utilised estuaries since prehistoric times because of the flat land, safe harbours, river 
access and valuable resources that they provide, and many of the UK’s largest cities including 
London, Cardiff and Glasgow were founded beside estuaries (HR Wallingford, 1997). The Severn 
Estuary is rich in archaeology and people have been living in the area since before the Estuary was 
formed around 8,000 years ago (Severn Estuary Coastal Group and ATKINS, 2010c). Human 
impact has been appreciable, particularly through the construction of flood embankments, 
industrialisation and the planting of Spartina (cordgrass) (Environment Agency, 2006). Perhaps the 
greatest impact has been from land reclamation, which dates back at least to early Roman times 
(Environment Agency, 2006).  
Today, the Estuary has a mixture of urban and rural land uses, with the main settlements being 
Bristol, Gloucester, Newport and Cardiff. It is also home to significant industrial development 
including chemical processing plants, power stations and ports, which are supported by good 
transport links, cooling water, waste disposal and offshore aggregates for construction (IMCORE, 
2011). The Estuary is also important for recreation and tourism (Knowles & Myatt-Bell, 2001), and 
may in future become a key source of renewable energy (DECC, 2010). The tidal floodplain 
throughout the Estuary is under pressure from future development. Key proposals in or adjacent 
to the SMP2 area include: development of wind farms; regeneration of ports and waterfronts 
including Portishead, Watchet and Weston; a major Bristol Port development; and a new gas fired 
power station at Uskmouth (Severn Estuary Coastal Group and ATKINS, 2010c).  
Governance at the scale of the Severn Estuary is complex. While ACC and SLR do not adhere to 
administrative and political boundaries, the responsibility for reacting to these threats on the 
Estuary will be shared between a number of groups (Dodds, 2010): two Governments 
(Westminster and the Welsh Government), fourteen Local Authorities, two County Councils, a 
range of government agencies, and many landowners. A ‘profusion of legislation and policy’ exists, 
with direct and indirect implications for the Estuary’s environmental management (Ballinger & 
Stojanovic, 2010, p. 144). This includes European directives, national and regional frameworks, 
and local action plans. Of particular note with regards to coastal management are the SMP2 (Severn 
Estuary Coastal Group and ATKINS, 2010e); the Severn Estuary Flood Risk Management Strategy 
(Environment Agency, 2011c), which is currently being updated; Catchment Flood Management 
Plans (Korontzi, 2009); the Coastal Habitat Management Plan (Environment Agency, 2006); and 
flood risk plans under the European Parliament’s Floods Directive 2007/60/EC (European 
Parliament, 2007). Devolutionary processes have greatly impacted the institutional framework for 
climate change risk management. For example Wales has its own environmental body, Cyfoeth 
Naturiol Cymru / Natural Resources Wales, and has developed its own National Strategy for Flood 
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and Coastal Erosion Risk Management (FCERM) (Welsh Government, 2011). See Appendix O 
for more information about Severn Estuary governance.  
2.2.3 Sea-level change on the Severn Estuary  
ACC is already occurring on the Severn Estuary, where winter temperatures have increased by 
between 1.4 and 2.2oC since 1961, and summer temperatures have increased by between 1.0 and 
1.8oC during the same period (Hovey, 2010). ACC is likely to have both positive and negative 
impacts there. Positive impacts may include a boost to tourism as temperatures rise; and a 
lengthening of crop growing seasons leading to enhanced agricultural productivity (Defra, 2012). 
However, these benefits are likely to be outweighed by the negative impacts related to SLC.  
Section 2.1.2 discussed rates of global SLC. Local SLC can vary considerably from the global mean, 
and SLC at the scale of the Severn Estuary is a function of a combination of factors acting on local 
to global scales, and on short and long timescales. These factors include global changes (particularly 
climatically driven global mean SLR); regional changes due to variations in ocean circulation, 
temperature, salinity and atmospheric surface pressure (Lowe et al., 2009; Milne, Gehrels, Hughes, 
& Tamisiea, 2009); and local changes due to storms, rainfall patterns, tidal amplitude variations and 
local land subsidence.  
Records show that the mean sea level on the Estuary is gradually rising (Environment Agency, 
2011b), and has been throughout the Holocene16, with fluctuations superimposed onto this upward 
trend (Environment Agency, 2006). Estimated rates of historical SLR on the Severn Estuary are 
summarised in Table 1. The rates vary due to the dominance of different processes during different 
time periods (SLR was fastest when ice sheets melted at the beginning of the Holocene), and due 
to different methods for estimating SLR. For example, Allen (1991) measured the height difference 
between the shoreward and landward side of historic sea-defences for their pre-1945 estimates, 
and used geochemical methods for their post-1945 estimates. More recent work by Phillips and 
Crisp (2010) used tidal data from gauges in the Bristol Channel.  
 
 
 
 
                                                   
16 The Holocene is the current interglacial period; the geological epoch that began around 11,700 years ago and 
continues today.  
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Period Estimated 
SLR 
Source 
10,000BP – 7,000BP17 14mm/yr or 
11mm/yr 
Hawkings (1971) and 
Shennan (1983) 
respectively, cited by 
Environment Agency 
(2006) 
Minimum average rate of SLR between the Later 
Roman period- Medieval Period (AC238-1327)18 
0.40mm/yr  (Allen, 1991) 
Minimum average rate of SLR between the Medieval 
and Modern periods (1327-1797) 
0.79mm/yr (Allen, 1991) 
Minimum average rate of SLR during the Modern 
period (1797-1945) 
1.49mm/yr (Allen, 1991) 
Minimum average rate of SLR during the period 
1945-1990 
4.65mm/yr19 (Allen, 1991) 
1993-2007 2.4mm/yr (Phillips & Crisp, 2010) 
Table 1: Estimates of historical SLR on the Severn Estuary 
 
It is not possible to precisely predict how sea levels will change in future on the Severn Estuary or 
anywhere else. Not least, the climate system is not perfectly understood or represented in climate 
models, has an element of intrinsic (unforced) variability, and will be forced by future unknown 
greenhouse gas emissions, which are themselves forced by unknown future economic conditions 
and value sets. However, there is consensus in the literature that sea levels on the Estuary will 
continue to rise in future, as shown in Table 2. The Table shows projections from a variety of 
sources including computer modelling (e.g. UK Climate Projections, 2012) and extrapolation from 
current trends (e.g. Phillips & Crisp, 2010). 
  
                                                   
17 BP = years Before Present 
18 AC = Ante Christum, Latin for ‘before Christ’ 
19 Some authors support these rates (e.g. French et al, 1994) while others suggest lower rates (e.g. Rossiter, 1972) or 
can find no evidence of accelerated SLR at all (e.g. Woodworth 1987, 1990)(Environment Agency, 2006).  
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Source Projected SLR rate/level For the 
period: 
Environment Agency 
Severn Estuary Flood Risk 
Management Strategy 
(SEFRMS) 
(Environment Agency, 
2011c). 
The SEFRMS plans for SLR of approximately 1m 
and for an increase in river flows of up to 20%, using 
Defra guidelines (Defra, 2006), which at the time of 
the SEFRMS publication was still the formal Defra 
approved guidance for flood risk management 
planning.  
2010-2110 
Marine Climate Change 
Impacts Partnership 
(MCCIP, 2010).  
21–68cm SLR projected in Cardiff under a medium 
greenhouse gas emission scenario.  
1990 - 2095 
Severn Estuary 2nd 
Shoreline Management 
Plan (Severn Estuary 
Coastal Group and 
ATKINS, 2010b) 
Current allowances for net SLR (mm/yr) in the South West and 
Wales, for draft management policies (after Defra 2006): 
 
1990-2025 2025-2055 2055-2085 2085-2115 
3.5 8.0 11.5 14.5 
 
UK Climate Projections 
(2012) 
Central estimates for relative SLR at Cardiff: 
High emissions scenario:  53.1 cm 
Medium emissions scenario:  44.4 cm 
Low emissions scenario:  37.3 cm  
For 2095  
(1980-1999 
baseline) 
Severn Estuary Coastal 
Habitat Management 
Plan (CHaMP) 
The Severn Estuary CHaMP used Defra’s 
recommended SLR allowance of 6mm/yr, pointing 
out that this ‘probably represents a potential worst 
case’ (Environment Agency, 2006). 
Epochs of 
20, 50 and 
100 years. 
Phillips and Crisp (2010) Extrapolated from tide gauge data (1993-2007) from 
four locations in the region to suggest a 2050 MSL 
rise of 0.37m.  
1993-2050 
Table 2: Estimated future SLR on the Severn Estuary 
 
The plume plots in Table 3 show more detailed estimates over time for Cardiff and Gloucester 
from UK Climate Projections 2009 (UKCP09). The UKCP09 projections are a suite of climate 
projections for the UK, providing climate information designed to help those planning climate 
change adaptation (UK Climate Projections, 2012). They use modelling, past observations, IPCC 
scenarios, and expert judgement together with the UK Met Office’s supercomputers to provide 
probabilistic projections of future SLC.  
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 Cardiff Gloucester 
Low 
emissions  
  
Medium 
emissions  
  
High 
emissions  
  
Table 3: UKCP09 Projections for future SLC on the Severn Estuary 
The graphs show 5, 50 and 95th percentiles of relative SLR projections for Cardiff and Gloucester under 
low (IPCC SRES: B1), medium (IPCC SRES: A1B) and high emissions (IPCC SRES: A1FI) scenarios20, relative to 
1990 levels. Source: UKCP09 (UK Climate Projections, 2012) 
 
Extremely high sea levels are usually the product of a combination of factors, such as a storm surge 
at a high tide. Mean SLR increases the likelihood of these extreme levels by raising the baseline 
level of the water; meaning a high tide or surge reaches higher than if the mean sea level was not 
rising. Extreme events have caused significant inundation to the area in the past (e.g. Horsburgh 
& Horritt, 2006), and will continue to do so in future, potentially reaching higher elevations due to 
raised mean sea levels. Future trends in some of these events, such as extreme tides, can be 
predicted with confidence. Others, such as the frequency and magnitude of storms, cannot, and 
there is currently debate over how these events may change in future (Christensen et al., 2007; 
Jenkins et al., 2009; UK Climate Projections, 2010; Woolf & Wolf, 2010). However, unless these 
events decrease in magnitude or frequency, the established SLR trend alone will mean that extreme 
                                                   
20 These IPCC (AR4) scenarios can be summarised as follows. IPCC SRES: B1 = global population peaks mid-21st 
century then declines, clean and resource-efficient technologies are introduced. IPCC SRES: A1B = rapid economic 
growth, global population peaks mid-21st century then declines, a balance across all energy sources (fossil and non-
fossil fuels). IPCC SRES: A1FI = rapid economic growth, global population peaks mid-21st century then declines, 
fossil fuel intensive (IPCC, 2000).  
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high waters will become more frequent in the coming decades. It is important to understand how 
people perceive these risks so that their perceptions can be taken into account when responding 
to them. 
2.3 Understanding public perceptions of sea-level change on 
the Estuary  
2.3.1 The role of public perceptions in risk management 
Some commentators argue that risk perceptions should not be included in policy decisions. Their 
argument is based on the idea that public perceptions, which are not always based on scientific 
understanding, introduce bias and noise into the system, are prejudiced, and ultimately may lead to 
the loss of lives and resources (see Pidgeon & Beattie, 1998 for a review of these arguments). 
Others, including in coastal management arenas21, have a more positive view of the role that public 
perceptions play. Fiorino (1990) suggests that there are at least three reasons why risk perceptions 
should be included in decision making. These are normative, substantive and instrumental:   
 Normative: ignoring lay perspectives is incompatible with democratic ideals, and ‘citizens 
are the best judge of their own interests’ (Fiorino, 1990, p. 227).  
 Substantive: lay risk judgments are as sound (or more so) than expert risk judgments 
(Fiorino, 1990). Non-experts can see problems that experts miss, and local knowledge can 
add an important layer to risk understandings. ‘Far from being ‘information poor’ - groups 
of citizens actually have access to a range of cultural resources’ (Irwin, Dale, & Smith, 
1996, p. 49), possessing local knowledge that can valuably contribute to policy making and 
debate (Irwin, Simmons, & Walker, 1999). 
 Instrumental: effective lay participation increases legitimacy, leads to better decision 
making, incorporates a broader range of values, and can reduce the probability of error 
(Fiorino, 1990).  
One important instrumental role for public perceptions is to help shape future risk  
communications: without feedback from the target audience, scientists do not know how their 
well-intended communications are being received and understood by the public (Pidgeon & 
Fischhoff, 2011). This ‘strategic listening’ (Pidgeon & Fischhoff, 2011) is the purpose of the mental 
models approach (Morgan et al., 2002) adopted for this thesis (section 2.4.1). It aims to investigate 
                                                   
21Public participation is a key principle of Integrated Coastal Zone Management as set out in European Council 
Recommendation 2002/413/EC (European Parliament, 2002).  
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public perceptions so that future risk communications can be improved. But why communicate 
these risks? 
2.3.2 The role of communicating sea-level change risks 
Risk communication is the act of conveying information between people about levels of risk, the 
significance of risks or management decisions about risks (Renn & Levine, 1991citing Covello et 
al, 1986). The purposes of risk communication can include the following:  
 
1. Ethical reasons for informing people of the risks that they may face: the ‘right-to-
know’ function (Renn & Levine, 1991).  
2. Allowing people to identify risks that are large enough to warrant some of their limited 
time and attention (Morgan et al., 2002). 
3. Facilitation and motivation of deliberation and participation, for instance the 
facilitation of informed voting choices, or the ‘buy-in’ or opting out of risk amelioration 
measures such as coastal defence schemes (e.g. Evans, Milfont, & Lawrence, 2012; 
Ryan et al., 2012).  
 
The purpose of this project is to facilitate effective communication of sea-level rise risks to enable 
lay people to engage with SLC and make informed decisions. Although some decisions about SLC 
risks are made centrally (for example decisions regarding coastal defence budgets), individuals must 
make their own decisions as to whether to install a flood board, move to higher ground, support 
local flood management plans and so on. The IPCC (2012) argues that such risk communication 
is a ‘no-regrets’ measure, meaning that it provides benefits under current climate, and also under a 
range of future climate change scenarios.  
Research shows that a lack of communication can lead to low engagement and/or increased 
vulnerability. For instance, insufficient risk communications have been linked with poor 
perceptions of flood hazards in Norway (Krasovskaia, Gottschalk, Sælthun, & Berg, 2001); while 
in the UK, low awareness of climate change risks in coastal communities may be increasing 
vulnerability because people are less likely to take adaptive actions like retrofitting their homes or 
obtaining insurance (Fernandez-Bilbao, 2012). Communicating risks, however, is not a panacea. 
First, the public may have justified reasons for inaction; reasons that will hold whether they learn 
more about the risks or not. For instance, they may perceive the risk to be irrelevant for them 
(indeed, it might be), or may have a different value set to the one implied by the risk 
communications. Second, communication raises the possibility of introducing area-based stigma 
by drawing attention to risks (e.g. Gregory & Satterfield, 2002). Fischhoff (2001, p. 361) defines 
stigma as the ‘principled refusal to engage in an act that would otherwise be acceptable’; i.e. 
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something that is stigmatised is ‘just not done’. Stigma can lead to blight, whereby an area loses its 
appeal due to economic downturns, disinvestment and out-migration. It can be lessened by 
reducing the perceived risk (antithetical to the communication aim of raising awareness of it) or 
reducing the social amplification of stigma by educating the media and the government about the issue 
(Kunreuther & Slovic, 2001).  
2.3.3 What we already know about public perceptions of sea-level change on 
the Severn Estuary  
There has been little detailed research to date on public perceptions of SLC, and no published 
research to my knowledge has investigated SLC perceptions on the Severn Estuary in particular. 
So far, most relevant research has treated SLC as just one of the many aspects of climate change 
(e.g. Bostrom et al., 1994; Read, Bostrom, Morgan, Fischhoff, & Smuts, 1994; Reynolds et al., 
2010), without investigating SLC in its own right. Studies that have particularly focussed on SLC 
have tended to rely heavily on survey approaches (Evans et al., 2012; Ryan et al., 2012). Few have 
used in-depth interviews (Harvatt, Petts, & Chilvers, 2011), and none to my knowledge has used a 
mental models approach. Indeed, as shown in section 2.6, much of what we know about SLC 
perceptions comes from our understanding of climate change perceptions more generally.  
What we do know is that SLR is one of the more commonly discussed consequences of climate 
change among the public, media and policy makers (Rick, Boykoff, & Pielke Jr, 2011), and tends 
to be associated with negative affect22, (Lorenzoni, Leiserowitz, De Franca Doria, Poortinga, & 
Pidgeon, 2006). The European public is more concerned about marine issues not directly related 
to climate change, for example pollution, over fishing and habitat destruction (CLAMER, 2011b), 
and research suggests that in general, the UK public has a low awareness of SLR (Fernandez-
Bilbao, 2012)23. On the Severn Estuary, there is recognition amongst lay Estuary users (fishermen 
and wetlands visitors) that climate change is occurring (Gregory, 2012; Sterenfeld, 2012), and 
research indicates some acceptance of sea-level rise and the need for adaptation among 
stakeholders (Severn Estuary Coastal Group and ATKINS, 2010a). In unpublished survey results 
(N=100) from an undergraduate Earth Science project at Cardiff University (2012) 61% of local 
lay people thought that SLR was associated with climate change in the Severn Estuary region. 
However, apart from this research indicating a basic awareness of SLC, little is known about public 
perceptions of the issue. It is this gap in risk perception research that this thesis aims to fill.  
                                                   
22 ‘Affect’ is the feeling that something is good or bad.  
23 However, Tol, Klein, and Nicholls (2009) suggest that compared to other European nations, knowledge of SLR 
and its consequences are widespread in the UK. 
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2.4 Addressing the gap: investigating public perceptions of sea-
level change on the Severn Estuary 
2.4.1 The mental models approach 
This study uses a mental models approach to investigate public perceptions of SLC on the Severn 
Estuary. The mental models approach is based on the ‘foundational assumption of behavioural 
decision theory that an individual’s beliefs influence his or her decisions, which influence 
behaviours’ (Austin & Fischhoff, 2011, p. 2). Its core premise is that for communications to be 
effective in changing behaviour, communicators must know what people already think of the 
issues, so that communications can be framed in ways that encourage people to integrate the new 
information into their beliefs rather than ignore or reinterpret it (Harris, Daniels, & Briner, 2002). 
The mental models approach to risk communication developed by Morgan et al. (2002) built on 
earlier work (e.g. Maharik & Fischhoff, 1993) to do this systematically, by finding out about the 
audience’s mental models of a risk before communications are designed.  
‘Mental models are personal, internal representations of external reality that 
people use to interact with the world around them. They are constructed by 
individuals based on their unique life experiences, perceptions, and 
understandings of the world’ (Jones, Ross, Lynam, Perez, & Leitch, 2011, p. 
46).  
 
Mental models can be described as knowledge structures that people use to reason and make 
decisions. Such knowledge structures have been portrayed in a number of ways including schemas, 
scripts and frames (Breakwell, 2007, p. 94). The idea of schemata was first proposed by Immanuel 
Kant in the 1780s (Kant, 1996) and perhaps most famously developed by constructivist24 
psychologist Piaget to describe the ways in which children understand the world (Boyle, 1969). A 
variant on this general idea, the mental model was first suggested by psychologist Kenneth Craik, 
who proposed that people carry a small scale model of how the real world works in their head 
(Craik, 1943). While mental models are unique to individuals, research suggests that people who 
share common experiences and cultural backgrounds can share convergent mental models (Denzau 
& North, 1994). Experts are a prime example, with expert knowledge ‘founded upon shared 
understandings of ‘established’ facts and theories’ (Breakwell, 2007, p. 98). Mental models are 
important because ‘the decisions that people make about a hazard will at least in part depend on 
what ‘mental model’ they have of it’ (Breakwell, 2007, p. 93).  
                                                   
24 Constructivism asserts than perceptions, memories and so on are actively built and assembled by the mind, rather 
than being passively acquired (Colman, 2009).  
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Mental models and learning 
When faced with new information, we can ignore it, interpret it using our existing mental model, 
or (more rarely) change our model to accommodate it. We are undergoing cognitive change, or 
learning. Piaget suggested that schemas were created by a dual process of assimilation, by which 
new information is added to the schema; and accommodation, by which the schema changes to 
allow for this assimilation (Boyle, 1969). If new information is not assimilated into the model, but 
instead stored in relative isolation, it is less likely to influence thought and behaviour (Kearney & 
Kaplan, 1997). These cognitive changes can occur in a second or over many days and can be caused 
by intrinsic causes such as emotions, or extrinsic causes (Johnson-Laird, 2013) such as a new 
experience or an effective risk communications campaign. 
Mental models and the construction of preferences  
‘decision making is a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive 
to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and 
numerous other contextual factors’ - (Slovic, 1995, p. 369) 
 
Sometimes when people are asked for their opinion, they do not already have one. Research shows 
that rather than answering ‘don’t know’, individuals often form an opinion there and then 
(Schuman & Kalton, 1985), constructing what has been termed a ‘pseudo-attitude’ (Terpstra, 
Lindell, & Gutteling, 2009). The attitude is not necessarily unreal, but it has been quickly 
constructed. It may have been constructed based on other factors such as norms, analogies, values, 
or cues in the questions themselves (Slovic, 1995). Alternatively, it may draw on information in the 
individual’s existing mental model, or from a model of issues that are perceived to be similar (Jones 
et al., 2011). For example, we might use a mental model of water flow to think about an electrical 
current (Jones et al., 2011). In the context of climate change, this often manifests in people drawing 
on their understanding of other environmental problems, particularly pollution and ozone 
depletion (Kempton, 1997).  
The mental model that an individual uses when someone shouts “tsunami, run!” and the model 
that they use when someone says “I’d like you to think about the things that might make the Severn 
Estuary more or less vulnerable to SLC” are probably quite different. Of course they evoke 
different feelings, but they also allow for different levels of reflection: one must be very quick, 
while the other can be slower. Different decisions also require different degrees of deliberation: the 
decision of whether to sell your flood-prone house may require more deliberation than the decision 
of whether to run away from a large wave. The degree to which we think about things before we 
make a decision, and the means by which we make these decisions have been described in terms 
of bottom up and top-down information processing (van der Pligt, de Vries, Manstead, & van 
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Harreveld, 2000), and systems one and systems two processing (Kahneman, 2002). In top-down 
or systems one processing, thoughts are automatic and intuitive; the result of no conscious effort. 
In bottom up or systems two-processing, thoughts are deliberate and effortful. There is a gradation 
between the two, with attitude formation lying between these extremes of automatic processes and 
full cost-benefit-analyses (van der Pligt et al., 2000). van der Pligt et al. (2000) suggest that the type 
of processing that we use is different according to the attributes of the decisions being made. 
Processing is only completely automatic when the individual is confronted with very familiar, trivial 
and unimportant choices (van der Pligt et al., 2000); a situation unlikely to be the case with a 
complex subject such as SLC. Instead, an individual would rely more on bottom up processing, 
combining their beliefs to form an overall attitude judgement (van der Pligt et al., 2000). The degree 
of deliberation will depend on the accessibility of the ‘mental contents’, that is, the ease at which they 
come to mind (Kahneman, 2002), and is also likely to depend on the time available for deliberation.  
Mental models and risk communication 
 ‘If people lack detailed knowledge of global climate change, how do they form 
their opinions on this issue?’ (Kempton, 1997, p. 14).  
 
‘It is all too easy for policy-makers and science-based institutions to communicate 
to stakeholders and publics and miss their targets because of an inadequate 
awareness of how those audiences are comprehending, interpreting or rejecting 
those communications.’ - (Campbell, 2011, p. 4892). 
 
 
In the 1990s, the British government launched a communications campaign to raise awareness of 
climate change. Despite best intentions, it failed to significantly change the public’s understanding 
of the issue, with 21% still believing climate change would destroy the ozone layer (Kempton, 
1997). This was because ‘the program was not designed to replace existing cultural models, which 
have a strong tendency to persist’ (Kempton, 1997, p. 19). The mental models approach addresses 
this problem by making audiences’ mental models key in the development of such 
communications. The approach developed by Morgan et al. (2002) follows five steps:  
1. Create an expert model of the risks to enable a comparison of lay perceptions with a current 
‘best understanding’.  
2. Conduct mental models interviews with members of the public. These open-ended interviews 
are designed to explore peoples’ correct and incorrect beliefs about a risk, in their own words. 
Responses are analysed in terms of how they correspond with the expert model.  
3. Conduct a questionnaire to estimate the prevalence of beliefs expressed in stage 2. 
4. Draft risk communications using the results of steps 2 and 3.  
5. Evaluate the communication, testing and refining it with members of the target audience.  
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This study follows steps 1-3 of this approach. Due to time constraints, it does not develop and test 
risk communications (steps 4 and 5), but does make recommendations for these (Chapter 9). 
Although the broad methodology has been followed closely, some modifications have been made. 
These include the addition of a probability elicitation phase during step one, a modified protocol 
for creating public cognitive maps, and an in-depth analysis of contextual factors such as emotions 
and worldviews (see section 2.5).  
The mental models approach has been used to successfully explore climate change perceptions 
(Bostrom et al., 1994; Lowe & Lorenzoni, 2007) as well as perceptions of other risks such as 
electromagnetic fields (Cox et al., 2005), HIV/AIDS (Morgan et al., 2002) and chemical risks (Cox 
et al., 2003). Studies have shown that mental models approaches improve participants’ 
understanding when measured soon after communication materials are studied by the audience 
(Morgan et al., 2002). It is however difficult to assess the outcomes of mental models 
communications (Austin & Fischhoff, 2011), particularly if there is a long time-lag between 
communications and decisions, or between decisions and outcomes.  
2.4.2 Limitations and criticisms of the mental models approach  
Some critics have argued that people do not reason with mental models (or solely with mental 
models) but use other means of reasoning (O'Brien, Braine, & Yang, 1994; Oberauer, 2006). 
However, the mental models theory has been shown to provide a good fit for data sets representing 
reasoning processes (Oberauer, 2006), and provides a coherent conceptual framework for eliciting 
public opinions. Having said this, some limitations and criticisms of the mental models approach 
remain. These are: researcher influence, an assumption of an expert model of ‘truth’, and an 
emphasis on the knowledge deficit model of risk perceptions. These are now discussed. 
Researcher influence  
The researcher is not a passive arbiter in any stage of the research process; instead, each stage is a 
co-construction between the researcher and the researched. First, the influence diagram used to 
summarise the expert model inevitably bears some imprint of the researchers who produce it (Lowe 
& Lorenzoni, 2007). Second, a person’s mental model is not extracted from their head and laid 
neatly on the page, and the ways in which models are elicited, recorded and analysed can all bias 
research outcomes. In this thesis, reflexive accounts of each stage (sections 3.4 and 5.2.3) help to 
recognise such issues.  
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An expert model of truth? 
‘Science does not monopolise social rationality’ (Stirling, 2011, p. 305). 
‘Science informs, not defines’ (Wynne, 2011, p. 305) 
 
The terms ‘misunderstandings’ (Cox et al., 2003), ‘misinterpretations’ (Cox et al., 2005) 
‘misconceptions’ (Morgan et al., 2002), ‘misperceptions’ (Austin & Fischhoff, 2011; Lata & Nunn, 
2011) and ‘incorrect beliefs’ (Morgan et al., 2002; Read et al., 1994; Reynolds et al., 2010) are 
common in mental models literature. Such terms imply that the expert model is correct or true, 
while the public model is not; and this is not necessarily the case. Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) show us that science is not rational, instrumental and self-contained, but is instead socially 
constructed; ‘essentially and irredeemably human’, affected by social, political and cultural values 
(Edge, 1995, p. 5). What then, is scientific truth? Kuhn stated that there is not one truth; amongst 
scientists, experts or members of the public (Kuhn, 1962). We cannot know truth when theories 
cannot be proved to be true but can only be falsified (Popper, 1963).  
So while experts may have formal, scientific understanding, they are not the arbiters of truth. 
Indeed, local and lay knowledges ‘may well represent a more robust and well-tested body of advice, 
information, and practical assistance than any new or externally generated piece of technical 
evidence’ (Irwin et al., 1996, p. 55). Therefore, throughout the reading of this thesis, it should be 
remembered that public views are being compared with expert views by way of a ‘tool’ for 
exploring differences in risk perceptions. This does not imply that lay views are wrong; simply that 
they are different. For this reason, the thesis tends to use the term ‘differences’ or ‘EP differences’25 
rather than ‘incorrect beliefs’ or ‘misconceptions’. Where these latter terms are used, they are done 
so for brevity and consistency with mental models literature, and should not be taken to mean that 
such beliefs are inferior to the expert model.  
A knowledge deficit?  
The mental models approach to risk communication focuses on finding out what information the 
public requires (Morgan et al., 2002). It therefore tends to focus on knowledge aspects of risk 
perception. Indeed, knowledge has been shown to be a ‘key determinant of behavioural intentions’ 
towards climate change action (Bord, O'Connor, & Fisher, 2000), and lack of knowledge has been 
cited as a barrier towards personal engagement (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). However, a common 
criticism of the mental models approach is that it rests too heavily on the knowledge deficit model 
of risk understanding and communication. This model essentially says that the public knows too 
                                                   
25 EP differences is used as an abbreviation for ‘Expert/Public differences’, to mean the differences between the 
expert model of SLC and lay perceptions of SLC.  
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little in order to act appropriately; misconceptions lead to inappropriate responses, and thus the 
public needs to be educated in order to respond appropriately (Kempton, 1997).  
Critics of the knowledge deficit model point out that perceptions are determined by a great many 
factors in addition to a person’s knowledge of a risk (Baumann & Sims, 1978; Kahan et al., 2012). 
This idea is not new; Kates (1971) suggested that residents of hazardous areas have a ‘hazard 
perception threshold’, below which no action is taken; thresholds that are unique to individuals 
and vary according to factors such as the individual’s personality and previous experience (Kates, 
1971, p. 441). Indeed, the definition of risk perception provided by Pidgeon et al. (1992, p. 89) 
includes ‘people’s beliefs, attitudes, judgements and feelings, as well as the wider cultural values 
and social dispositions people adopt’. Information is interpreted in relation to such prior beliefs 
and cultural values (Kahan, Jenkins‐Smith, & Braman, 2011), and so ‘communicators must attend 
to the cultural meaning as well as the scientific content of information’ (Kahan et al., 2011, p. 23). 
Pidgeon and Fischhoff (2011) stress that communications should therefore respect audiences’ 
values and feelings, not only listening to the ‘facts’ that people know, but to other contextual factors 
as well. Accordingly this thesis adopts an interpretive approach to risk perceptions, which seeks to 
both retain a focus upon knowledge (Sturgis & Allum, 2004), alongside an investigation of feelings, 
concerns and other factors.  
2.5 An interpretive approach to risk perceptions 
During the last few decades, a number of frameworks have developed to explore risk perceptions. 
The psychometric paradigm (e.g. Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978) was 
developed in the 1970s to use psychometric scaling methods to quantify and rate qualitative 
characteristics of risk perceptions such as control, dread and knowledge. Soon after, Douglas and 
Wildavsky’s (1983) Cultural Theory of risk paved the way for the inclusion of more social and 
cultural factors in risk perception, such as blame. These factors are now recognised as essential: 
after all, we do not exist in a vacuum, and are influenced by a plethora of social networks and 
norms. A more recent suggested extension to cultural theory is the cultural cognition of risk, 
which draws on both cultural theory and the psychometric paradigm to describe how people form 
perceptions of risk that are coherent with their self-defining values (Kahan, Slovic, Braman, & 
Gastil, 2006). In this framework, the psychometric paradigm ‘furnishes an account of the individual 
level mechanisms [such as heuristics26] through which cultural values shape risk perceptions’ (Kahan 
et al., 2011, p. 2). The Social amplification of risk framework also attempts to unify the 
psychometric and cultural theories of risk (Pidgeon & Beattie, 1998) by linking ‘systematically the 
                                                   
26 Heuristics are cognitive aids or mental shortcuts, used to form judgments and make decisions.  
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technical assessment27 of risk with psychological, sociological, and cultural perspectives of risk 
perception and risk-related behaviour’ (Kasperson et al., 1988, p. 177). It examines how more 
‘objective’ risk characteristics such as number of deaths can be amplified or dampened through social 
and psychological processes and interactions between actors. Finally, a later development in risk 
research has seen an ‘increased awareness of and interest in more interpretative qualities of risk 
perceptions as grounded in context’ (Pidgeon, Simmons, & Henwood, 2006, p. 96). This 
interpretative approach places a greater emphasis on qualitative methods, which are better able 
to ‘capture the complexity of risk perceptions in specific hazard locations’ (Pidgeon et al., 2006, p. 
103). As such, interpretative approaches might incorporate such concepts as place identity (e.g. 
Bickerstaff, Simmons, & Pidgeon, 2006b) and biography (e.g. Parkhill, Pidgeon, Henwood, 
Simmons, & Venables, 2010).  
As discussed above, mental models studies have traditionally focussed on knowledge rather than 
on these contextual factors (Bostrom et al., 1994; Morgan et al., 2002; Read et al., 1994). However, 
some mental model studies have begun to investigate such contextual factors in addition to 
knowledge. Cox et al. (2003) used a grounded theory28 approach for their analysis of chemical 
users’ interview transcripts, which raised issues of concern, experience and personal barriers to 
using protective measures. Their ‘expanded mental models approach’ allowed the research team to 
capture more of the ‘considerable complexities and contextual richness in user representations and 
understandings’ (Cox et al., 2003, p. 322). In a later study, Cox et al. (2005) also investigate 
contextual factors, discussing concern, affect and acceptability in their mental models studies of 
public perceptions of electromagnetic fields. This thesis also adopts such an interpretative 
approach to investigate contextual factors, in parallel with the more traditional knowledge-based 
mental models approach developed by Morgan et al. (2002).  
Like in Cox et al’s (2003) study, the interpretative approach used here is facilitated by a grounded 
analysis of the mental models data. Such an analysis was not however the initial aim of the study. 
It was during EPP transcription that it was decided that contextual factors should be investigated, 
due to themes such as optimism emerging from the data. These factors are discussed under three 
main headings: orienting dispositions, risk appraisals and responses, drawing on a variety of 
frameworks (particularly Bubeck, Botzen, & Aerts, 2012; Dake, 1991; Grothmann & Reusswig, 
2006; Rogers, 1975). First, orienting dispositions include an individual’s sources of information 
and personality characteristics, which may influence their appraisal of a risk. Second, this risk 
appraisal can be conceptualised as having two components: an appraisal of the threat itself (‘threat 
appraisal’), and an appraisal of the individual’s ability to cope with the threat (‘coping appraisal’). 
                                                   
27 The technical assessment of risk focuses on the probability of events and the magnitude of consequences 
(Kasperson et al., 1988).  
28 In grounded theory, the theory is generated by the data, approaching the research without any strong prior theory 
(Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992).  
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Third, their responses to a risk may be active (such as installing a flood board or buying home 
insurance) or inactive (such as avoiding the issue). 
Although themes are broadly categorised into these three categories, in reality they interact and do 
not stand alone. For example, while the psychological distancing29 of risks could be described as 
an orienting disposition whereby individuals who think about a risk as psychologically distant may 
be less likely to engage with possible solutions (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006), it could also be 
described as a non-active response, ‘a manifestation of a personal denial about direct effects’ 
(Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006, p. 82). Scepticism and uncertainty, which are also here categorised as 
personality variables (orienting dispositions), could equally be described as inactive responses, for 
example where individuals fall into a maladaptive ‘uncertainty trap’, claiming that they “don’t yet 
know enough to act” (Moser, 2007, p. 67).  
The next section expands upon each of the factors discussed in the thesis, drawing on relevant risk 
perception literature. To reiterate, these factors emerged from a thematic analyses of public and 
expert interviews, so the following review does not attempt to cover all aspects that may influence 
risk perceptions. Instead it provides a theoretical background for the data analyses. As discussed 
in section 2.3.3, literature on public perceptions of SLC is sparse. Therefore, the following review 
draws on literature from both SLC perceptions in particular and climate change perceptions more 
generally.   
2.6 Factors included in the analysis of public perceptions 
2.6.1 Orienting dispositions 
Orienting dispositions are those factors that may ‘predispose’ an individual to make particular 
choices and decisions. They include sources of information, personality variables30 and 
demographic factors such as age and gender. Each is discussed here.  
Sources of information  
Formal education  
British school children are introduced to a range of scientific disciplines, and the ways in which 
teachers present scientific information has been suggested to affect confidence in science as a 
                                                   
29 Psychological distance describes the perceived remoteness of things. Something is psychologically distant if it is 
far into the future or past, in a distant place, refers to experiences of others, or is unlikely (Liberman & Trope, 2008). 
30 Personality can be defined as ‘the sum total of the behavioural and mental characteristics that are distinctive of an 
individual’ (Colman, 2009, p. 565).  
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whole (Oulton, Dillon, & Grace, 2004). However, a higher level of education does not necessarily 
mean higher scientific literacy (Hargreaves, Lewis, & Speers, 2003). This may be because our time 
exposed to science at school is small compared to our time exposed to science elsewhere (Falk & 
Dierking, 2010)31 such as through media, friends, museums and walks in the park. It is therefore 
important to consider how such other information sources may influence risk perceptions, as 
discussed below.  
Media  
People receive information about climate change and SLC through a variety of media, including 
television, newspapers and online sources. TV is among the most common sources of scientific 
information in the UK (Hargreaves et al., 2003), and is also one of the most trusted:  TV 
(particularly the BBC) is rated as more trusted than newspapers or the internet in Europe 
(CLAMER, 2011a) and the UK (Hargreaves et al., 2003). Some research shows that although 
people tend to say they distrust media per se, they tend to trust the media that they do use 
(Hargreaves et al., 2003). However, they do not passively absorb and blindly trust whatever they 
read (e.g. Butler & Pidgeon, 2009). While media tend to focus on flooding and SLC generally rather 
than in relation to specific areas of the UK (Harvatt et al., 2011), journalists in prominent UK 
newspapers do tend to accurately portray SLR projections (Rick et al., 2011).  
Science  
A whole body of research has developed to investigate the character and situation of knowledge 
amongst experts and lay publics, and it is recognised that ‘the public understanding of science 
represents an interactive process between lay people and technical experts rather than a narrowly 
didactic or one-way transmission of information packages’ (Wynne, 1991, p. 114). For example, 
studies show that members of the public often see science as an inaccessible ‘other’ possessing 
‘unique powers’ (Bickerstaff, Lorenzoni, Pidgeon, Poortinga, & Simmons, 2008; Bickerstaff, 
Simmons, & Pidgeon, 2006a; Michael, 1992). In Michael’s account, the public address science as 
‘an abstract entity or principle’ (p313) and differentiate themselves from it, being ‘not mentally 
equipped to comprehend science’ (Michael, 1992, p. 318). But the public also challenge expert 
authority, for example by undermining theoretical knowledge by common sense (McKechnie, 
1996). Research shows that despite this complex relationship, scientists tend to be among the most 
highly trusted sources of information (CLAMER, 2011b; Ding, Maibach, Zhao, Roser-Renouf, & 
Leiserowitz, 2011; Hargreaves et al., 2003; Whitmarsh, Kean, Peacock, Russell, & Haste, 2005). 
However, in 2012, one third (34%) of UK respondents disagreed with the statement that ‘climate 
                                                   
31 This paper refers to work carried out in the USA. However, their calculations are broadly in line with the contact 
UK school pupils also receive.  
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scientists can be trusted to tell us the truth about climate change’ (Shuckburgh, Robison, & 
Pidgeon, 2012).  
Experience: direct and vicarious 
“Who are you going to believe? Me or your own eyes?” – Chico Marx in 
1933 film ‘Duck Soup’ 
 
We live in a culture where ‘seeing is believing’ is an ‘axiom of common sense’ (Irwin et al., 1999, 
p. 1315). Weber (2010) suggests that learning about climate change from personal (direct) 
experience is difficult because observations are spaced in time and memory of past events can be 
faulty. However, research indicates that experiences of specific local risks such as flooding are 
influential in determining perceptions of these risks (Baumann & Sims, 1978; Harvatt et al., 2011; 
Siegrist & Gutscher, 2006; Spence, Poortinga, Butler, & Pidgeon, 2011; Wagner, 2007). Personal 
observation is the most trusted source of information on the causes of flooding (Whitmarsh, 2008), 
and mental models of flash flooding risks have been shown to be founded on personal experience, 
consisting largely of observations (Wagner, 2007). Visibility is key and ‘the more visible an 
influencing factor, the better it is understood’ (Wagner, 2007, p. 679). 
Local knowledge is important in the public understanding of global environmental issues as well 
as local ones (Bulkeley, 2000). However, the experience of local flood risks on the perception of 
more global risks such as climate change are more mixed: for instance Whitmarsh (2008) found 
that flood victims’ understanding of and responses to climate change differs very little from those 
of other people; while Spence et al. (2011) found that people reporting experience of flooding tend 
to express more concern over climate change. Similarly, in qualitative interviews with residents in 
four UK locations, Zsamboky, Fernández-Bilbao, Smith, Knight, and Allan (2011) found that there 
were higher levels of awareness of climate change by residents of areas in which flooding had 
occurred.  
The link between direct experience and risk perception has been explained by way of the availability 
heuristic and the Precaution Adoption Process Model. The availability heuristic (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973), postulates that people make judgements about the probability of events by how 
easily they think of examples. Here, experience is relevant because if an individual has experienced 
a risk they are likely to think it is more probable, because they think of examples more readily. The 
Precaution Adoption Process Model asserts that health-protective behaviours are enacted after an 
individual has progressed through a series of stages, from being ‘unaware’ of the risk, through 
‘uninvolved’, ‘undecided’, ‘decided to act’ (or not), ‘acting’ and ‘maintaining action’ (Weinstein, 
Sandman, & Blalock, 2008). In this model, personal experience of a hazard is likely to determine 
progress between stage two (unengaged) and stage three (undecided) (Weinstein et al., 2008).  
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Individuals can also gain experience vicariously, for example through learning from informal 
sources of information such as friends, family and the community. ‘In the absence of personal 
familiarity people might draw on second hand experience’ (Marx et al., 2007, p. 54); and such 
vicarious experience has been shown to affect climate change risk perceptions, at least in the short 
term (Lowe et al., 2006). Research shows that the amount of information gained through such 
sources can vary across age groups; while 32% of 18-24 year olds get information about marine 
climate change issues from friends and family, only 14% of individuals aged 65+ get information 
from these sources (CLAMER, 2011a).  
Personality variables  
Concern  
In a recent survey of the Welsh public, 36% of respondents were very concerned about climate 
change, 48% were fairly concerned, 9% were not very concerned and 7% were not at all concerned 
(Capstick, Pidgeon, & Whitehead, 2013). In relation to SLC in particular, 70% of European 
respondents report being concerned about SLR (CLAMER, 2011a), with such concerns ranking 
high compared to other marine climate change issues (CLAMER, 2011b). In the USA, 70% of 
survey respondents said they would be bothered a great deal if sea levels rose 20 feet, flooding 
coastal areas (Hamilton, 2008)32.  
Despite widespread self-reported concern about climate change issues among European and USA 
publics, climate change ranks low relative to other concerns, and is a psychologically distant risk 
(Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Pidgeon, 2012; Wolf & Moser, 2011). It particularly receives low 
priority compared to day-to-day issues like personal economic security (Lorenzoni et al., 2007; 
Zsamboky et al., 2011). Concern about climate change decreased between 2006 and 2010 (Pidgeon, 
2012), a decline that could be attributed to a number of factors. First, there may be a ‘finite pool 
of worry’ (Weber, 2006), where we can only worry about so many things at once; if a new concern 
enters our consciousness, others may be perceived as less of a worry. Second, concern may decline 
as a result of individuals getting fatigued or simply bored with climate change (Kerr, 2009). Third, 
individuals may be ambivalent, holding coexisting opposing attitudes, opinions or feelings33. 
Indeed, qualitative studies of survey responses show that ‘just because an individual explains they 
do not personally worry about global warming does not mean that they think there is nothing to 
worry about” (Carolan, 2010, p. 316). Such ambivalence can be due to avoiding the issue, holding 
fluid or unstable attitudes, changes in opinion over time, and the wording or interpretation of 
                                                   
32 Note that the framing of SLR as causing flooding in coastal areas is likely to have inflated this response. 
33 This is the dictionary definition of ambivalence; not its common usage as meaning indifference.  
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questions (Carolan, 2010). Distrust and politicisation of the issue may also be factors (Pidgeon, 
2012).  
Uncertainty and Scepticism  
‘Nobody likes uncertainty’ (Sandman & Lanard, 2011), which is unsurprising, particularly in the 
context of SLC where uncertainty means not knowing whether to buy a house on the floodplain 
or invest in a ten-metre high flood defence. Public uncertainty about climate change is a complex 
issue and has been found to relate to many factors including emotions, perceived levels of 
knowledge and knowledge sufficiency, risk judgment variables (Powell, Dunwoody, Griffin, & 
Neuwirth, 2007), and values (Kahan et al., 2011). Kahan et al. (2011) for instance found that 
egalitarians tended to perceive higher consensus on climate change. This is in part through a 
mechanism of biased assimilation, whereby individuals perceive information consistent with their 
own attitude as more convincing, thus assimilating this evidence in a biased manner (Corner, 
Whitmarsh, & Xenias, 2012; Kahan et al., 2011). It has recently been suggested that genuine 
uncertainty amongst the public about one aspect of climate change risk can spread to generate 
uncertainty about other aspects, in what has been termed ‘uncertainty transfer’ (Spence, Poortinga, 
& Pidgeon, 2012).  
There is growing recognition that climate change uncertainties need to be communicated; for 
example the IPCC states that risk communications are improved by the explicit characterisation of 
uncertainty (IPCC, 2012), and the Environment Agency recognises that it needs to communicate 
uncertainties so that people can make more informed decisions (Defra & Environment Agency, 
2011). Indeed, although some scientists believe that the public cannot understand uncertainty 
(Frewer et al., 2003), research shows that the public understand uncertainties regarding climate 
change (Darier & Schüle, 1999). Furthermore, Fischhoff (2011, p. 703) suggests that framing 
climate science as uncertain shows ‘the fateful gambles that we face. From that perspective, greater 
uncertainty can mean greater reason to act’. Communicating uncertainty may also increase trust in 
communications, and may make public expectations of scientists and risk assessors more realistic 
in the long-run (Johnson & Slovic, 1995). 
While uncertainty ‘refers to a lower subjective sense of conviction or validity’, scepticism refers to 
strongly held disbeliefs in climate change (Poortinga, Spence, Whitmarsh, Capstick, & Pidgeon, 
2011, p. 1016). Research shows that although climate change scepticism about trends and 
attribution is not currently widespread in Britain, scepticism about impacts and the belief that 
climate change as an issue has been exaggerated, is more prevalent (Poortinga et al., 2011; 
Shuckburgh et al., 2012; Whitmarsh, 2011). Research suggests that scepticism is largely determined 
by environmental and political values rather than education or knowledge (Poortinga et al., 2011; 
Whitmarsh, 2011). Both uncertainty and scepticism about climate change are thought to act as 
barriers towards engagement with the issue (Lorenzoni et al., 2007): if people think risks do not or 
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might not exist, they are less likely to respond to them. Indeed, in a number of US states, doubt in 
SLR is impacting on adaptation measures, as residents cite peer reviewed papers showing lower 
rises and sceptic view points (Peach, 2012).  
Values and worldviews 
Cultural theorists such as Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky (e.g. 1983) stress the importance of 
values and worldviews in risk perceptions. Values can be defined as concepts or beliefs that pertain 
to desirable end states or behaviours, transcend specific situations, guide behaviour, and are 
ordered by relative importance (Schwartz, 1992). While values focus on general overarching life 
goals, worldviews focus on more specific aspects (de Groot & Thøgersen, 2013). Worldviews are 
‘general social, cultural and political attitudes towards the world’ (Leiserowitz, 2006, citing Dake), 
which ‘provide powerful cultural lenses, magnifying one danger, obscuring another threat, selecting 
others for minimal attention or even disregard’  (Dake, 1992, p. 33).  
Both values and worldviews have been found to affect a range of climate change perceptions from 
scepticism (Poortinga et al., 2011) and policy preferences (Leiserowitz, 2006) to perceptions of 
scientific consensus (Kahan et al., 2011). For example, Whitmarsh (2011) found that values and 
politics are a much larger predictor of climate change beliefs than education and knowledge. 
Bellamy and Hulme (2011) found that egalitarian values were associated with heightened 
perceptions of the risks posed by abrupt climate change, while other research suggests that people 
who hold the worldview that the environment is resilient may find environmental risks more 
acceptable because they believe that nature can take whatever is thrown at it (Tansey & O'Riordan, 
1999).  
Future thinking  
Studies have shown that people find it difficult to envision the future, particularly on timescales of 
50 years or more (Lorenzoni & Hulme, 2009), or even as little as 15-20 years, after which peoples’ 
imaginings of the future ‘go dark’ (Tonn, Hemrick, & Conrad, 2006, p. 810). People think about 
time in different ways (Moser, Stauffacher, Krütli, & Scholz, 2011). Some, for example, are 
optimistic, while fewer are pessimistic (Carver, Scheier, & Segerstrom, 2010). Some think about 
the past in order to consider the future, while others think about all the possible things that could 
happen regardless of what has happened in the past (van Asselt, van’t Klooster, van Notten, & 
Smits, 2010). Van Asselt et al (2010) identified two ‘temporal repertoires’ to describe how experts 
think about the future: historic determinism, where the future is conceptualised as being 
determined by the past and present; and futuristic difference, where the relationship between the 
past, present and future is looser, and discontinuity is key. They suggest that despite foresight 
practice being more aligned with the futuristic difference repertoire, there is a strong tendency to 
resort to historic determinism. 
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Psychological distance 
Psychological distance describes the perceived remoteness of things. Something is psychologically 
distant if it is far into the future or past, in a distant place, refers to experiences of others, or is 
unlikely (Liberman & Trope, 2008). Construal Level Theory (CLT) posits that psychological 
distance is related to the extent to which people’s thinking is abstracted or concrete. In CLT, 
predicting far into the future requires a higher level of construal than predicting close events (Trope 
& Liberman, 2010), and distant events are more likely to be represented by a few abstract features 
rather than by complex, contextualised ones (Trope & Liberman, 2003). Psychological distance has 
a number of implications. When thinking about something requires a high level of construal (i.e. 
when it is psychologically distant), it is perceived to be less likely (Pahl, 2010). Lower levels of 
psychological distance in relation to climate change are associated with higher levels of concern 
(Spence et al., 2012).  
Studies show that the UK public associates climate change with impacts that are distant in both 
time and space (Shuckburgh et al., 2012; Spence et al., 2012). Psychological distance has also been 
found to apply to SLC: Evans et al. (2012) found that New Zealanders perceive greater seriousness 
of sea-level rise for the world than for New Zealand, and a greater threat for New Zealand than 
for themselves. However, as with many other factors that influence perceptions, the situation is 
more nuanced than this. Spence et al. (2012, p. 970) found that the UK public ‘really perceives 
climate change as global, being both distant and local in nature’. Likewise, a recent Wales-specific 
survey report showed that the Welsh public perceive the impacts of climate change to be close to 
home and relevant to the here and now, while also expressing high levels of concern for developing 
countries and the natural world (Capstick et al., 2013).  
Emotions  
‘we cannot assume that an intelligent person can understand the meaning of and 
properly act upon even the simplest of numbers such as amounts of money or 
numbers of lives at risk, not to mention more esoteric measures or statistics 
pertaining to risk, unless these numbers are infused with affect’ - (Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004).  
 
The way that somebody feels about a risk is an important aspect of their perception of that risk. 
We are after all emotional beings and rely on the ‘feelings’ we get about risks every day, as basic as 
judging whether someone on the street is going to cause us harm. Researchers in both sociology 
and psychology have investigated how the ways in which someone feels about a risk affects their 
perceptions of it. Cultural theorists have drawn on such influences as Immanuel Kant’s aesthetic 
judgments, which inspired Lash’s (2000) ‘risk cultures’, defined by aesthetic notions of taste rather 
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than by cognitive judgment. Lash describes these notions as affective, embodied and habitual, 
based on feelings such as pleasure, fear, shock and joy (Lash, 2000). To Lash, risk perceptions take 
place through imagination and sensation rather than judgments determined by physics and maths 
that have an ‘objective reality’ (Lash, 2000, p. 52).  
Social psychologists have been influenced by a variety of work in their analyses of risk, including 
influential research on heuristics (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Slovic and colleagues 
particularly endorse the importance of the affect heuristic –the feeling that something is good or 
bad- in rational reasoning about a risk, for example in its impact on probability assessments and in 
risk/benefit judgements (Slovic et al., 2004; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007). Often, 
this ‘affect heuristic’ is reliable, and studies show that analytic reasoning can be ineffective unless 
guided by emotion and affect (Phillips, 1984). Our emotions about a risk are often guided by 
previous experiences of it, and research indicates that people who have not experienced a flood 
underestimate the negative feelings associated with such an event (Siegrist & Gutscher, 2008). Such 
emotions can influence adaptive behaviours, at least for a time after a flood has occurred (Terpstra, 
2011).  
Slovic et al. (2004, p. 311) recommend that risk communications should be infused with emotion, 
particularly where ‘lack of experience may otherwise leave us too “coldly rational”’. Roeser (2012) 
supports this stance, suggesting that emotions are necessary for reflection and understanding the 
moral implications of climate change, leading to increased motivation. Having said this, emotion 
can be a de-motivator as well as motivator (Moser, 2007). For example, while some studies indicate 
that fear is an effective way of motivating behaviour change (Hine & Gifford, 1991), others indicate 
that fear tactics are ineffective in motivating personal engagement with climate change (O'Neill & 
Nicholson-Cole, 2009). Moser (2007) suggests that appeals to emotion are only effective when 
people feel personally vulnerable, have supportive and enabling conditions to act, and believe that 
they and their response can effectively solve the problem. 
Demographics 
Socio-demographic factors such as gender and age have been found to influence the interpretation 
of risk. Research indicates for example that women tend to be more concerned than men about 
climate change (Shuckburgh et al., 2012), marine climate change issues (CLAMER, 2011a) and SLR 
(Hamilton, 2008); and some studies suggest that women have greater scientific knowledge of 
climate change than men do, despite underestimating this knowledge in self-report measures 
(McCright, 2010). However, the effects of gender on climate change perceptions are contested. 
Firstly, it appears that when climate change is framed as a global rather than a local issue, a gender 
effect may not exist (Davidson & Freudenburg, 1996). Secondly, research suggests that gender 
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effects that do exist may not be due to demographic characteristics per se, but due to other features 
of the men and women recruited for risk perception research (Flynn, Slovic, & Mertz, 1994). 
Some research finds that older people are less concerned about or perceive a lower threat from 
climate change (Kellstedt, Zahran, & Vedlitz, 2008; Whitmarsh, 2008) and SLR (Hamilton, 2008) 
than young people; a relationship suggested to reflect the assumption that climate change is a future 
risk (Whitmarsh, 2008). Zsamboky et al. (2011) found a ‘not in my lifetime’ mentality due to the 
great proportion of elderly people living in coastal towns. This finding was supported by 
Fernandez-Bilbao (2012), who found that older participants were particularly dismissive of climate 
change, believing it would not happen in their lifetimes. However, other research indicates that 
concern about climate change per se and marine climate change issues in particular is lowest among 
younger people34 (CLAMER, 2011a; Shuckburgh et al., 2012). This discrepancy might in part be 
explained by recent research that indicates the relationship between age and concern about SLC is 
not a linear one, with middle-aged people showing the highest levels of concern. This was found 
in a recent survey of the Welsh public, which showed that it is the oldest and youngest groups who 
are least concerned about climate change (Capstick et al., 2013).  
2.6.2 Risk appraisal 
Threat appraisal: knowledge 
In self-report measures, 41% of UK survey respondents know a fair amount or a lot about climate 
change (Shuckburgh et al., 2012). However, a number of key misconceptions are often cited. For 
example, the belief that ozone layer depletion causes climate change has been found in a number 
of studies (Bord et al., 2000; Bostrom et al., 1994; Tobler, Visschers, & Siegrist, 2012). Recycling is 
consistently cited as a key mitigation measure (e.g. Lowe et al., 2006; Read et al., 1994), a perception 
also at odds with expert consensus35. Regarding specific knowledge aspects, studies show that 
public knowledge of consequences tends to focus on immediate physical impacts, such as flooding, 
rather than more indirect impacts such as social disruption (Capstick et al., 2013; Lorenzoni et al., 
2006).  
With regard to SLC, 43% of European respondents feel informed about SLR (CLAMER, 2011a), 
and research both in Europe (CLAMER, 2011a) and the USA (Akerlof, 2012) shows that the 
majority of respondents think that sea levels will rise in future. Some specific aspects of SLC are 
generally understood, for example ice-melt is a highly salient image associated with climate change 
                                                   
34 Shuckburgh et al. (2012) found that young people in the UK (16-24 year olds) express less concern than older people 
(35-64) about climate change. CLAMER (2011a) found that older people expressed more concern than younger 
people, especially those in the 55-64 age bracket compared to 18-34 year olds. 
35 Although recycling reduces the energy used to make new products, therefore mitigating climate change and SLR, 
this effect is small compared to mitigation approaches such as using renewable technologies and greener transport.  
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(Lorenzoni et al., 2006). However, a number of misconceptions have been cited, notably regarding 
the causes of SLC. For example, just 16% of survey respondents in Ann Arundel County 
(Maryland, USA) correctly stated that about half of observed SLR in the region is due to subsidence 
(Akerlof, 2012), and studies show a low awareness of the importance of thermal expansion (Read 
et al., 1994; Reynolds et al., 2010; Tobler et al., 2012). 
Knowing about the causes of SLC may be particularly important, with knowledge of the causes of 
global warming shown to be a ‘key determinant of behavioural intentions to address global 
warming’ (Bord et al., 2000, p. 205). It is suggested that this is because ‘intent to behave responsibly 
requires actual knowledge of global warming causes. Believing something bad is happening need 
not coexist with knowing what to do about it’ (Bord et al., 2000, pp. 206-207) and ‘responsible 
decision making requires at least some minimal knowledge of cause and effect’ (Bord et al., 2000, 
p. 216). Indeed, survey results from Switzerland showed that of all their knowledge subscales, it 
was knowledge about climate change and its causes that were most strongly related to concern 
(Tobler et al., 2012). Furthermore, Lorenzoni et al. (2007) found that a lack of basic knowledge 
about the causes of climate change, including as a result of perceived lack of locally-relevant 
information, was acting as a barrier to engagement.  
Coping appraisal  
Responsibility 
Studies show that individuals contextualise risks within broader perspectives such as blame (Cox 
et al., 2005), and climate change risks tend to be viewed in a framework of global equalities and 
fairness (Wolf & Moser, 2011), demography, health and consumption (Darier & Schüle, 1999). 
Studies show that individuals locate the responsibility for causing and mitigating climate change 
with others, including individuals, governments, industry, other countries and businesses 
(Lorenzoni et al., 2007), blaming climate change on factors such as corporations’ profit motivated 
cultures (Darier & Schüle, 1999). The responsibility for climate change action particularly tends to 
be ascribed to powerful external actors such as government and businesses. This has been found 
in the UK (Pidgeon, 2012; Poortinga, Pidgeon, & Lorenzoni, 2006; Spence, Venables, Pidgeon, 
Poortinga, & Demski, 2010b), Wales (Capstick et al., 2013) and in Australia (Ryan et al., 2012). The 
transferral of responsibility has also been shown to exist in the context of groundwater flooding 
(Kreibich, Thieken, Grunenberg, Ullrich, & Sommer, 2009) and SLR (Harvatt et al., 2011). The 
perceived responsibility for SLC adaptation and mitigation is important because if people do not 
feel personally responsible for the causes of and responses to SLC, they are less likely to engage in 
adaptive behaviour (Kellens, Terpstra, & De Maeyer, 2013). 
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Efficacy  
Self efficacy is a person’s perceived ability to take action and make a difference. Previous research 
has also shown that taking individual action against climate change is perceived as difficult 
(Capstick et al., 2013; Spence et al., 2010b). This lack of perceived self efficacy is important because 
it can be a barrier to engaging with climate change (Lorenzoni et al., 2007); ‘unless they feel they 
can produce the results they want, there is little incentive for people to take action’ (Breakwell, 
2007, p. 54). The ‘locus of control’ construct, which describes this locating of control with one’s 
self or with others, emerged in the 1970s and 80s (Breakwell, 2007). In a related field, one early 
study found that individuals who believe that the locus of control lies with an external power (i.e. 
have a lack self efficacy) ‘confront a tornado in a manner that is consistent with their attitudes [...]; 
they await the fated onslaught, watchful but passive’ (Sims & Baumann, 1972, p. 1391).  
Trust  
Trust is a complex issue involving a number of facets including confidence, reliability, honesty, 
consistency, objectivity, fairness and accuracy (Renn & Levine, 1991). Low levels of trust in the 
agencies perceived to be responsible for flood protection and information dissemination have been 
found amongst community groups in research reported by Fernandez-Bilbao (2012) in the UK. 
Similarly, moderate to low levels of trust were placed in councils to protect Wellington city, New 
Zealand, from future SLR (Evans et al., 2012).  
Poortinga and Pidgeon (2003) have put forward the idea of ‘critical trust’ whereby members of the 
public do not uncritically accept agencies’ decisions, but instead view them with an amount of 
scepticism. Indeed, a ‘healthy’ amount of distrust in government agencies can be a good thing. 
Studies show for example that trust in public flood defences is negatively related to flood 
preparedness and mitigation (Kellens et al., 2013). However, distrust in the agencies responsible 
for communicating SLC can be problematic, not least because ‘when people lack knowledge about a 
hazard, their risk judgments are based on the degree to which they trust the responsible risk 
managers’ (Kellens et al., 2013, p. 42).   
2.6.3 Responses 
Active responses 
The ways in which individuals, governments and stakeholders may actively respond to SLC on the 
Severn Estuary include mitigation and adaptation responses. So far in the UK, the main focus in 
tackling climate change has been mitigation, i.e. attempting to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
(Adaptation Sub-Committee of the Committee on Climate Change, 2010), which can include 
personal measures such as driving less and eating less meat. However, a commitment to SLC 
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(Nicholls & Lowe, 2004) means that adaptation is also necessary. Adaptation can be defined as ‘the 
planned or unplanned, reactive or anticipatory, successful or unsuccessful response of a system to 
a change in its environment’ (Tol et al., 2009), and on a personal level can include moving away 
from flood risk areas, purchasing home insurance or installing flood boards. This study focuses on 
peoples’ perceptions of SLC rather that their active responses to it; thus while PPP1 respondents’ 
comments regarding active responses are considered in section 8.2, such responses are not 
discussed at length. 
Inactive responses 
Optimism 
‘overly positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, 
and an unrealistic optimism are characteristic of normal human thought’ 
(Taylor & Brown, 1988, p. 193).  
 
People employ a number of cognitive strategies to avoid accepting unpleasant futures (Smith et al., 
2011), including denial and unrealistic optimism (Hamilton & Kasser, 2009). Optimism is a 
common trait (Carver et al., 2010) describing the expectation of success, of good prevailing over 
evil (Mautner, 1996). People have been found to be unrealistically optimistic about their future life 
events, believing they are less likely to experience negative events, and more likely to experience 
positive events than other people are (Weinstein, 1980). Dunning, Heath, and Suls (2004) suggest 
people hold these optimistic biases because a) they lack crucial information when comparing 
themselves with others, and b) they ignore valuable information that they have or could find. 
Optimism has been linked to higher levels of engagement coping and lower levels of avoidance 
(Carver et al., 2010; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995), better health, mood and achievement (Peterson, 
2000). It has even been suggested as a prerequisite for our survival as a species (Varki, 2009). But 
research suggests that optimism and positive illusions may also reduce peoples’ capacity for realistic 
and accurate decision making (Dunning et al., 2004; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995), and optimistic 
beliefs have been cited as potential barriers towards public engagement with climate change 
(Lorenzoni et al., 2007). 
Avoidance 
An ‘active silencing of risk’, whereby people actively take measures to avoid confronting an issue, 
has been noted in relation to environmental risks such as living with nuclear facilities (Bickerstaff 
& Simmons, 2009). The reasons for such avoidance may be explained in the context of cognitive 
dissonance: ‘Individuals may use strategies of denial to assuage their guilt in the knowledge that 
their actions adversely affect the climate, and to justify inaction in response to the uncomfortable 
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implications of climate change mitigation for high consuming lifestyles’ (Lorenzoni et al., 2007, p. 
453). The theory of cognitive dissonance states that if a person knows various things that are 
inconsistent with each other, (s)he will make them more consistent, for example through changing 
his or her beliefs to be consistent with his or her actions (Festinger, 1962). Thus, if (s)he knows 
that mitigating climate change means driving less, but will not drive less, (s)he may begin to deny 
that climate change is a real problem or avoid the issue altogether. 
External facilitators and barriers, reappraisals and feedbacks 
It should be noted that it is more than a person’s risk perceptions that determine their actions. 
There are a number of other barriers (and facilitators) to engaging with climate change such as a 
lack of (or provision of) enabling initiatives (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). Zsamboky et al. (2011) list a 
number of institutional barriers to public action at the coast, including spending cuts and a lack of 
flexibility with funding (e.g. for coastal defences). These external facilitators and barriers are not 
considered in detail in this thesis, but are touched upon in section 7.3.1 with regard to the 
externalisation of responsibility for mitigation and adaptation actions.  
2.7 Researcher epistemology and reflexivity  
Now that the framework for the thesis has been set, a few notes on epistemology36 and reflexivity37  
are necessary to situate the study. A fundamental epistemological issue present in all research is 
that the researcher inevitably contributes his/her own constructions to the interpretation of data 
(Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992), from selecting the domains of knowledge that are deemed important 
for the research (Sturgis & Allum, 2004) to interpreting what is meant by a comment made during 
an interview. This reflexivity should be acknowledged and documented, as it is in this thesis in a 
reflexive account of each empirical stage. However, I should elucidate my positioning in relation 
to the research before any such discussions commence. How I approach the research questions is 
influenced by, among other things: the newspapers that I read (predominantly the Guardian and 
online media), the leisure activities I engage in (some being water based), where I live (beside the 
Severn Estuary), the company that I keep (currently a number of sociologists and psychologists!), 
and my educational background and disciplinary grounding (BA Geography and MSc Science of 
Natural Hazards).  
                                                   
36 Epistemology is ‘the branch of philosophy that inquires into the nature and the possibility of knowledge’ 
(White, 1996, p. 174), including its acquisition and character. 
37 Reflexivity refers to the ways in which research activity shapes the object of inquiry and vice versa; the ‘researcher 
and researched are characterised as interdependent in the social process of research’ (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992, p. 
106).  
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Although my epistemology has been grounded in geography, this study is truly multi-disciplinary, 
situated within Psychology and Earth Sciences Departments, aiming to draw together the physical 
processes of SLC and human responses to it. Influences from other disciplines such as sociology 
and STS have also been important to situate themes, inform methodology, and aid the 
interpretation of results. It could be argued that such an approach is not only desirable for climate 
change research, it is necessary. Climate change and SLC cannot be studied from a human or 
physical position alone; the nature of the issues means that they are inextricably related. However, 
interdisciplinary research is challenging and researchers can face many institutional, personal and 
practical obstacles in conducting, disseminating and following-up their work (Foulds, Macrorie, 
Franz, & Wang, 2013). Indeed, finding a balance between disciplines has been difficult, but an 
interdisciplinary approach has also meant that I have been introduced to a wealth of literature that 
I may not have otherwise come across; a literature that has provided a multi-disciplinary context 
for findings.  
Thirty years of climate change perception and communication research (Wolf & Moser, 2011) have 
drawn upon many disciplines. Research to date can be broadly categorised into survey studies and 
more qualitative approaches such as interviews. This is a mixed-methods study, utilising both 
qualitative approaches (EPP interviews and PPP1 interviews) and quantitative approaches (EPP 
probability elicitations and PPP2 surveys). Adopting a mixed-methods approach such as this can 
add ‘considerable value’ to climate change attitude research by combining evidence from different 
methodologies (Pidgeon, 2012, p. 86). While quantitative surveys cast a wide net and can investigate 
statistical relationships, they often belie underlying nuances and ambivalences38 (Carolan, 2010), 
and rarely provide much insight into the contexts of public knowledge (Sturgis & Allum, 2004). In 
this thesis, qualitative data both inform survey content and provide such context. Indeed, the PPP1 
and PPP2 data work in tandem, often allowing for the triangulation39 of findings, ‘giving a more 
complete picture than any one approach alone’ (Pidgeon, 2010, p. 12). The adoption of such an 
approach has facilitated a more holistic consideration of the study’s research aims and hypotheses, 
which are outlined below.   
 
 
                                                   
38 This refers to the dictionary definition of ambivalence as the coexistence of opposing attitudes, opinions or 
feelings, not its common usage as meaning indifference.  
39 Triangulation is a method to ‘map out, or explain more fully, the richness and complexity of human behaviour by 
studying it from more than one standpoint’ (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2000, p. 112).  
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2.8 Research aims and hypotheses  
2.8.1 Research aims 
As discussed in 2.3.2, the purpose of this study is not to convince people to take a particular action, 
but to improve communications that provide Severn Estuary residents with the information they 
need to make their own informed decisions about how to respond to SLC. The outputs of the 
study should therefore provide an understanding of public perceptions of SLC on the Severn 
Estuary, and practical recommendations for future communications based upon these findings. 
The study realises these aims by answering the following research questions:  
1. How do ‘experts’ perceive the risks of SLC on the Severn Estuary? (Chapter 4) 
a. What do experts perceive the risks of SLC on the Severn Estuary to be? 
b. How much SLC do experts expect on the Severn Estuary? 
c. What factors influence expert perceptions of future SLC on the Severn Estuary? 
2. How does ‘the public’ perceive the risks of SLC on the Severn Estuary? (Chapters 6, 7, 8) 
a. Is SLC a salient issue for the public? 
b. What does the public know about SLC on the Severn Estuary? 
c. How much SLC does the public expect on the Severn Estuary? 
d. What factors in addition to knowledge affect public perceptions of SLC on the 
Severn Estuary? 
3. What are the implications of these perceptions for risk communications? (Chapter 9) 
a. What information about SLC should be communicated with the public? 
b. How might SLC best be communicated with the public?  
2.8.2 Hypotheses  
Communications should be grounded in the findings of this research rather than in prior 
assumptions of what the public need to know (Morgan et al., 2002). Furthermore, the thesis is 
exploratory on account of no published research having studied public perceptions of SLC on the 
Severn Estuary. However, SLC perception research in other regions (Hamilton, 2008; Harvatt et 
al., 2011) and research on climate change perceptions more generally (e.g. Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 
2006; Pidgeon, 2012; Wolf & Moser, 2011) inform some tentative hypotheses, which are outlined 
below. A more detailed set of hypotheses, developed from EPP and PPP1 analyses to inform the 
content of the PPP2 survey, are provided in Appendix J and section 8.5. 
 
 
 42 
 
Expert perceptions of SLC on the Severn Estuary  
It is hypothesised that SLC on the Severn Estuary will be an issue of great complexity, fraught with 
uncertainties as it is elsewhere (Hansen & Sato, 2012; Woodworth, Church, Aarup, & Wilson, 
2010). Although it will not be possible to precisely predict how much sea levels will rise in future, 
there will be consensus amongst experts that mean sea level on the Estuary will rise, as it is expected 
to globally (IPCC, 2007, 2013) and locally (e.g. MCCIP, 2010; Phillips & Crisp, 2010; UK Climate 
Projections, 2012).  
Public perceptions of SLC on the Severn Estuary 
Research yields mixed results as to the UK public’s awareness of SLR (Fernandez-Bilbao, 2012; 
Tol et al., 2009) so a tentative hypothesis is that there will be some understanding of SLC and its 
processes, and that most respondents will think that sea-levels will rise in future, as found by 
CLAMER (2011a) and Akerlof (2012). However, there will be some key ‘misconceptions’, as noted 
in previous research (Akerlof, 2012; Read et al., 1994; Reynolds et al., 2010; Tobler et al., 2012). In 
addition to knowledge, other factors such as emotions and previous experiences will also influence 
public perceptions (Bubeck et al., 2012; Hamilton, 2008; Harvatt et al., 2011). Like climate change, 
SLC will be of low concern relative to other issues, and will be a psychologically distant risk 
(Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Pidgeon, 2012; Wolf & Moser, 2011). 
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3 EXPERT PERCEPTIONS: 
METHODS 
 
This chapter details the methodology for the first empirical stage of the research: the Expert 
Perceptions Phase (EPP). This Phase was designed to develop an expert model of the risks of SLC 
on the Severn Estuary. It involved a literature review and interviews (N=11) with experts in the 
field of SLC on the Severn Estuary. The chapter first details the overarching rationale for the EPP, 
before discussing the methodology used for each part of the interview, data analyses methods, and 
the limitations of each approach. It concludes with a reflexive account of the phase.  
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3.1 Introduction and overarching rationale 
Face-to-face interviews were carried out during the summer of 2011 with eleven experts from 
academic, consultancy and governmental roles who had expertise in sea-level processes, impacts 
and adaptation responses on the Severn Estuary. These interviews accompanied a literature review, 
which together facilitated the creation of an expert model of the risks. This was a mixed methods 
phase, with each interview session including a semi-structured interview, the creation of a cognitive 
map and a subjective probability elicitation of future SLR. The interview and cognitive map 
facilitated the creation of a ‘meta-influence diagram’, while the probability elicitation produced 
Estuary-specific estimates of future SLC. Table 4 shows how each part aimed to answer the 
research questions.  
 
Research 
Question  
Data  Data collection 
methods 
Data analysis 
methods 
What do experts 
perceive the risks of 
SLC on the Severn 
Estuary to be?  
Scoping of issues and 
details of specific 
processes, impacts and 
measures. Identification 
of key experts in the 
field for interview 
Literature review Assimilation into a 
meta-diagram of the 
risks 
Scoping of issues and 
details of specific 
processes, impacts and 
measures.  
Semi-structured 
interview during elite 
interview sessions 
with experts in the 
field of SLC on the 
Severn Estuary  
Thematic analysis 
facilitating 
assimilation into a 
meta-diagram of the 
risks 
Relationships between 
risk factors/themes 
Cognitive mapping 
task  
Assimilation into a 
meta-diagram of the 
risks 
How much SLC do 
experts expect on 
the Severn Estuary? 
Estimates of SLC in 
2050, 2100 and 2200 
Subjective probability 
elicitation during elite 
interview sessions 
Conversion of 
cumulative 
distributions into box 
plots and line graphs. 
What factors 
influence expert 
perceptions of 
future SLC on the 
Severn Estuary? 
Thoughts articulated 
during probability 
elicitations   
Audio recordings of 
subjective probability 
elicitation 
Thematic analysis  
Table 4: Research summary, EPP 
 
A literature review was necessary in order to scope the potential topics for interview, to identify 
experts to approach for interview, and to cover areas not covered during interview sessions. The 
main literature review was carried out during autumn 2010 and spring 2011, and updated at regular 
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intervals until November 2012. There are four reasons why expert interviews were necessary to 
accompany the literature review in creating the expert model. These are: 
1. Topics can be missed during a literature review and the literature does not always 
represent nuances and the wide range of opinions held by experts. Interviews tend to give 
a more ‘diverse and heterogeneous picture of a subject than written reports’ (Hansson & 
Bryngelsson, 2009, p. 2274). This can be particularly important in a case such as this, which 
requires specific knowledge of the Severn Estuary.  
2. Expert judgements are a useful tool while research is ongoing. While expert 
judgement is not a substitute for definitive scientific research, it can ‘provide useful 
insights for policy makers and research planners while research to produce more definitive 
results is ongoing’ (Morgan, Pitelka, & Shevliakova, 2001, p. 280). 
3. Expert judgements can provide an up-to-date snapshot of current expert 
understanding. Science evolves, and views change. Speaking with experts draws on their 
most up-to-date views rather than consulting literature that may no longer be fully 
endorsed.  
4. All methods use expert judgements in some form. There are three ways of estimating 
the likely occurrence of future SLC: looking at past records, using computer models to 
simulate future conditions, and using expert judgement (Arnell, Tompkins, & Adger, 
2005). The first assumes that the events in question have occurred in the past, and the 
conditions were the same then as they will be in future; and the second method relies upon 
the underlying assumptions of the models (Arnell et al., 2005). Both of these methods 
require, to some extent, the judgements of experts; even models use expert judgements, 
either explicitly or implicitly (Arnell et al., 2005; Dessai & Hulme, 2004). The third method, 
used here, elicits expert judgement directly. 
3.2 Expert perceptions phase: data collection methodology  
3.2.1 Sampling strategy 
With increasing calls for public participation in decision making, there has been a tendency to 
dissolve the boundary between experts and the public (Collins & Evans, 2002). However, it is 
necessary to delineate the groups in order to create a model of expert perceptions. There is ‘no 
agreed definition of what constitutes an ‘expert’’ (Lowe & Lorenzoni, 2007), and expertise can be 
described using a variety of criteria. An expert can be defined by the way in which they approach 
a problem (O'Hagan et al., 2006), how they work with the topic (e.g. through interacting with it or 
contributing to it) or through their lived experience of it (Collins & Evans, 2002). Alternatively, an 
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expert can be anyone whose knowledge we want to elicit (Garthwaite, Kadane, & O'Hagan, 2005). 
For this study, interviewees were selected on the basis of their ability to best answer my interview 
questions (c.f Rice, 2010). As per Morgan and Keith (1995), no attempt was made to select a 
statistically representative sample of experts, because the main purpose of this part of the study 
was to scope all the possible risks and explore different opinions and views. 
Cooke and Goddens (2004, cited in Lowe & Lorenzoni, 2007) recommend that experts be selected 
on their reputation including their experience, publications, background and perspectives. Other 
factors to consider include balance of views, interest and availability (Arnell et al., 2005). For this 
study, experts from academic, consultancy and governmental roles who had expertise in sea-level 
processes, impacts and adaptation responses on the Severn Estuary were identified through a 
literature review, attending events and conferences, and through recommendation. They were 
initially contacted via email, outlining the objectives and general format of the interview. A 
snowball sampling procedure was also used, whereby each expert interviewed was asked to suggest 
others. Hansson and Bryngelsson (2009) point out that the initial sample plays a major role in the 
outcome of a snowball sampling procedure, but the proportion of contacts made through this 
method was small compared with my initial sample so this should not pose a great problem. Some 
bias was however introduced at the sampling stage due to experts’ availability, with two of the 13 
experts approached not available for interview. Such non-response can introduce error, a function 
of the number of non-respondents and the degree to which these non-respondents differ from 
respondents (Goldstein, 2002). To reduce this error, work by the two non-participating experts 
was included in the model via the literature review despite no interviews taking place.  
Participating experts’ areas of expertise, genders and number of years of experience are listed in 
Table 5. As shown, the sample included experts from a range of backgrounds. They together 
covered each main theme in the expert model, including physical processes, vulnerability factors, 
social and physical impacts (specific areas of expertise are not shown in Table 5 in order to uphold 
confidentiality). Although some experts are not leading experts in SLC per se, all work on topics 
related to some aspect of SLR on the Severn Estuary or are involved in related decision making 
processes.  
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Expert 
(pseudonym) 
Expertise Gender Experience 
in field 
(years) 
Bob Academic  Male 5-10 
Sandra Government  Female <5 
Andrew Academic  Male >20 
Claire Academic  Female  5-10 
Roxy Consultant  Female  11-20 
Harry Academic  Male 11-20 
Matt County Council  Male >20 
James Environment Agency  Male 5-10 
Daisy Government  Female  <5 
Frank Academic & advisor to various organisations 
such as local authorities and the Department of 
Energy and Climate Change (DECC) 
Male >20 
Jack Academic Male >20 
Table 5: Expertise of experts interviewed, EPP 
Ethical considerations 
Ethical approval was obtained from the Cardiff School of Psychology Ethics Committee for each 
of the three empirical phases of research, including the expert interview phase. The data collection 
process entailed strict confidentiality in accordance with The British Psychological Society’s ‘Code 
of Human Research Ethics’ (2010) but was not entirely anonymous due to the nature of the 
research (the need to transcribe and possibly follow up on interviews). Written consent was 
obtained from participants prior to the interview commencing, and interviewees were made aware 
that they could withdraw from the interview at any stage. Opportunities were made available for 
participants to ask any questions they had. Each was given a full debrief, and informed that they 
had the right to access the information they gave up until the point it had been anonymised. 
Participants were also made aware that they had the right to ask for the information they gave to 
be destroyed/deleted up until the point that the data was anonymised, and were informed of the 
procedures for contacting the investigator should any concerns have arisen. Letters of invitation, 
consent forms and debrief sheets are provided in Appendix A. Once data collection was complete, 
data was anonymised and aliases were used for transcription, coding and analysis.  
3.2.2 Interview methodology: introduction  
Expert interviews have been used in a plethora of studies, from nuclear radiation (Wynne, 1996) 
to unemployment (Stephens, 2007). This study used face to face interviews, which remain the ‘gold 
standard’ for such interviews (Granger Morgan and Henrion 1990, cited in Kriegler, Hall, Held, 
Dawson, & Schellnhuber, 2009). Face to face interviews allow a strong rapport to be built between 
interviewer and interviewee and facilitate a continual ‘re-moulding’ of the interviewer-interviewee 
interaction through ‘visual cues and small utterances’ (Stephens, 2007). Also, the probability 
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elicitation and cognitive mapping methods utilised in this study would have been very difficult over 
the phone or via email.  
The interviews took around two hours, and were carried out either in my office or in the expert’s 
own place of work. The interview protocol, covering the three stages of the interview, can be found 
in Appendix B. Each session began with an introduction to the project, the objectives of the 
interview and an outline of what the expert could expect. Participants were then asked a few 
introductory questions about their job title, description of their expertise and for how long they 
had worked in the field before the three main interview sections commenced. These were: a semi-
structured interview, a cognitive mapping task and a probability elicitation. 
3.2.3 Semi-structured interview 
Rationale  
The first part of the session was a semi-structured interview. An interview can be described as a 
conversation with a purpose (Kahn & Cannell, 1958 cited in Fowler & Mangione, 1990). The 
purpose of this semi-structured interview was to elicit experts’ opinions in a way that was 
meaningful to them. The objective was to scope the risks of SLC on the Severn Estuary, and to 
find out as much about these risks as possible. The value in using semi-structured interviews rather 
than a structured protocol is that it allows new themes to emerge; themes that may not have been 
encountered during the literature review. 
Methods 
The direction of the interview was largely determined by the expert’s answers and discussion, 
though key topics (issues facing the Severn Estuary, SLC processes and impacts) were raised if the 
expert did not mention them. Additional topics were followed up if the expert mentioned them. 
These topics included adaptation and mitigation, public understanding, and uncertainty. 
Additionally, protocols were tailored towards each respondent’s area of expertise. So while all main 
topics were present on all protocols, topics pertaining to the experts’ area of expertise were in bold 
to ensure they were followed up. In some cases, specific topics were added, for example Harry was 
asked about relationships between the North Atlantic Oscillation and sea level on the Severn 
Estuary. The protocol ensured that all necessary topics were discussed, while the semi-structured 
format encouraged maximum input from the expert, allowing them to introduce new topics and 
focus on those that they thought were important. In practice, all of the main tropics were covered 
to some extent during each interview.  
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Limitations  
A limitation of semi-structured interviews is that, as with any interview, topics may be missed if 
the expert does not think of them and if they are not covered with the ‘key questions’ on the 
protocol. However, the creation of a cognitive map later in the session was an additional prompt 
for such ideas.  
3.2.4 Cognitive map creation 
Rationale  
Participants were asked to create a cognitive map to summarise their thoughts about SLC on the 
Severn Estuary. This stage further explored expert perceptions (particularly relationships between 
themes), and also acted as a prompt for further thought and discussion. Topics often arose during 
this stage that had not come up during the semi-structured interview.  
It has been argued that mental models can be represented by means of a ‘cognitive map’ or 
‘influence diagram’ drawn onto paper: a mind map representing knowledge in a manner 
representative of how the knowledge is used (Kearney & Kaplan, 1997). An influence diagram is a 
directed network of linked concepts. It is a snapshot of all the factors that a person thinks influence 
something, including the decisions that might shape the processes. The result should be a ‘visual 
display that expresses a participant’s unique knowledge structure’ (Kearney & Kaplan, 1997). Such 
maps can occur at many levels of abstraction. For example I might have a detailed representation 
of the items in my office and some of the offices in my building, but only a vague representation 
of some of the buildings on my street. Hereafter, maps created by individual experts are referred 
to as ‘cognitive maps’ to avoid confusion with the ‘meta-influence diagram’ that was created to 
summarise expert understanding (see 3.3).  
Mental models and their corresponding cognitive maps vary among individuals. They may vary by 
the number of items known, the ways in which items are linked together, and the level of ownership 
-the degree to which a person knows how to use a term rather than just knowing it (Kearney & 
Kaplan, 1997). Even people who share the same level of expertise can be expected to have different 
cognitive maps due to different experiences and training (Otto-Banaszak, Matczak, Wesseler, & 
Wechsung, 2011). Any method of measuring a person’s cognitive maps should allow for the 
expression of these differences (Kearney & Kaplan, 1997).  
Methods  
The concept of cognitive maps was explained to the participant, and the objectives outlined. 
Experts were shown an example of a ready-made cognitive map about what influences whether I 
get sunburnt, with a description of how the map might be constructed. They were then asked to 
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draw a similar diagram for SLC on the Severn Estuary. Throughout the process they were asked 
to talk about what they were writing and drawing so that I could understand what each part meant 
and the rationale behind the map structure. Example cognitive maps are shown in Figure 3 and 
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 3: Example of a cognitive map (by Jack, academic) 
 
Figure 4: Example of a cognitive map (by Frank, academic and advisor) 
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Limitations  
As with the other stages of the interview session, the cognitive map cannot hope to cover every 
thought about SLC in an expert’s mind. However, in the two hours available, the combination of 
the semi-structured interview and the cognitive map creation produced a wealth of valuable 
information for creating a meta-diagram of the risks.  
3.2.5 Subjective probability elicitation  
Rationale  
The scale of impacts on the Severn Estuary will depend on the rate and magnitude of future SLR, 
which will be forced by both global and local factors acting over short and long timescales. Many 
of these factors are uncertain. However, policy decisions will still need to be made in order to plan 
adaptation measures; and without assessments of the scale, magnitude and likelihood of future 
SLC, policy makers will make their own assumptions about the likelihood of different outcomes 
(Mastrandrea & Schneider, 2004). Probability is the best known and most widely used formalism 
for numerically quantifying such uncertainty (Morgan & Henrion, 1990).  
There are a number of ways to elicit probability estimates from experts. These include 
questionnaires that simply ask the respondent to estimate the likelihood that certain events will 
happen (e.g. Arnell et al., 2005), Delphi methods (e.g. O’Neill, Osborn, Hulme, Lorenzoni, & 
Watkinson, 2008), and subjective probability elicitations. Watson and Buede (1987) state that 
questionnaires are the elicitation technique of last resort because experts cannot discuss the 
meaning of questions with the researcher, and the researcher cannot tailor subsequent questions 
to experts’ answers. The Delphi method is a process whereby experts are asked for their opinions, 
these opinions are summarised, and shown to the experts again to allow for revisions of their earlier 
answers, eventually leading to a convergence towards a ‘correct’ answer. This was not used here 
because it was these very uncertainties and differences that were being studied. 
Instead, each expert participated in three subjective probability elicitations: one for 2050, one for 
2100 and one for 2200. Subjective probability elicitation is an established methodology (Spetzler 
& Stael Von Holstein, 1975). It is a process by which a person’s personal probabilistic ideas are 
converted into a number between zero and one (Jenkinson, 2005), and allows a quantification of 
an individual's personal judgement of uncertainty based on their synthesis of knowledge, thoughts 
and published literature (Zickfeld et al., 2007). A probability elicitation was included in the EPP 
for a number of reasons. These are:   
 To provide local probability estimates. Relative SLC occurs at different rates in different 
locations, so local projections are necessary to allow for effective local adaptation planning. 
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However, local estimates made using modelling techniques can be problematic due to 
downscaling factors and spatial variability. 
 To facilitate a discussion of multiple viewpoints. Research shows that experts can hold 
vastly different views about the same topic (Arnell et al., 2005; Nordhaus, 1994; Vaughan 
& Spouge, 2002; Zickfeld et al., 2007; Zickfeld, Morgan, Frame, & Keith, 2010), but such 
diversity is not always represented in consensus reviews such as IPCC reports.  
 To elicit a distribution of estimates of future SLC rather than point estimates such as 
means and medians, which do not represent the full range of possibilities. ‘So far, much 
of the focus in assessments of climate change and its impacts has been on central 
tendencies’ (Kunreuther et al., 2013, p. 447). Elicitating probability distributions 
discourages simplification, embracing the ‘intrinsically plural, conditional nature of 
knowledge’ called for by Stirling (2010).  
 To further explore the uncertainties involved in estimating SLC. Acknowledging such 
uncertainties is important for public and planners alike. ‘The establishment of consensus 
by the IPCC is no longer as critical to governments as a full exploration of uncertainty’ 
(Oppenheimer, O'Neill, Webster, & Agrawala, 2007). 
 To investigate the contexts in which estimates are made, including assumptions, alternative 
scenarios, and barriers to elicitation.  
 To elicit estimates for 2200 as well as the more usual time periods of 2050 and 2100. Few 
authors consider projections further into the future than 2100 (but see Lenton et al., 2006; 
Winkelmann, Levermann, Martin, & Frieler, 2012), when it is clear that beyond 2100 the 
magnitude of climate change and the resulting impacts are ‘likely to be very large indeed’ 
(Houghton, 2009), and management decisions made now have consequences beyond 2100 
(Lenton et al., 2006).  
Methods 
There are a number of ways in which probability judgments can be encoded (elicited and recorded) 
during subjective probability elicitations. Popular methods include direct estimation where the 
expert is asked to state their response, responses on a scale, the use of probability wheels40, and the 
use of bets. Each has their own advantages and disadvantages. Some are more intuitive for the 
participant depending on their background, while others yield more analysable data. It has also 
been documented that respondents’ responses can be made more or less extreme by the choice of 
response mode. ‘It is an open question as to whether one response mode gets closer to the true 
                                                   
40 Probability wheels are devices for visually representing probabilities. The arms of the wheel can be moved to 
represent larger or smaller slices of the wheel (like a pie chart), and a spinning pointer is anchored in the centre of 
the wheel. The proportion [X] of the wheel that represents the probability is varied until the probability that the 
pointer will end up on [X] is the same probability that the elicited value (e.g. sea-level rise) will be [Y] (Morgan & 
Henrion, 1990).  
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opinion, or indeed whether opinion actually varies with response mode’ (Wallsten & Budescu, 
1983, after Fischoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein 1980).  
Two elicitation encoding methods were piloted with colleagues (N=3) to test user friendliness and 
the utility of results. These were: 1) a box plot drawn directly onto a scale whose outer bounds 
were first stated by the experts, and 2) a cumulative density function (CDF) method whereby 
participants stated the probability of various sea level magnitudes and their responses were marked 
on graph paper to produce a CDF. Common problems with boxplot-style methods are centring 
and spacing effects, where people preferentially use the centre of the scale and space their responses 
over the scale aesthetically, as reported by Renooij (2001). The CDF method, on the other hand 
does not require participants to be able to see the results as they articulate them, which reduces 
anchoring biases41. The CDF method was chosen for this reason and for the richer data that it 
provided. The interview protocol was adapted from the Stanford / SRI Assessment Protocol 
(Spetzler & Stael Von Holstein, 1975) and from Watson and Buede (1987). It ran as follows: 
1. Motivation 
Rapport was developed between the interviewer and the participant during the semi-structured 
interview, and the objectives of the elicitation were made clear. Participants were made aware of 
common heuristics and biases such as anchoring, overconfidence42 and herding43 in order that such 
biases might be reduced.  
2. Structuring 
The conditions of the probability elicitation were specified so that each estimate was as ‘accurate’ 
as possible. However, elicitations were unconstrained: the only conditions specified in this study 
were that the judgements should be for SLC in 2050, 2100 or 2200 on the Severn Estuary relative 
to 2011 levels. Two experts responded by doing multiple elicitations for different scenarios.  
3. Conditioning 
The participant was asked to talk about the information, scenarios and anchors they were using, 
and assumptions they were making. Participants were free to refer to trusted sources throughout 
the elicitation. Having said this, some experts did not do so because such sources were unavailable 
or because they chose to use what they remembered from the literature. Throughout the elicitation, 
participants were asked questions such as “how might extreme values come about?” and “is there 
no way at all that SLC could be more/less than that?” to increase the robustness of estimates.  
                                                   
41 Anchoring is where an initial estimate is used as an anchor on which to base subsequent estimates, biasing 
judgments towards the initial anchor (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
42 Overconfidence is common both in expert and non-expert judgements and can result in probability distributions 
that are too narrow. 
43 Herding occurs when other peoples’ opinions are incorporated into our own. It can cause problems if the ‘herd’ is 
led down the wrong path.  
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4. Encoding  
Although the probability elicitations were mainly directed in terms of percentage probability (e.g. 
a 95% chance of SLC being greater than X) or as a decimal (e.g. a probability of 0.95 that SLC will 
be greater than X), judgements were not constrained in this way and participants were encouraged 
to think of probability however they were most comfortable. For example, Matt described small 
probabilities as fractions44. A probability wheel was available for the experts to use if they wished, 
but most did not utilise it. The encoding process was as follows: 
 First, the participant was asked to think about what the extreme values might be and give the 
absolute upper and lower bounds (the range) of possible SLC, however small their 
probabilities. This reduced the possibility of anchoring on a mean or central estimate (Morgan 
et al., 2001) and counteracted central bias (the tendency to choose data points around the 
middle of the distribution). I marked the maximum and minimum sea-level values onto a piece 
of graph paper and drew a scale between them to create the x-axis.  
 Next, the participant was asked to assign cumulative probabilities to sea-level values within 
that range. Each response was marked onto the graph (marked with an ‘X’ on the example in 
Figure 5), the y-axis of which had been prepared prior to the interview. This process was 
repeated until around eight points were spread out on the distribution. Any inconsistencies 
were checked and corrected if necessary.  
 A rough line (marked with an A in Figure 5) was drawn between the points to form a 
cumulative distribution function.  
 Sea-level values corresponding to the median and the 50% and 90% confidence intervals were 
then read from the graph (example marked with a B in Figure 5), and the distribution adjusted 
if necessary until the respondent was satisfied that it summarised their own probability 
assessment. Elicitations carried out with Bob, Sandra, Andrew, Claire and Harry did not 
include checking all confidence intervals during the interview session but were confirmed with 
the experts via email correspondence afterwards.  
 Finally, the participant was asked “If I had £1000 and would give it to you if you made exactly 
the right estimate of SLC by [year], what would your absolute best estimate be?” in order to 
obtain a ‘best estimate’.  
5. Verification 
Throughout the elicitation, estimates were checked to ensure the participant actually believed their 
distribution. For example, if the probability of more than 50cm sea-level rise was 0.7, the 
probability of it being less than 50cm was checked to be 0.3.  
                                                   
44 Some research shows that talking about likelihood as a frequency (e.g. 10 in 100) versus talking about it as a 
probability (e.g. 10%) affects judgement of risk (Slovic, Monahan, & MacGregor, 2000), so this should be borne in 
mind.  
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Figure 5: Example of points on an elicited subjective probability distribution  
The points [X] are elicited from the expert, before a rough line (A) is drawn between the points. Sea-levels 
corresponding to confidence intervals (B) are then read off and checked with the expert. 
 
The probability elicitation method used here differs from previous SLC elicitations (Bamber & 
Aspinall, 2013; Titus & Narayanan, 1996). First, experts were not constrained in their elicitations 
and were free to make estimates as large or small as they felt appropriate. This is in contrast to 
elicitations of SLC projections by Titus and Narayanan (1996), where experts were consulted 
regarding the probabilities of each separate parameter in their SLR model, and results were 
aggregated, thus constraining projections by model parameters. Second, previous studies have not 
been systematically analysed in terms of the wider context in which they were made to take into 
account the factors that may have influenced the experts’ judgements. In this study, experts were 
encouraged to talk through their thoughts as they worked through the elicitations, and the 
elicitations were audio recorded, transcribed and thematically coded. This allowed for an 
exploration of how judgements were constructed, and facilitated an increased understanding of 
expert motivations, assumptions and barriers.  
Limitations  
There are three main limitations of the probability elicitations carried out for this study. Firstly, the 
small sample size means conclusions are tentative, leaving research questions regarding the 
probably judgements of other experts. Because the problem is very specific (SLR on the Severn 
Estuary) the expert base is relatively small, which may cause some skewing by anomalous 
perspectives (Arnell et al., 2005). Second, it should be noted that each expert’s judgement depends 
on what they retrieve from memory (or their chosen source) at that particular time, and possibly 
on the order in which the information is integrated into a unified opinion (Wallsten & Budescu, 
B 
A 
 56 
 
1983). Each elicitation is therefore a snap-shot of personal opinion at the time the interview was 
carried out and will change in light of new information. 
Third, elicitation is a ‘far from perfect process’ and while ‘probability is perfect [...] we can’t elicit 
it perfectly’ (O'Hagan & Oakley, 2004, p. 239). Furthermore, evaluating the success of a subjective 
elicitation is difficult. Garthwaite et al (2005, p. 694) suggest that ‘a “true” distribution would be 
the result of a method that leads the expert to view the problem from as complete and unbiased a 
perspective as possible through appropriate use of cognitive tools’ and that a successful elicitation 
will faithfully represent the person’s opinion. This was verified to some extent at the end of each 
elicitation by checking data points with experts and asking whether they were happy with the CDF. 
Of course, we cannot know which experts were most accurate in their probability elicitations 
because SLC in 2050, 2100 or 2200 hasn’t happened yet. So unlike frequentist probabilities such 
as tossing a coin, or predictions that are easily tested after the event such as weather forecasts 
(Murphy & Winkler, 1974), elicitations of SLC for 2050, 2100 and 2200 cannot be calibrated (yet).  
3.3 Expert perceptions phase: analysis methodology  
Transcription  
Around 140,000 words were transcribed during the expert interview phase. Transcription is a 
pivotal part of qualitative research (Oliver, Serovich, & Mason, 2005) and although it took some 
time, it was not regarded as a chore to be endured! Transcribing my own material had a number of 
advantages, namely:  
1. The transcription process facilitated ‘intense familiarity’ with the data, and thus aided the 
‘methodological and theoretical thinking essential to interpretation’ (Lapadat, 2000, p. 204).  
2. Transcription can powerfully affect the way in which participants’ opinions are understood 
and what conclusions are drawn (Oliver et al., 2005). In this research, transcription formed the 
first stage of the analysis, allowing me to get to know the data and make notes on themes as 
they arose. These themes then formed much of the coding structure, shown in Table 7.  
3. I was less likely to make content errors than outside transcribers, as I was present in all of the 
interviews and was able to contextualise what was said. 
4. I was already familiar with the subject matter so understood terminology.  
Transcription can be regarded as the first stage of data reduction (Lapadat, 2000); it is not possible 
to include every nuance, gesture and sigh and so a transcription style must be decided upon. At 
two ends of the spectrum, interviews can be transcribed in a naturalistic (or verbatim) way, where 
each utterance is captured in as much detail as possible; or in a denaturalistic way, where grammar 
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is corrected, interview noise (e.g. stutters and pauses) is removed and accents are standardised 
(Oliver et al., 2005). I chose an approach somewhere in the middle. Because the purpose of my 
expert interviews was to create an expert model of the risks, I was interested primarily in 
information content. The key criteria were therefore that the transcript was readable (i.e. not 
contain notations that need to be explained) and was a true representation of that the expert said. 
It was unnecessary to report on each stutter and pause, especially considering the time investment 
necessary for naturalistic transcription (Halcomb & Davidson, 2006). Furthermore, naturalised 
transcription can be seen as disrespectful –even unethical- if participants would have written words 
differently or used different grammar to their spoken words (Oliver et al., 2005; Poland, 2001). 
Finally, verbatim quotes can be difficult to read, and their impact can be made stronger by some 
careful editing of the transcript, without changing the meaning of what has been said (Poland, 
2001). Having said this, it was important to take into account when an expert expressed uncertainty, 
so some verbatim features (such as umms and aaahs) were included where contextually relevant. 
The following protocol was adapted from the literature (McLellan, MacQueen, & Neidig, 2003; 
O'Connell & Kowal, 1999; Poland, 2001) and was used for both expert and public interviews:  
Item  Protocol  
Long pause  [pause] 
Short pause … 
Interruptions and broken speech Only when contextually relevant (e.g., not where it is a 
stutter or stammer) Wor-  
Inaudible speech [Inaudible segment]/[unclear] 
Talking over each other  [overlapping]  
Uncertain text  It was [uncertain? Unclear?] what was said 
Garbled words XXX XXXX indicating approximate number of words 
Emphasis  CAPITAL LETTERS 
Sensitive information  ##sensitive information## 
Mispronunciations, grammatical 
errors, slang etc 
Transcribed as the individual says them.  
Dialectical pronunciations and 
enunciated reductions (e.g. ‘wanna’ 
and ‘sorta’)  
Transcribed where they are meaningful, e.g. where they 
are deemed important to the context or might indicate 
uncertainty. Elsewhere they are standardised. 
Filler words (e.g. um, yeah, whoa) Transcribed where they are meaningful, for example 
where they are deemed important to the context or 
might indicate uncertainty. Elsewhere they are ignored. 
Word or phrase repetitions  Transcribed where meaningful, for example where they 
are deemed important to the context or might indicate 
uncertainty. Elsewhere they are ignored. 
Paralinguistic features (vocal 
phenomena such as laughing and 
sighing)  
Not transcribed unless judged contextually important, 
where they will be written [laughing] for solo person, 
[laughs] for group, [cough] etc. 
Extralinguistic features e.g. gestures  Not transcribed  
Prosodic features (e.g. pitch, duration 
and loudness)  
Not transcribed 
Talking about irrelevant information 
(e.g. the weather today) 
Not transcribed. Short comment summarising what is 
said [talking about the weather] 
Table 6: Transcription protocol for EPP and PPP1 interviews 
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‘The process of transforming speech into specific words is not without challenges’ (McLellan et 
al., 2003) and an element of subjectivity comes into play when deciding where and when 
punctuation is required in order to not change the meaning or emphasis of a respondent. Some 
minor editing has been used to abbreviate quotes in this thesis. This editing largely consists of the 
removal of obvious repetitions and minor utterances from the interviewer. [...] indicates where 
larger sections of text have been omitted for clarity or where a topic was returned to after talking 
about something else.  
Thematic analysis  
Once interviews were transcribed, the next stage of the research was to ‘code’ the transcripts to 
allow an analysis of the themes and concepts within them. Coding describes the process of 
assigning sections of material (in this case transcript text) to these themes. Thematic analysis is a 
method of content analysis where the categories in the coding scheme capture the dominant 
themes within the transcript (Franzosi, 2004). ‘Through its theoretical freedom, thematic analysis 
provides a flexible and useful research tool’ (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 78). I used both structured 
(or deductive) coding to code responses on pre-defined themes like ‘flooding’ (c.f. Hansson & 
Bryngelsson, 2009) and a grounded exploratory (or inductive) approach whereby themes that 
emerged from the data were assigned new codes (c.f. Moser et al., 2011). These included codes like 
‘future’ that were used when respondents talked about things that may affect how they think about 
the future. Some of these codes were then assigned sub-codes to allow for a more detailed 
categorisation: for instance ‘future’ consisted of sub-codes ‘care’ and ‘uncertainty’. The framework 
therefore evolved from a set of pre-defined themes into a more complex set of codes. The final 
coding framework is shown in Table 7. 
NVivo (a computer-assisted qualitative analysis program) was used to aid the coding, sorting and 
organisation of data. Once the data was coded, the codes were printed out and scrutinised to draw 
together themes to construct an expert model of the risks. Emergent codes were then scrutinised 
to explore issues such as the ways in which experts think about the future and what methods they 
use to make projections of future SLC.  Cross-calibration and corroboration of the data with other 
researchers was not possible because I alone carried out all of the interviews, all of the transcribing 
and all of the analysis. However, this did mean that some interview error was minimised and meant 
the interviewing process was highly standardised between interviewees.   
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Table 7: Coding framework for EPP thematic analysis 
Codes and sub-codes Example  Coding 
frequency  
Processes It’s quite a lot of work just to figure out what’s happening now – Jack 10 
Climate change (general) Volcanoes yeah [pause], methane burps - Bob 14 
Extreme events  One person’s extreme event is not somebody else’s - Andrew 48 
Rainfall events  In 1981, there had been very little rain – Claire  
climate change suggests that we’re going to see changes in rainfall patterns - Daisy 
10 
Storms & surges  I think the jury is out on storms – Andrew  104 
Tides  You get the morphology essentially controlling the tidal propagation - Frank 27 
Tsunamis There’s a couple of people who think it [1607] might have been a tsunami, but there’s just so much 
written evidence that it was a storm – Claire  
9 
Other risks (i.e. not SLR or 
extreme events) 
I think other things are a greater risk to food security than having to realign the coast slightly. Or 
climate change. Like foot and mouth, or some other- a crop disease - Roxy 
39 
Severn Estuary characteristics and 
vulnerability  
You could raise sea levels by ten metres at low tide, and it still wouldn’t be that significant - James 42 
SLR  [with SLR] an event that was before a 1 in 100 year event, has become more likely - Jack 5 
SLR – evidence & 
historical  
When we analysed the extreme sea levels, there was a downward trend, and an upward trend of the 
minimum extreme sea levels – Harry  
12 
SLR – processes & rates If the temperature increases, you will get increased [NAO] indices in the North Atlantic. With quite 
high probability. And that will mean higher extreme sea levels - Harry 
94 
Impacts It’s only a problem to us because we live right on the coast - Harry 12 
Primary impacts  your potential climate change impacts are much more than they would be maybe on an open coast - 
Roxy 
13 
Biochemical cycling  I think we know very little about how sediments are moving through the estuary in ways that are 
important to biogeochemical cycling – Bob  
10 
Changes in tidal 
amplitudes  
My judgment would be a decline in tidal range. Or no change – Jack 3 
Flooding  [the Severn] is at risk from all these different sorts of flooding - Roxy 3 
Coastal & 
generic  
We really did have overtopping in Burnham. It’s happened fairly recently - Andrew 75 
Fluvial & surface  the length of time that many of the outfalls that we’ve got along the coast can actually discharge at will 
be reduced - James 
55 
Morphological change  centennial time scales before we see any impact on coastal habitats because of sediment loading - Bob 56 
Continued… 
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Table 7 continued 
Codes and sub-codes Example  Coding 
frequency  
Pollution  in a warmer, wetter world, Britain can expect to experience more frequent, big storm events, which 
will mobilise sediment, potentially pollutants, and all other kinds of stuff from catchments – Bob 
19 
Secondary impacts  there’s another dimension here of course. More people and buildings - Jack 21 
Economic, infrastructure 
& resources 
it can’t always be the public purse that has to step up and deal with these situations - Roxy 68 
Environmental  one risk of course is that we might get species that we don’t want - Daisy 31 
Other  what are the impacts of food prices, what are the impacts of people moving - Sandra 6 
Social (including homes)  most of our towns’ populations are located around the coast - Sandra 58 
Adaptation & Mitigation there are some areas of managed retreat, land owners are unhappy, which you can understand- Matt 89 
Understanding  I don’t think people really understand what is going to happen - Bob 4 
Expert’s background my interests are really understanding and managing long term coastal change - Jack 48 
Future research  I think we need more research into what has actually taken place here - Andrew 10 
Public understanding and 
communication  
You’ve got to be very careful that we don’t frighten people - Andrew 63 
Science, epistemology & heuristics I’m not sure if you can be the judge of whether I’m overconfident here - Jack 174 
Timescales  People’s values in 100 years, what are they going to be? – Jack  21 
Uncertainty & risk – general  [re future sediment erosion and accretion] we just don’t know; we just don’t know - Bob 70 
Probability Elicitation Themes   
Control & Comfort I’m hoping that it would be less than [30cm SLR], because- actually that is quite a bit of water - Daisy 19 
Future I really can’t think that far ahead - Claire 13 
Care If it goes over 2m, I’m not going to be here, what do I care? - Daisy 8 
Uncertainty - probability 
elicitation 
We’ve got no idea. And I’m willing to say “I have no idea”. I have no perception at all - Andrew 60 
Best/point estimates point estimate is naughty, really - Frank 20 
Methods of estimating 
probabilities 
This is all what I can recall and what we noted from other peoples’ work - Andrew 94 
Sources we talk about 1m over the SMPs, which is 100 years - Daisy 38 
Severe negative impacts  if it’s more than 2m here, that’s really really devastating in other parts of the world - Daisy 18 
Traits  I’m very optimistic - Claire 18 
Table 7: Coding framework for EPP thematic analysis
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Cognitive map analysis 
The experts’ individual cognitive maps were used mainly for a further scoping and discussion of 
SLC risks on the Severn Estuary. The analysis of transcripts from this stage brought many more 
issues to light and clarified where and how items were connected in experts’ own mental models. 
The cognitive maps themselves were also studied to ensure all of the topics that were included in 
the diagrams were considered for the meta-influence diagram. Diagrams were also very useful for 
assigning topics to themes and for seeing how experts linked themes and topics.  
Meta-influence diagrams are necessarily oversimplifications (Wood, Bostrom, Bridges, & Linkov, 
2012), and it is not possible to include everything that might possibly influence a risk. Subjectivity 
is implicit in diagram construction, from which experts are selected and agree to participate, 
through to the choice of which items go in which section. Like the climate change diagram created 
by Lowe and Lorenzoni (2007, p. 134), my meta-diagram will bear ‘some imprint of the research 
team who produced it’. However, also like Lowe and Lorenzoni (2007), I have been conscious of 
minimising the influence of my own views during the interview and map-creation process. One 
limitation cited by Ozesmi and Ozesmi (2004, citing Kosko 1992) is that if individual maps are 
aggregated to form one map, ‘the interviewees’ knowledge, ignorance and biases are all encoded in 
the maps’. However, I wanted to include such differences and disagreements in my model so this 
is not a limitation in this instance.  
Creating the meta-influence diagram 
‘The expert model is a composite of expert knowledge and beliefs, and is not one 
assumed to exist in the head of any one expert. It may include contradictory 
beliefs and uncertainties […] and miss variables that researchers have not 
studied.’ (Austin & Fischhoff, 2011).  
 
The aim of the meta-influence diagram is to summarise current expert understanding of the risks 
of SLC on the Severn Estuary. The influence diagram is a core part of the mental models 
methodology (Morgan et al., 2002), and provides a way of comparing public and expert 
perceptions. Sometimes, a simple diagram can tie the elements together, but sometimes ‘the reality 
is just complicated, and the diagram reflects that’ (Environment Agency, 2011a, p.44). The map 
was intended to represent qualitative rather than quantitative relationships between nodes. Such 
qualitative relationships ‘capture the sort of information that can be conveyed in non-technical 
communications, as well as being relatively uncontroversial scientifically’ (Maharik & Fischhoff, 
1993, p. 246).  
Influence diagrams were developed in the 1970s as a way to summarise information about 
uncertain decisions (Miller, Merkhofer, Howard, Matheson, & Rice, 1976). They have been utilised 
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by a number of agencies including the Environment Agency (e.g. Environment Agency, 2011a) 
and the World Economic Forum (World Economic Forum, 2011), for many uses including expert 
understanding of climate change (Lowe & Lorenzoni, 2007) and chemical risks (Cox et al., 2003). 
They have a common structure consisting of nodes and influences, which are often categorised 
into sections for ease of interpretation. Influence diagrams often include two types of node: 
rectangles to denote decisions, and ovals to denote uncertain circumstances (Morgan et al., 2002). 
As the majority of nodes in this diagram are processes rather than decisions, for the sake of clarity 
this delineation was not used. 
‘There is no simple recipe for converting the scientific information on a risk into an influence 
diagram’ (Morgan et al., 2002, p. 42). Indeed, I found it a far from easy task (see section 3.4). 
Strategies suggested by Morgan et al (2002) include the assembly method whereby factors are listed 
and related, the use of physical laws, scenarios, and templates. The methodology used here was 
based on the assembly method. After coding the interview transcripts, the relevant information 
was entered into an Excel spreadsheet, using the initial code structure as a starting point, and 
further iteratively sub-categorised them. These eventually became the basis of a hierarchy. This 
hierarchy was then worked through with pen and paper, a white board and post-it notes to develop 
a map structure. This research phase was an iterative process and took around three months. A 
number of different computer programs and various formats were trialled before a coherent 
structure was achieved and refined. CMap Tools (2013) software was chosen due to its flexibility, 
availability of various shapes and arrows, and hierarchical functions. Because SLC on the Severn 
Estuary is a complex set of interrelated issues, separate diagrams were created for each theme, 
which were then organised to feed into each other.  
Probability elicitation analysis  
Probability elicitation analyses consisted of converting CDFs into box plots (c.f. Morgan & Keith, 
1995; Morgan et al., 2001) and line graphs showing estimates over time, so that experts’ elicitations 
could be compared and contrasted. Box plots show the range of judged possible values, the 5th 
and 95th percentiles, the interval spanned by the 50% confidence interval, the median and the ‘best 
estimate’. Line graphs show low, medium and high estimates of SLC for the three time periods. 
The raw data is provided in Appendix C.  
Some authors combine separate expert judgements to provide one refined expert judgement (e.g. 
Titus & Narayanan, 1996; Vaughan & Spouge, 2002). This was not done in this study for two 
reasons. Firstly, it was the range of views and projections that I was interested in. Second, as 
eloquently summed up by Keith (1996, p. 139), ‘the fraction of experts who hold a given view is 
not proportional to the probability of that view being correct’. Subjective probability is by 
definition personal, and an aggregated probability distribution may not represent anyone’s opinion 
at all.  
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3.4 Reflexive account of the expert perceptions phase 
Interview sessions 
The interviews were very productive, and fulfilled their objective of providing the information 
necessary to create a detailed expert model of the risks. If I had more time, I would have liked to 
have interviewed more experts to obtain more probability elicitations for comparison, and to 
ensure I had covered all of the details of SLC on the Severn Estuary. I had not reached absolute 
saturation by the eleventh interview (i.e. some new ideas were still arising). However, no major new 
themes were arising, and I felt confident that I had enough information to compare with public 
perceptions.   
Regarding the interview experience, it was an enjoyable as well a productive one. Contrary to 
Zuckerman’s findings (1996, cited in Stephens, 2007) my knowledge was not continually tested 
during interviews, perhaps due to previous research I had carried out the field of SLC. However, 
the research phase was a learning process for me, as I did not have much prior experience of semi-
structured elite interviews. I struggled to remain totally ‘interpersonally neutral’ (Fowler & 
Mangione, 1990), particularly in the first few interviews. For example, I often found myself agreeing 
with interviewees in an attempt to put them at ease, especially if respondents struggled with the 
probability elicitation. Such ‘ethic of care behaviours’ (Matteson & Lincoln, 2009) can bias 
responses, and it can be a fine line between being ‘too friendly’ and ‘too professional’ during 
interviews; ‘too friendly’ poses the risk of bias, and ‘too professional’ poses the risk of ‘shutting 
down’ responses.  
As stated by Stephens (2007), ‘all research is a lived experience’. Indeed, my approach to the 
interviews changed as I became more confident and as I learned how to get the most useful data 
from the interview situation. I transcribed the first interview before carrying out any further 
interviews, and ensured I kept up to date with transcription rather than leaving it all to the end. 
This meant that issues arising in earlier interviews could be resolved as interviews progressed. The 
first interview in particular highlighted a number of areas for improvement: 
1. I learnt from this first interview that I must avoid talking over participants and appreciate the 
value of silence. 
2. Interview length was reduced from an initial two and a half hours to around two hours. 
3. The participant found the semi-structured interview section most tiring so it was refined. 
4. A major problem with the probability elicitation in the first interview was incorrect recall of 
values. Bob drew on a particular source (Shennan & Horton, 2002) but recalled that the units 
were an order of magnitude larger than they actually were (centimetres rather than millimetres). 
This meant that his sea-level rise estimates were ten times what they ‘should’ have been. 
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Subsequent interviewees were therefore told that they may like to bring trusted sources with 
them to the interview session, in order to reduce such recall errors. Once Bob realised his 
error, his estimates were adjusted accordingly.  
5. Minor adjustments were made to the protocol format, e.g. the map was changed to one that 
included topography, and the description of interview objectives was refined.  
6. The final stage of the interview initially consisted of the experts evaluating a ready-made 
influence diagram. This was dropped after the first session because it was deemed to be the 
least valuable stage. Another study that utilised ready-made influence diagrams also found that 
their example diagrams were not significantly utilised (Morgan & Keith, 1995).  
Semi-structured interviews  
Data can be considered reliable if is ‘repeatable, stable, or consistent’ (Wallsten & Budescu, 1983), 
and it can be said to be valid when it ‘accurately represents the opinion of the person from whom 
it was elicited’ (Wallsten & Budescu, 1983).The validity and reliability of the interview data in this 
thesis depends on a number of factors including but not limited to:  
 The experts’ memory (and reliance upon it) during the interview. For example, Bob’s recall 
errors affected his probability elicitations, which would not be the same if repeated once 
he had re-read the relevant papers that he cited.  
 My choice of what questions to ask; and the experts’ choice of what to answer and how 
to answer affects the extent to which the final data set reflects the experts’ views. 
 Various stages of interpretation and vocalisation, starting with when the expert learns of 
an issue, through to how they process the information, remember it and say it, through to 
when I hear it, transcribe it, read it back, and analyse it. ‘The data [that the mental models 
interview] produces reflect how people talk as well as how they think’ (Maharik & 
Fischhoff, 1993, p. 249).  
The validity of these semi-structured interviews (and indeed any interviews) is an important one to 
bear in mind when considering the results of this research. All findings are essentially an 
interpretation of what I perceive the experts to believe and should be read as such. Participating 
experts were sent a copy of the model and explanatory notes to check through if they wished to, 
but only one of the 11 experts responded to this invitation (and he suggested no corrections), so 
no modifications were made apart from adding to the model notes when new information came 
to light (e.g. with the publication of new documents) and making minor alterations to allow public 
perceptions to be mapped onto the model (section 5.2.3).  
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Cognitive mapping task 
The cognitive mapping task was a popular part of the expert interviews (Quote Box 1). Previous 
work using cognitive mapping methods has also shown that participants often enjoy the process 
(Kearney & Kaplan, 1997). With lay participants, there is a concern that cognitive mapping can be 
overwhelming due to ‘combinatorial explosion’ whereby the number of items grows very rapidly 
as a result of considering things in combination with each other (Ozesmi & Ozesmi, 2004). Indeed 
some of the maps did become very complex and did provide a challenge for expert interviewees 
(Quote Box 1).  
1. “This was fun… You could see how the thoughts were coming together” – Bob 
2. “This is very different. I’ve never done anything like this” – Matt 
3. “The diagram’s quite hard to do, but then I don’t know if that’s just because my head’s like 
really like…” – Sandra  
4. “I do this all time. In essence, we’re doing this type of analysis of coastal areas all the time. 
So in essence you’re getting my day job really, in some ways. But it’s still a challenge when 
you have to put it on a blank piece of paper. Because normally you start with- you don’t 
start with blank pieces of paper, you go back to something you’ve written before” – Jack 
Quote Box 1: Experts’ comments about cognitive mapping methods 
 
Creating the meta-influence diagram  
It was very difficult to organise the information into a coherent structure while including the main 
points and the main relationships. This became more troublesome as the diagram became more 
complicated, because the CMap Tools (2013) software that I used crashed every time an item was 
changed or moved. This meant it was necessary to create each section of the map separately and 
combine them at the final stage.  
Probability elicitations  
As stated by O’Hagan et al (2006), expertise in a specialist area is no guarantee of expertise in 
providing coherent probability assessments. This was the case with the elicitations carried out in 
this study, and the probability elicitation was the most problematic and challenging stage of the 
interviews. Although no interview participants refused to participate in the probability elicitation, 
some were not totally comfortable with the procedure. For instance, Andrew felt that the process 
was like “almost being asked to deny what other people have done and what other people think”. 
A reluctance to participate in expert elicitations was also noted by Arnell et al. (2005), whereby 
many scientists preferred to rely on climate model simulations. In this study, some experts stressed 
that they were not an expert at this stage, as shown in the quotes below.  
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5. “I take no credit for what I know” - Andrew 
6. “I’m not an expert” – Matt 
Quote Box 2: Experts’ comments during probability elicitation methods 
 
Despite some of the experts expressing uncertainty about their level of relevant expertise for such 
a task (Quote Box 2) all of the participating experts contributed highly valuable information to the 
probability elicitation and to each stage of the interview. Each helped to facilitate a detailed model 
of expert risk perceptions and contributed to useful local projections of future SLR. It is to these 
results that we now turn. 
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4 EXPERT PERCEPTIONS: RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the results of the first empirical stage of this research: the 
Expert Perceptions Phase (EPP). The purpose of the EPP was to develop an expert model of the 
risks of SLC on the Severn Estuary, to facilitate a comparison between expert and lay 
understandings. There were two outputs from this stage: a meta-influence diagram summarising 
expert perceptions of the risks of SLC on the Severn Estuary, and probability estimates of SLC for 
the years 2050, 2100 and 2200.  
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4.1 Expert perceptions Output One: Conceptual model of the 
risks 
4.1.1 How to use the model  
Figure 8 shows the expert meta-diagram of SLC on the Severn Estuary. It is designed to visually 
summarise the literature and the combined understanding of the 11 experts interviewed for the 
EPP in the summer of 2011. Arrows or “influences” connect related “nodes”: the node at the 
arrow’s tail exerts some influence on the node at the arrows head. Nodes (ovals) are organised into 
sections (sub-boxes), and sections are organised into themes (large boxes). The influence diagram 
can therefore be scrutinised at three levels of complexity: themes (drivers, physical impacts, socio-
economic impacts and vulnerability), sections (e.g. hydrological change and morphological change 
within the physical impacts theme) and individual nodes (e.g. erosion & accretion in the 
morphological change section). A summary is provided in Figure 6.   
Relationships have been simplified so that only those between themes and groups are included, 
rather than relationships between nodes in different themes/groups. Key uncertainties (aleatory45 
and epistemic46) and disagreements47 are denoted by dashed lines and dashed borders. The model 
is accompanied by a 60-page document (Appendix O), explaining and expanding upon each node 
in the model. These notes are not designed to be read from start to finish, but to be used as a 
reference tool.  
                                                   
45 Aleatory uncertainties are not reducible by further research because they arise from factors such as random 
variability within a system.  
46 Epistemic uncertainties arise from things that we could know, but don’t. They can in principle be reduced by 
further research.  
47 Disagreements within the literature or between expert interviewees. 
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Figure 6: Expert model summary 
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Figure 7: Expert model influence diagram summarising SLC on the Severn Estuary 
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4.1.2 The expert model: a summary and discussion  
What the model shows 
The diagram shows the drivers (causes) of SLC, which can lead to physical and socio-economic 
impacts. These impacts are moderated by natural and socio-economic vulnerability, which are 
themselves a function of exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity. These form the main themes 
of the model. The overall format of the model is inspired by decision theory (e.g. Miller et al., 1976) 
and previous mental models studies (particularly Morgan et al., 2002). The conceptual framework 
is influenced by a number of sources, notably Nicholls (2010) and the cognitive maps created by 
experts during the EPP. The model stresses the importance of diagnosing all attributes of the risk; 
not just the intensity of the drivers but also the vulnerabilities of the systems that stand to be 
affected. The framework used here is in-line with the event attribution framework by Huggel, 
Stone, Auffhammer, and Hansen (2013), which has been put forward since the model was 
developed. These authors stress that event attribution should be framed ‘with a more integrated 
risk concept’ where risk is defined as a function of the probability of occurrence of an event and 
its associated consequences, with consequences being a function of the intensity of the event, the 
exposed assets and their vulnerabilities (Huggel et al., 2013, p. 696).  
The model shows that SLC on the Severn Estuary is complex: a large number of processes, big 
and small, act over short and long timescales in various habitats and conditions. Closer scrutiny 
reveals countless interactions, feedbacks and thresholds, many of which are unknown or uncertain. 
While the model can be read in any direction (indeed the themes interact in non-linear ways), we 
shall start with the drivers on the left hand side as this is the most intuitive way to understand the 
basic cause and effect structure. The drivers of SLC are the physical processes that cause sea levels 
to change on the Severn Estuary. They include climatic drivers such as anthropogenic climate 
change, and non-climatic drivers such as local land movements. Drivers include both global 
regional and local factors that may influence sea levels on short and long timescales. Together, they 
determine the frequency and magnitude of extreme water levels. Impacts on the Severn Estuary 
tend to be most acute when drivers act together, such as a storm surge at high tide.  
These extreme sea levels have the potential to cause physical impacts at the coast, including 
changes to hydrological, ecological and morphological systems. Some such impacts are immediate, 
such as flooding, submergence and saltwater incursion; others are lagged, such as wetland loss, 
erosion and changes in water tables. Physical impacts occur by way of four main pathways: 
inundation (flooding), pollution, landscape changes and impacts on water resources. Flooding and 
habitat loss are expected to be the main physical impacts on the Estuary [Jack]48. 
                                                   
48 Where the model contains information from experts, their pseudonym is shown in square brackets. 
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Physical environmental changes have the potential to impact people living around the Severn 
Estuary through socio-economic impacts. This theme is organised into three broad pathways of 
impacts: people, built environment and ecosystems, and is loosely grouped into three clusters: 
personal & community wellbeing, business and industry, and government. Impacts include direct 
impacts such as damage to personal property and an inability to work, as well as more indirect 
impacts such as declining house prices and impacts on tourism.  
As mentioned above, the impacts of SLC upon the physical and socio-economic environment are 
expected to be mediated through these systems’ vulnerability to the risks. Vulnerability can be 
described as the degree to which a system is susceptible to, and can(not) cope with, change (IPCC, 
2001). It is like a filter or a moderator for the drivers and pathways, controlling how much impact 
they have. Vulnerability is a function of exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity (Nicholls, 2010), 
which are divided in the model into their physical and socio-economic aspects.  
Exposure describes the degree to which the system is exposed to drivers (Nicholls, 2010). It varies 
in space and time; for example, the outer estuary is more exposed to waves while the inner estuary 
is more exposed to changes in river flows; and the estuary is more exposed to flood inundation at 
high tide than it is at low tide. Physical sensitivity (the degree to which the physical system is 
affected (IPCC, 2001)) and adaptive capacity (the ability of the system to adjust (IPCC, 2001)) 
combine with exposure to determine the overall physical vulnerability of the system (Nicholls, 
2010). Some physical factors make the Severn Estuary particularly sensitive to flooding, such as its 
large catchment size, coastal configuration and topography. Others, such as its high tidal range, 
afford it some resilience.  
The extent to which people are affected by SLC (their socio-economic vulnerability) is 
determined by their exposure to the threat, how sensitive they are to change (socio-economic 
sensitivity) and how they respond (socio-economic responses). Socio-economic sensitivity 
consists of factors such as age, income and population density, but in practice it is highly dependent 
on context. For example, elderly people are often seen as vulnerable, but it is often factors such as 
health problems, low income or living in isolation that makes them vulnerable, rather than their 
age (Zsamboky et al., 2011). Socio-economic responses describe the ways in which humans are 
adapting or might adapt to SLC on the Severn Estuary. They include mitigation, adaptation and 
geoengineering49 responses; the choice and execution of which are determined by response drivers 
such as monetary resources and public attitudes. This theme includes a potential Severn Estuary 
Barrage, which is considered here as both a mitigation measure (to reduce reliance on fossil fuels 
and therefore reduce greenhouse gas emissions) and a possible adaptation measure (to reduce 
                                                   
49 Geoengineering is ‘deliberate large-scale intervention in the Earth’s climate system, in order to moderate global 
warming’ (The Royal Society, 2009). 
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coastal flooding). The barrage was a common theme amongst both expert and public interviewees, 
and is an important consideration in future SLC risks on the Severn Estuary. However, the impacts 
of a barrage on the processes and responses to SLC are not considered in great detail in the model 
(or the thesis), for two reasons. Firstly, a barrage might never happen (DECC, 2010; House of 
Commons, 2013) so knowing about the estuary’s response to SLC without one is important. 
Secondly, the existence of a barrage would have such wide-ranging impacts on the Severn Estuary 
that it would like change so much of the expert model as to warrant the development of a whole 
new one.  
The final sections of the model summarise a number of thresholds, time lags and feedbacks 
that operate with regard to SLC processes and impacts. Thresholds50 exist in both physical and 
socio-economic systems. For instance, anthropogenic climate change may pass key (but uncertain) 
thresholds leading to the irreversible breakdown of the Greenland Ice Sheet and the West Antarctic 
Ice Sheet, leading to 13-15m of SLR over a period of centuries (Nicholls, 2011). And from a socio-
economic perspective, coastal protection may be viable up to a SLR of 50cm, before it crosses a 
threshold where managed retreat is more viable for 60cm. Time lags51 include those caused by the 
thermal inertia of the deep ocean, which mean that SLR will continue long after climate forcings 
have ceased (Nicholls, 2011). Feedbacks52 in the climate system are numerous, and include the 
release of methane (a powerful greenhouse gas) from surface waters as ice melts (Kort et al., 2012) 
contributing to further warming.  
What the model does not show  
The model aims to summarise the processes operating on the Severn Estuary with relation to SLC, 
but it is not totally exhaustive. Firstly, physically plausible but highly unlikely extreme events (such 
as a shut-down of the North Atlantic thermohaline circulation53) pose equal if not much greater 
risks to the Severn Estuary than SLC. These factors are not implicitly included in the model, but if 
they occurred they may interact with the physical or human processes that are included, for example 
by exacerbating deprivation. Secondly, it is not possible to include all the possible processes and 
interlinkages while maintaining a visually coherent structure. It has been essential to simplify the 
model so it is readable. Thirdly, the model is a snapshot of understanding from a finite set of 
experts and literature at a given time (2011/12), so might change if different experts were 
interviewed at a different time. In this study, an extensive literature review was used alongside the 
expert interviews to broaden the scope and knowledge base of the model. However, the meta-
influence diagram will always be a function of the contributing sciences (Wood et al., 2012). This 
                                                   
50 Thresholds are conditions marking the transition from one state to another. 
51 A time lag is a length of time separating two correlated physical phenomena. 
52 Feedbacks occur where changes in one condition cause a response that leads to further change in the initial 
condition. 
53 Large scale ocean circulation driven by density currents. Part of the ‘great ocean conveyor’. 
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brings us back to a point made in section 2.4.2 regarding the ‘truth’ of such an expert model. While 
such a model is necessary to provide a benchmark by which to compare different views, the model 
presented here is a model of SLC on the Severn Estuary, not one of ‘scientific truth’. 
While the model is not time-specific, it does not consider further than 200 years. This is for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, although the time period was not specified during expert interviews or 
the literature review, both experts and the literature tended to focus on the next 100 years, with 
some consideration of the next 200 years. Secondly, many of the processes, particularly socio-
economic ones, may have changed beyond recognition by 2300. It should also be noted that 
although there may be a very small possibility of sea-level fall on the Estuary, this is considered so 
unlikely that it is also not considered in the model. Also, there are elements of the future we cannot 
anticipate, such as unexpected discrete events and discontinuities in long-term trends, so these 
unknowns simply cannot be included in the model either.  
Finally, though the relative importance of certain nodes is discussed in the model text (Appendix 
O), the meta-diagram does not show which nodes are most ‘important’. This is because the experts 
were not explicitly asked which were most important during the interviews, and the literature does 
not often explicitly state such things. However, where the literature or the experts did state the 
importance of certain factors (such as flooding), this is included in the model notes.  
Uncertainties and disagreements  
The most notable uncertainties and disagreements in the meta-influence diagram are denoted by 
dashed lines54. While uncertainties are described more in Appendix O, they also warrant a brief 
discussion here on account of their relevance for public understanding and adaptation planning. 
There are uncertainties in all themes of the expert model. Some of them are due to gaps in 
knowledge and can in theory be reduced by further research (epistemic uncertainties), while some 
are a function of factors such as random variability and cannot be reduced by further research 
(aleatory uncertainties). Some such uncertainties are shown in Table 8. Note that although they are 
categorised as epistemic or aleatory, there is a lot of overlap; for example, although uncertainties 
regarding the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) are classified as epistemic, part of the reason why 
scientists are uncertain about its future response is due to its natural variability; and while 
anthropogenic climate change is classified as having aleatory uncertainty due to unknown future 
emission trajectories, it also contains reducible uncertainties (if it did not, there would be no value 
in continuing climate change research). Experts also cited a number of uncertainties involved in 
predicting future SLC on the Severn Estuary, which are described later in Table 11. 
 
                                                   
54 Uncertainties are drawn from those explicitly states by experts and in the literature. There is an element of subjectivity as to 
which factors are considered the most notable, but including key uncertainties was deemed a valuable addition to the model. 
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Node  Epistemic uncertainty   Aleatory uncertainty   
Drivers of SLC  
ACC 
(anthropogenic 
climate change) 
The rate and extent of future ACC 
is unknown in part because the 
climate system is not perfectly 
understood or represented in 
climate models 
The rate and extent of future ACC is 
unknown in part because it has an element 
of intrinsic (unforced) variability, and will 
be forced by future unknown greenhouse 
gas emissions, themselves forced by 
unknown future economic conditions and 
value sets  
NAO (North 
Atlantic 
Oscillation) 
Models disagree about future 
changes to the NAO in response to 
anthropogenic climate change 
NAO responses will be influenced by 
future ACC, which is itself unknown (see 
above) 
Glacio-eustacy: 
large ice-sheets 
The response of large ice sheets to 
warming constitutes the biggest 
uncertainty in the range of future 
climate–induced SLR 
Responses of large ice-sheets will depend 
on future ACC, which is itself uncertain 
(see above) 
Tsunamis The absolute tsunami risk for the 
Severn Estuary is unknown but in 
theory more research could reduce 
the associated uncertainties 
The tsunami risk could be increased due to 
ACC through increased incidence of mass 
movements (see above for ACC aleatory 
uncertainties) 
Storms  Scientists are uncertain as to how 
storms will change with ACC 
Storms are affected by natural variability in 
climate and weather systems  
Meteotsunamis55 Further research is necessary to 
assess the extent to which 
meteotsunamis may threaten the 
Severn Estuary coastline in future  
Future trends may be affected by many of 
the same processes governing future trends 
in storms (see above) 
Physical impacts of SLC  
Changes in tidal 
regime and curve  
It is unknown how the tidal range 
will respond to SLC, and future 
changes may be affected by 
morphological feedbacks 
SLC will depend on ACC, which itself 
depends on future emissions, cultural 
values, global economics etc (see above)  
Interactions 
between flood 
water bodies  
It is not fully understood how 
different sources of flood risk 
combine and interact 
 
Estuary retreat / 
rollover 
Rollover will only be possible if 
there is room to migrate and if 
sediments are available. Further 
research could reduce uncertainties 
regarding the estuary’s response 
Sediment supply, and the availability of 
space for the estuary to migrate, will be 
influenced by factors that cannot currently 
be known (e.g. future population growth 
and land use management decisions) 
Recovery? What constitutes ‘recovery’ on the 
Estuary is difficult to define due to 
ongoing estuary retreat / rollover, 
the rates of which are uncertain 
Recovery will in part depend on natural 
variability within the system, for example 
the population dynamics of coastal 
ecosystems 
Physical sensitivity and adaptive capacity  
Species 
interdependencies 
Research may reduce gaps in 
knowledge regarding species 
interdependencies  
 
Socio-economic responses  
Maladaptation?   Future human behaviour (including 
maladaptive behaviours) cannot be known 
Table 8: Summary of uncertainties in the expert model 
                                                   
55 Meteotsunamis are unanticipated ‘long-period waves that possess tsunami characteristics but are meteorological in 
origin, although they are not storm surges’ (Haslett & Bryant, 2009). 
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As shown in Table 9, there were few disagreements between experts during the EPP, and few 
disagreements between experts and the literature. A high degree of consensus may be due to a 
number of factors, including degrees of familiarity with the science (Morgan & Keith, 1995), 
psychological anchoring (Morgan & Keith, 1995), and the existence of strong evidence to support 
a consensus.  
 
Disagreement  
Details  
Spatial vulnerability to 
surges 
There is debate over where on the Estuary is most exposed to surges. 
It may be that the surge level builds as it travels up the estuary [Matt] 
and thus threatens the upper reaches more, or that the surge 
amplitude reduces as water spills out onto the floodplain as it travels 
[James], thus affecting the lower reaches more  
Extreme sea levels  There is debate [Claire, Harry] over whether extreme sea levels are 
actually increasing on the Severn Estuary 
1607 tsunami / storm There is debate in the literature regarding whether the devastating 
1607 floods may have been caused by a tsunami or a storm (Bryant 
& Haslett, 2007; Haslett & Bryant, 2004; Horsburgh & Horritt, 
2006). 
Dominance of 
overtopping versus 
defence failure  
Flooding may occur through overtopping or defence failure, and 
there is debate over which process will be dominant as sea levels rise 
[Claire, Matt, Roxy] 
Table 9: Summary of disagreements in the expert model 
 
The large number of factors that combine to influence the risks of SLC on the Severn Estuary, and 
the complexities involved in predicting its future response, have implications for designing the next 
stage of this study (PPP1). While not all of these factors could be covered during either the PPP1 
interviews or the PPP2 survey, many had to be included to enable a holistic coverage of the topic. 
The solution was to design the PPP1 protocol around the core themes in the meta-influence 
diagram, rather than trying to investigate each separate node in the model. Hence, as shown in 
Appendix E, the PPP1 protocol included main prompts on each theme: the drivers, the physical 
impacts, socio-economic impacts, responses, and factors that influence vulnerability. 
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4.2 Expert perceptions Output Two: Probability elicitations of 
future sea-level change 
4.2.1 Results 
The box plots in Figure 8 summarise the distributions of expert estimates of SLC for 2050, 2100 
and 2200. They show the range of judged possible values, the 5th and 95th percentiles, the interval 
spanned by the 50% confidence interval, the median and a ‘best estimate’.  Wider spreads indicate 
higher uncertainty; for example, if an expert was absolutely certain that SLR would be 44.4cm (the 
UKCP09 medium emissions scenario for Cardiff by 2095), all of the symbols would be clustered 
on 44.4cm. The plots show that all participants projected a high likelihood of future SLR on the 
Estuary, with three experts asserting very low probabilities (≤2%) of sea-level fall for 2100 or 2200. 
However, they show that despite strong consensus that there will be SLR, there was wide variation 
in judgements. For example, the upper 95% confidence levels for the year 2050 range from 10.7cm 
to 95cm (i.e. there is a 5% chance that sea-level rise will exceed this value); median estimates for 
2100 range from 20cm to 100cm; and ‘best estimates’ for 2200 range from 25cm to 280cm, more 
than an order of magnitude difference.  
There was also considerable disagreement regarding how much SLC is possible on the Severn 
Estuary: while James perceived a very remote possibility (1/109 chance) of 70m sea-level rise by 
2050, Bob, Claire and Jack projected an absolute maximum of 0.5m. Figure 9 shows that the 
trajectories of change also differ: while some experts’ median estimates show accelerated SLR after 
2100 (e.g. Jack), others (e.g. Bob) show a deceleration. Levels of confidence also vary: while some 
experts were willing to state absolute maximum and minimum values (e.g. Frank), others were not 
(e.g. Matt).  
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Figure 8: Box plots summarising expert subjective probability distributions  
Box plots show results elicited for relative SLC on the Severn Estuary in 2050 (red), 2100 (blue) and 2200 
(green). Vertical tick marks indicate 90% confidence intervals, and boxes denote 50% confidence intervals. 
Open circles indicate medians, solid triangles indicate ‘best estimates’ (value chosen if the expert were to bet 
money on it) and the open triangle indicates a reluctantly stated best estimate (Frank was reluctant to give 
best estimates because he felt it defeats the object of eliciting a probability distribution). Question marks show 
where no absolute maximum or minimum was stated, and dashed lines show where no explicit probability or 
very low probabilities (1/105 to 1/109) were estimated. PLE = possible low emissions scenario; BAU = business 
as usual scenario; IM = intermediate mitigation scenario; SM = stringent mitigation scenario 
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Figure 9: Experts’ low, medium and high estimates of sea-level change for 2050, 2100 and 2200.  
Low estimates (95% probability of exceedance) are denoted by dotted lines. Median estimates are shown by 
solid lines. High estimates (5% probability of exceedance) are denoted by dashed lines. Alternative scenarios 
(by Frank & Jack) are shown. Note the different scale for Sandra’s elicitation. 
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4.2.2 Comparison with projections in the literature  
Consistent with a recent expert judgement study (Bamber & Aspinall, 2013), the results indicate a 
greater diversity of opinion than that shown in often cited reports such as the IPCC (IPCC, 2007, 
2013) and UKCP09. While median estimates -which ranged from 9.6cm to 40cm in the year 2050; 
20cm to 100cm in 2100; and 35cm to 300cm in 2200- were of the same order of magnitude as 
estimates in the literature56, experts’ 50% and 90% confidence intervals varied considerably more. 
These findings support work by Kriegler et al. (2009, p. 5045), who found that in many cases, 
experts’ probability judgements relating to tipping points in the climate system were ‘considerably 
higher than the probability allocated to catastrophic events in current climate damage assessments’. 
Indeed, in the 20 years from 1989 to 2010, while the range in projected SLR by 2100 has increased 
in academic papers and in newspaper reports, it has not (so much57) in IPCC reports (Rick et al., 
2011).  
4.2.3 Discussion of the factors influencing expert projections  
A thematic analysis of elicitation transcripts indicates that a number of factors may have affected 
experts’ judgements, leading them to be different from each other’s and different from mainstream 
projections such as those of the IPCC (2007). These include the methods and information that 
experts used, heuristics, and the ways in which experts think about the future. 
Methods and sources 
Consistent with Spetzler and Stael von Holstein’s (1975) observation that people tend to place 
more confidence in a single piece of ‘representative’ information than in a larger body of more 
generalised information, seven of the 11 experts directly or indirectly used UKCP09 (see UK 
Climate Projections, 2012) to guide their elicitations. This is unsurprising considering that 
UKCP09, a suite of UK climate projections providing information for adaptation planning, itself 
consists of probabilistic distributions from an ensemble of climate models. Roxy stated for example 
that “UKCP09 [is] our best guess at the moment. But that in itself is based on guesses on guesses”. 
Despite UKCP09’s high esteem, none of the experts based their projections solely on these data. 
Other sources included experts’ own measurements, satellite observations, IPCC projections 
                                                   
56 Global average relative sea-level rise estimates in IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) are 26cm to 98cm 
(model based likely range for four RCP scenarios, compared to 1986-2005) by the year 2100 (IPCC, 2013), though 
these projections were not released until after the expert elicitations took place. Global average relative sea-level rise 
estimates in IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) are 18cm to 59cm (model-based range for six emissions 
scenarios, compared to 1980-1999) by 2100 (IPCC, 2007), while Titus and Narayanan’s aggregated median estimates 
of SLC are 34cm by 2100 and 81cm by 2200 (Titus & Narayanan, 1996). Some local estimates for Cardiff are 21–
68cm SLR projected under a medium greenhouse gas emission scenario by 2095 (MCCIP, 2010), and a central 
estimate of 44.4 cm by 2095 under a medium emissions scenario (UK Climate Projections, 2012). Other local 
projections for the Severn Estuary are provided in Table 2. 
57 The latest IPCC report (IPCC, 2013), published since the Rick et al. paper, has a wider range of projections than 
the AR4.  
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(IPCC, 2007), the Severn Estuary SMP2 (Severn Estuary Coastal Group and ATKINS, 2010d) and 
papers published about local and regional SLC (see Table 10). As well as using a variety of 
information sources, experts chose different methods to construct their judgements. These 
included: calculating a linear rise from recorded rates of SLC on the Estuary (e.g. Harry); 
extrapolating from a range of emissions scenario graphs (e.g. Frank); thinking about extreme 
scenarios, feedbacks and time lags (e.g. Sandra); gut feelings (e.g. Matt); and using indicators from 
local geomorphology (e.g. Andrew). Harry, who used his own data, had higher confidence in his 
2050 projections than any other expert, denoted by the narrowest confidence intervals. Sandra, 
who thought about extreme scenarios, feedbacks and timelags, had the widest confidence intervals 
of all 2200 elicitations.  
Expert  Sources Methods 
Bob  Shennan & Horton 
(2002) 
Used recorded rates to project future rise.  
Sandra UKCP09 Used UKCP09 emissions scenario graphs, “taking them as 
rough guidelines and taking my own approximation from 
there”, taking into account that her sources only include certain 
emissions scenarios. 
2200: thought about processes such as feedbacks, ice caps 
melting, and high emissions scenarios. 
Andrew UKCP09 and 
academic papers 
about local SLR 
2050: UKCP09 & continuation on a trajectory, “just allowing 
what we know has happened to carry on happening” 
2200 minima: UK coastal geology.  
Claire IPCC (from 
memory) 
Based on other people’s measured rates, plus a mental PDF. 
Rates not worked out accurately, but used as a guide.  
Roxy  UKCP09 and SMP2 “A general feel”.  
2200: extrapolated from 2100, and compared what the world 
was like 200 years ago with what it could possibly be like in 200 
years. 
Harry  Own work, other 
data sets and IPCC 
reports 
Used geological record and his own sea level measurements to 
extrapolate rates into the future. Also used other data sets with 
longer time scales, and created a mental curve with an 
accelerated rise.  
Matt  Shoreline 
Management Plans, 
UKCP09 
“Semi-informed” gut feelings based on background 
knowledge. Once plotted, looked at graph and spread it out to 
make it less steep.   
James  UKCP09, Defra and 
various others 
Used historical rates, published projection graphs (including 
Defra and UKCP09), background reading and “general 
knowledge about what is happening from a climatic point of 
view”. 
Daisy  SMP2 Extrapolated from the 2100 1m estimate used in SMP2. 
Frank  Variety of published 
sources, especially 
UKCP09 
Used rates from published sources, extrapolating from a range 
of emissions scenarios; as well as thinking about extreme 
scenarios, time lags, and physical processes. 
Jack  IPCC, literature, 
observations 
(including satellite).  
Used rates and trends, graphically by drawing a curve and 
families of curves, using instincts for 2200, increasing the 
ranges due to the greater uncertainties associated with making 
projections specific to the Severn Estuary. 
Table 10: Sources and methods used by experts to estimate future SLC on the Severn Estuary 
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The ways in which experts think about the future 
Transcripts indicate that the ways in which experts think about the future influenced their 
probability judgements. The first aspect regards the uncertainties implicit in predicting future sea-
levels. Almost all elicitations show wide probability ranges and confidence intervals, indicating large 
uncertainties in projections. Uncertainty increases over longer timescales in all elicitations, and is 
greatest for the year 2200. Table 11 lists sources of uncertainty cited by expert participants.  
Expert Source of uncertainty: aleatory uncertainties 
Bob, Sandra, Claire, Roxy, 
James, Frank, Jack  
Uncertainties in future conditions e.g. emissions scenarios, 
possibility of a Severn Barrage 
Matt Unknowables 
 Sources of uncertainty: epistemic uncertainties 
Sandra, Andrew, Harry, Matt, 
James, Jack  
Process uncertainty, e.g. ice sheet response to warming, 
feedbacks, time lags, regime shifts 
Sandra, Andrew, James, Frank  Climate model uncertainty 
Matt, Daisy Availability of and confidence in data  
Sandra, Roxy Unavailability / non-existence of projections for long timescales 
(most of the sources upon which experts based their judgements 
do not make projections beyond 2100) 
James Uncertainties regarding what parameters are included in 
guidance projections  
Table 11: Sources of uncertainty in expert judgements of future SLC on the Severn Estuary 
 
Experts tended to find it particularly difficult to think about the future beyond 2100, as shown in 
Quote Box 3. This is unsurprising because uncertainties increase with time due to the chaotic 
nature of the climate system and unknowns such as emissions scenarios. Lenton et al. (2006, p. 2) 
suggests that our focus on short timescales also ‘surely reflects the human lifetime’ and our 
difficulty in contemplating the world ‘long after we cease to live in it’. These results echo 
stakeholders’ difficulty in thinking about the future in the context of rapid SLR on the Thames 
Estuary, many of whom commented on the difficulty of making decisions over long timescales 
(Lonsdale et al., 2008). Research suggests that people think about time in different ways (Moser et 
al., 2011). Experts interviewed for this study showed varying reliance on each of the two repertoires 
discussed by van Asselt et al. (2010)58. This was revealed by their methodologies: trend 
interpolation (e.g. Andrew) and using indicators of past sea levels from local geology (e.g. Harry) 
are historic determinist approaches, whereas thinking about extreme scenarios (e.g. Sandra) is more 
aligned with futuristic difference.  
                                                   
58 As discussed in section 2.6.1, van Asselt et al (2010) identified two ‘temporal repertoires’ describing how experts 
think about the future: historic determinism, where the future is conceptualised as being determined by the past and 
present; and futuristic difference, where the relationship between the past, present and future is looser, and 
discontinuity is key. They suggest that despite foresight practice being more aligned with the futuristic difference 
repertoire, there is a strong tendency to resort to the historic determinism repertoire. 
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7. “What’s the purpose of the outlandish [2200 elicitation]?” – Andrew 
8. [for 2100] “there’s a problem here though, because it’s going to be so dependent on the 
futures, isn’t it. And so it gets less like simple probability. [It is now] conditional 
probability. Which makes me very uncomfortable because it’s just like guessing” [... for 
2200,] “200 years and 1000 years, you know, it is really difficult to actually think that far 
ahead…” - Claire 
9. “[2200] It’s a stupidly long time” – Roxy 
10. “[2200] It’s all these ifs ifs ifs ifs ifs” – Harry 
11. 2100: “Gosh we’re really guessing, aren’t we. That’s so far away that so many things can 
happen” – Matt 
12. “200 years. I have NO confidence in my estimates AT ALL that far ahead, because it’s just 
TOO far ahead to conceive of, really... It’s so far ahead in the future as to be completely 
meaningless… These are now WILD guesses” – Daisy 
13. 2200: “for a median change, I feel- well, we’re getting into the realms of science fiction 
here” – Jack 
Quote Box 3: Experts’ future thinking 
 
Heuristics  
The influence of heuristics in probability judgements has been well documented (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Heuristics that were particularly evident in these elicitations are anchoring, 
where an initial estimate is used as an anchor on which to base subsequent estimates, and herding, 
where others’ opinions are incorporated into the experts’ own. Despite efforts to encourage experts 
to concentrate on ranges of possible outcomes rather than anchoring elicitations on particular 
values, some experts calculated their distribution directly from median values in the published 
literature (Quote Box 4).  
14. “I have been institutionalised, if you like. I’ve fed myself a diet of about 40cm” – Andrew, 
academic 
15. “I’ve been brainwashed, haven’t I? By lots of clever scientists” – Roxy, consultant 
16. We talk very much about 1m by the end of the [SMP] plans, which is 100 years. So I don’t 
tend to do anything below that [laughs]. I tend to talk about 1m in 100 years – Daisy, 
government 
Quote Box 4: Experts’ anchoring heuristics 
Another heuristic increasingly recognised as important in decision making is the optimism bias, 
whereby people tend to believe they are less likely to experience negative events, and more likely 
to experience positive events than other people are (Weinstein, 1980). Transcripts indicate that the 
optimism bias may have influenced some experts’ elicitations, consistent with a growing body of 
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research regarding the relationships between probability estimates, optimism and pessimism 
(McKenna, 1993; Vosgerau, 2010; Windschitl, Smith, Rose, & Krizan, 2010) (Quote Box 5). For 
instance, where Frank and Jack provide alternative scenarios, they are for lower emissions rather 
than higher emissions, which may indicate an optimistic stance. Interestingly, those experts who 
vocalised their optimism did not project lower SLC: as James remarked, “one man’s pessimism is 
another man’s optimism” and such outlooks are subjective. However, it is reasonable to suggest 
that if they were not being optimistic their SLC judgements may have been higher.  
17. “[it’s the] optimism in me thinking that we’ll have hopefully curbed some emissions” – 
Andrew 
18. “I can’t envisage sea levels in the Severn Estuary being more [than 5m].” 
[facilitator] Why not there but elsewhere? “Well… I’m not sure- I don’t know. I don’t have 
any reasons.” - Claire 
19. “I’d like to think it would be nearer 20 than 50. So we had actually got a grip on it... We can 
do it… Fighting with my optimism and my pessimism.” – Roxy 
20. “I’m not going to advocate vast amounts of melting of glaciers and ice caps [...] I 
personally think it will be low. But I guess that’s more of a vested interest because I’m 
uncomfortable with the idea of it being higher… It feels like a lot of water; it feels like a 
very big impact. It feels like a big problem” – Daisy 
Quote Box 5: Experts’ optimism 
4.3 Summary: expert perceptions of sea-level change on the 
Severn Estuary  
The expert model (Figure 8) illustrates the complex nature of SLC on the Severn Estuary, showing 
that there are many facets of change, many interactions, and much uncertainty. Quantitative 
analyses of subjective probability distributions underscore the uncertainties implicit in predicting 
the Estuary’s future response. While they show that experts perceive future SLC on the Estuary as 
highly likely, there is wide variation between judgements and much uncertainty regarding the 
magnitude of future SLC, particularly over longer timescales. Qualitative analyses of elicitation 
transcripts indicate that experts’ judgements may have been influenced by their choice of methods 
and information sources, heuristics, and the ways in which they think about the future. As well 
having a number of implications outside of this research (see 9.2.1), the EPP has provided a model 
to compare with public perceptions in the next phase of the study. It is to this phase that we now 
turn. 
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5  PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS: 
METHODS 
 
This chapter discusses the methodology employed for the second and third empirical stages of 
research: mental models interviews with members of the public living around the Severn Estuary 
(N=20), and a wider public survey of the Estuary population (N=359). The rationale and methods 
are outlined, and the limitations discussed.  
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5.1 Introduction  
This chapter details the methodology used to explore public perceptions of SLC on the Severn 
Estuary. This investigation involved two stages. Public perceptions phase one (PPP1) consisted of 
qualitative interviews with members of the public living around the Severn Estuary (N=20), and 
public perceptions phase two (PPP2) involved a quantitative survey of a wider sample of the 
population living around the Severn Estuary (N=359). Broadly, PPP1 was designed to scope public 
beliefs, while PPP2 was designed to further explore the perceptions raised during PPP1. The two 
stages complement each other, and thus their results are discussed in parallel in Chapters 6, 7 and 
8. Table 12 outlines the research questions answered in PPP1 and PPP2. 
 
Research 
Question  
Data Data collection 
methods 
Data analysis 
methods 
Is SLC a salient 
issue for the public?  
Public opinions of 
SLC, and its 
comparison with 
other issues 
PPP1 mental models 
interviews, PPP2 
introductory questions  
Thematic analysis, 
descriptive statistics  
What does the 
public know about 
SLC on the Severn 
Estuary? 
Knowledge and 
beliefs about SLC 
on the Severn 
Estuary  
PPP1 mental models 
interview, picture sorting 
task and cognitive 
mapping task;  PPP2 
knowledge questions  
Thematic analysis 
facilitating assimilation 
into a public meta-
diagram of the risks; 
descriptive statistics 
How much SLC 
does the public 
expect on the 
Severn Estuary?  
Estimates of 
future SLC 
Mental models interview 
(PPP1), sliding scale to 
gauge broad perceptions 
of magnitudes (PPP2), 
true/false questions 
(PPP2) 
Thematic analysis; 
descriptive statistics  
What factors in 
addition to 
knowledge affect 
public perceptions 
of SLC on the 
Severn Estuary? 
Opinions, feelings 
and values   
Mental models interview 
(PPP1); PPP2 questions 
about values, concern 
and future thinking  
Thematic analysis;   
exploratory statistics 
(multiple regressions) 
to explore relationships 
How might SLC 
best be 
communicated with 
the public? 
Media preferences, 
opinions about 
communications 
PPP1 mental models 
interviews, PPP2 
questions about media 
use and trust in 
information sources 
Thematic analysis,  
descriptive statistics  
Table 12: Research summary: public perceptions (PPP1 & PPP2) 
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5.2 Public perceptions phase one methods: qualitative interviews  
5.2.1 Introduction  
This section reports the second empirical phase of the research, the first of the public phases 
(PPP1). It involved mental models interview sessions carried out in 2012 with members of the 
public living around the Severn Estuary (N=20). Each session included a semi-structured interview, 
a picture sorting task, and a novel approach to the creation of a cognitive map. The purpose of this 
phase was to explore perceptions amongst members of the public, to a) compare with expert 
perceptions, and b) inform the development of a wider survey (section 5.3).  
5.2.2 Rationale and methodology for PPP1 
Overarching rationale 
Administering a questionnaire ‘presumes that one knows in advance the full set of potentially 
relevant lay beliefs and misconceptions, as well as the terms in which they are intuitively phrased’ 
(Morgan et al., 2002, p. 23). Structured tests also risk communicating the experts’ knowledge and 
may encourage compliance bias. Open ended interviews, on the other hand, place no such 
constraints on the interviewee and allow people to express their beliefs more naturally (Read et al., 
1994). Focus groups would be an alternative means of eliciting such beliefs, but individual 
interviews are preferred as the ‘behaviours in question are generally at the individual level and 
because, in focus groups, a few people can influence others' thoughts or propensity to speak, 
leading to incomplete or inaccurate elicitation.’ (Austin & Fischhoff, 2011, p. 126).  
Interview methodology 
The purpose of the interview sessions was to find out what people already perceive regarding SLC 
on the Severn Estuary. The interviews therefore provided participants with minimal new 
information and aimed to give them plenty of scope to talk about everything that (s)he considered 
relevant to the topic. The methodology was adapted from the mental models methodology 
developed by Morgan et al. (2002), designed to allow participants to talk about their beliefs in a 
way that is meaningful to them. There are a number of ways to elicit a mental model. Some 
approaches aim to do it ‘directly’ through a diagrammatic interview approach, while others aim to 
recreate the mental model from other data such as interview transcripts (Jones et al., 2011). The 
approach adopted for this study used a combination of methods, comprising three separate parts 
of the interview session, each exploring participants’ mental models in slightly different ways. 
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The first stage of the session was a semi-structured mental models interview, designed to elicit a 
‘core dump’ of the participants’ thoughts on the topic, before each of these initial thoughts was 
followed up in more detail and more themes were introduced for discussion (Morgan et al., 2002). 
Questions were open ended in order to elicit as much information as possible, without leading the 
participant. The second stage was a picture sorting task, designed to prompt discussion on topics 
that did not arise during the mental models interview. The third stage was a cognitive mapping 
task, designed to explore how participants grouped and linked ideas.  
Interview sessions typically lasted around 90 minutes, and were carried out in the participants’ 
home or place of work. All sessions were audio recorded and transcribed. Prior to the interviews 
commencing, the methodology was piloted with family and friends (N=5) to allow for 
familiarisation with the interview questions and process, and to refine the methodology. Changes 
were made to the protocol at this stage, particularly a simplification of the cognitive mapping task 
on account of participants finding the original method (adapted from Tikkanen, Isokaanta, 
Pykalainen, & Leskinen, 2006) too constraining.  
Sampling 
The aim was to recruit a demographically diverse sample of participants living close to the Severn 
Estuary. All participants were aged 18 or over, and it was desirable that participants should have 
no obvious connection to the topic (Morgan et al., 2002). However, it was not possible to guarantee 
that participants held no formal expertise in SLC, as participants were not told prior to the 
interview that it would be about SLC. One participant (Laura) did have some prior experience of 
the subject having worked on policy documents for the region.  
The number of interviews I could carry out hinged upon how much time and money was available, 
and how many people were willing to be interviewed. Previous research suggests that between 10 
and 25 interviews is sufficient for mental models studies (de Bruin & Bostrom, 2013; Morgan et 
al., 2002) and cognitive mapping studies (Tikkanen et al., 2006) in order to reveal most of the 
common beliefs held by the population. After about 20 interviews, saturation is reached and very 
few new concepts arise (Morgan et al., 2002; Ozesmi & Ozesmi, 2004). Due to time constraints, 
20 participants were interviewed for the current study. This seemed sufficient; although themes 
were occasionally still emerging in later interviews, saturation of major themes appeared to have 
been reached by this point. Due to the exploratory nature of the study more interviews would have 
been desirable, but were deemed unnecessary.  
A purposive sampling technique was used whereby I asked acquaintances (‘gatekeepers’) who live 
in the target areas to pass my contact details on to people who might be willing to participate 
(methodology suggested by Warren, 2001). The acquaintances were not made aware of whether 
the recommended person would be or had been contacted, in order to preserve each participant’s 
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confidentiality. Chain-referral sampling was also used (Heckathorn, 2011), whereby participants 
passed my details to other potential willing participants from target areas. Finally, three participants 
had been previously involved in studies undertaken by the research group of which I am part (the 
Understanding Risk Group), and had given written consent to be contacted for future projects. 
Key demographic information was collected during each interview, and the sampling frame became 
smaller and more specific as interviews progressed, in order to ensure the final sample was 
sufficiently diverse. Demographic statistics and approximate interviewee locations are shown in 
Table 13 and in Figure 10.  
 
Demographic variable  Sample statistic 
Location  Wales 30%  England 70% 
Gender  Female 50% Male 50% 
Age  18-47 45%59 48-69 55% 
Housing situation  Owned 85% Rented/living rent free 15% 
Highest Qualification  Graduate 60% Non-graduate/withheld 40%  
Member of local interest group  Yes 20% No 80% 
Member of environmental group Yes 20% No 80% 
Table 13: Sample statistics, PPP1 
 
Appendix K shows national population statistics for England and Wales. It shows that the gender 
split of interviewees is nationally representative, but that the housing situation and level of 
qualifications is not nationally representative. Fully 64% of the English and Welsh national 
population own (or mortgage) their homes, compared to 85% of the PPP1 sample; 27% of the 
English and Welsh population have achieved graduate level qualifications, compared to 60% of the 
sample population. 
 
                                                   
59 Mean=47, Range=18-69 
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Figure 10: Map showing approximate residence of PPP1 interviewees 
 
Aside from the drawback of a sample skewed towards highly educated home owners, the benefits 
of this sampling strategy were as follows:  
 Results should not be biased by targeting respondents who are interested in the topic, 
which would have been more likely if I had advertised it in a newspaper or by way of a 
poster inviting participants to contact me.  
 Results should not be biased by targeting respondents who knew a lot about the topic, 
which would have been more likely if I had approached interest groups such as the Severn 
Estuary Partnership.  
 The strategy meant that the number of recruits and their demographic characteristics could 
be carefully moderated. Each time I asked a gatekeeper to forward the email to their 
contacts, I specified that it should only be forwarded to people living in a certain area, of 
a certain age range and so on. 
 The method was cheap, requiring no external advertising costs, and quick, requiring no 
lengthy cold-calling sessions.  
Ethical considerations  
Participants were initially contacted via post and/or an email requesting an interview and providing 
them with a clear description of the project and example consent forms (Appendix D). Participants 
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were told that the interview would be about ‘change on the Severn Estuary’ rather than about SLC, 
so as to avoid participants engaging in research prior to the interview. Once the prospective 
participants had agreed to the interview in principle, they signed formal consent forms prior to the 
interview beginning. During the interview session, opportunities were made available for 
participants to ask any questions they had, and these were answered at the end of the session. A 
debrief sheet was provided at the end of the interview, containing further information about the 
project and contact details in case participants wanted to find out more about the study and their 
input. Participants were paid an honorarium of £10 to thank them for their participation.  
The data collection process entailed strict confidentiality in accordance with The British 
Psychological Society’s ‘Code of Human Research Ethics’ (2010) but was not entirely anonymous 
due to the nature of the research (the need to transcribe and possibly follow up on interviews). 
Once the data had been transcribed and digitised, transcripts were made anonymous and 
pseudonyms were used from there on. Only pseudonyms and non-identifying generic terms (e.g. 
gender, age and geographical area) are used to describe participants throughout the thesis. 
Mental models interviews  
Rationale  
The mental models interviews constituted the first 40 minutes or so of the interview session. The 
purpose of these interviews was to elicit as much of the participant’s mental model on SLC as 
possible, in a way that was meaningful to them. As recommended by Morgan et al. (2002), the 
direction of the interviews were largely determined by the participants’ discussion. Participants 
were not asked every question on the protocol; rather, the emphasis was drawn from the 
conversation itself. For example, if a respondent mentioned the Severn bore, their beliefs regarding 
the Severn bore were probed further. 
Methods & Protocol 
The full interview protocol can be found in Appendix E. The protocol for the mental models stage 
was arranged on one page, with topics ordered hierarchically to follow the rough structure of the 
influence diagram, as advised by Morgan et al. (2002). As recommended by Fowler and Mangione 
(1990), the protocol began with a brief introduction in order to ‘train’ the respondent as to what 
was expected, including information about the style of the interview and the fact that I would keep 
relatively quiet but may ask for clarification. A simple opening question was then used to start the 
interview. The interviewee was first asked to talk about the Severn Estuary in general, and then 
about SLC in particular. (S)he was encouraged to talk for as long as s(he) could, with simple 
prompts such as “anything else?” or “can you tell me more about that?” When a topic was 
mentioned, it was marked on the protocol sheet, so that it could later be followed up. Once 
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participants had made a ‘core dump’ of all of the information that came to mind, they were asked 
to elaborate on topics that they brought up (Morgan et al., 2002). The interview then became more 
directed, and the participant was asked to talk about each major area on the influence diagram if 
they had not already discussed it. These topics included processes, future changes, impacts and 
adaptation measures, and were considered to be such basic concepts that their omission from prior 
discussion was deemed an oversight rather than ignorance (Maharik & Fischhoff, 1993). As before, 
participants were asked to elaborate on each topic that they raised. Changes to the protocol during 
the interview phase were kept to a minimum.  
Picture sorting task  
Rationale  
The next stage of the interview session was designed to make sure that nothing important was 
missed during the mental models interview. A number of methods could have been used for this, 
including picture sorting tasks, providing definitions of terms, and solving problems (Morgan et 
al., 2002). The picture sorting task was chosen because it was accessible, relatively easy and visually 
interesting.  
Methods & Protocol  
Participants were given a stack of 69 photographs and asked to sort them into two different piles; 
one with pictures relating to SLC on the Severn Estuary, and one with pictures unrelated. In each 
case, they are asked to explain what the picture showed, and why it was or was not related to SLC 
on the Severn Estuary. As they were talking, themes were noted on post-its for the final stage of 
the interview, the cognitive mapping task. The pictures used for this stage are shown in Appendix 
F. Some were illustrations; others were photographs that I had taken or downloaded from 
Wikimedia Commons (2012). Some were adapted using Photoshop, such as image 12, which shows 
an ‘elderly people crossing’ sign. After the first five interviews (Lynne, Darren, Betty, Owain and 
Karen), four of the images (39, 46, 47, and 65) were dropped due to topic duplication, two were 
added to improve clarity (images 71 and 72), and one (73) was added to show the Severn bore, 
which was not previously represented.  
The pictures showed a variety of topics from a ‘cross section of human life and activities’  (Morgan 
et al., 2002, p. 67) in addition to pictures specifically relevant to the topic, for example sea-defences 
and flooded land. Images could be (and were) interpreted in a variety of ways, often in ways initially 
unintended or unexpected. For instance, image 67 of boiling water was intended to represent the 
thermal expansion of water, but prompted discussion of needing to boil water contaminated during 
a flood. Broadly, around one third of the images were intended to be related to impacts, around 
one third were related to causes and other factors, and one third were not directly related to SLC 
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at all (Appendix F). The images that were not related to SLC were important so that respondents 
did not feel they had to find relevance in each picture (Morgan et al., 2002). Figure 11 and Figure 
12 show the contents of two participants’ picture sorting piles.  
 
Figure 11: Christine’s picture sort, PPP1 
The picture sort shows showing related images on the left, unrelated images on the right, and ‘don’t 
knows’ at the bottom 
 
 
Figure 12: Paul’s picture sort, PPP1 
The sort shows unrelated images on the left and related images on the right 
 
 96 
 
Cognitive mapping task 
Rationale  
The purpose of the cognitive mapping stage was to further prompt discussion of the topics, and 
to investigate how ideas are linked together. Therefore, maps would ideally incorporate all the 
aspects that the participant thinks are relevant to SLC on the Severn Estuary, and show how these 
aspects are connected and grouped together. Each should be a ‘visual display that expresses a 
participant’s unique knowledge structure’ (Kearney & Kaplan, 1997, p. 599). The main use of the 
maps however was to provide additional verbal data for both qualitative and quantitative analyses 
and to clarify topics raised during earlier stages. 
Methods & Protocol  
Methods of cognitive mapping include concept mapping, semantic web analysis, and decision-
analysis-based mental models approaches (Wood et al., 2012). Decision-analysis-based mental 
models approaches focus on how one variable influences another, often quantified probabilistically 
(Wood et al., 2012). Semantic webs can take a similar format, but are more qualitative in nature; 
and concept maps map concepts closer or further apart according to their similarities and 
differences (Wood et al., 2012). This phase of the research encouraged participants to develop a 
simple semantic-web style map using methodology adapted from Kearney and Kaplan’s (1997) 
conceptual content cognitive map (3CM) method. The protocol ran as follows:  
1. During the picture sorting task, topics related to SLC were noted on post-it notes. Major points 
noted on the protocol sheet during the mental models phase were also added to the list of 
post-it note topics.  
2. The purpose of the task was explained, with a brief description of how cognitive maps can be 
created.  
3. All of the post-it notes were laid out in front of the participant, and the participant was asked 
if there was anything else that they thought was relevant to SLC on the Severn Estuary. They 
were told that they could add to the list at any time.  
4. The participant was then asked to arrange the topics on the page in a way that was meaningful 
to them, placing the cards on a large sheet of paper and drawing relationships between them, 
similar to methodology used by Dray et al. (2006).  
One of the main benefits of this method is that, like the 3CM method, it does not aim to distinguish 
between those items that are consistent and inconsistent with an expert model (Kearney & Kaplan, 
1997), and allows an expression of the relationship between topics. Through the use of post-its, it 
also reduces the problem of ‘limited channel capacity’ whereby we can only think of a certain 
number of issues at one time (Kearney & Kaplan, 1997). With this method, the participant could 
use many items without having to think about them all at once; an approach particularly suitable 
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for exploring participants’ understanding of complex domains such as SLC. Example cognitive 
maps are shown in Figure 13 and Figure 14.  
 
Figure 13: Cognitive map created by Betty, PPP1 
 
Figure 14: Cognitive map created by Jessica, PPP1 
Unused concepts are on the clipboard and folder, left 
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One participant was not confident in creating a cognitive map, so a ‘back-up’ method was used 
(see Appendix E for protocol). This method, adapted from Tikkanen et al. (2006), involved first 
grouping the items, then naming the groups and putting them in order of importance before 
organising them into a map structure on the page.  
PPP1 Analysis methodology  
Around 230,000 words were transcribed during the public interview phase, using the same 
transcription methodology as in the expert phase (Section 3.3). Once transcription was complete, 
analyses were in two parts; a content analysis of the ‘knowledge factors’ in the transcripts to 
facilitate a comparison with the expert model, and an interpretive analysis to explore non-
knowledge themes. 
Content analysis of knowledge factors  
All of the nodes in the expert model were entered into an Excel spreadsheet. Each of the public 
transcripts was read through, and at the first instance a theme was mentioned in a way consistent 
with the expert model, it was entered into the spreadsheet. On account of the latter parts of the 
interview becoming increasingly reactive (Morgan et al., 2002), the responses were assigned a 
different value depending on how much the response was prompted. Topics mentioned in the 
‘core dump’ stage at the beginning of the mental models interviews were assigned a ‘4’, topics 
mentioned after a prompt or during the picture sorting/cognitive mapping stage were assigned a 
‘2’ (Table 14). These scores were then used to draw up ‘salience tables’ for each theme, whereby 
salience is calculated as a percentage of PPP1 participants who mentioned a node in the expert 
model (100% indicates that everyone mentioned the topic in the core dump phase, and lower 
percentages indicate that fewer people mentioned the topic or that it was mentioned during the 
later stages of the interviews). The scores were also summed for each participant to calculate a 
‘mental model completeness score’ (Appendix H). Differences (topics inconsistent with the expert 
model) and ‘new concepts’ (absent from the expert model) were listed in separate spreadsheets.  
Nature of item Code 
assigned  
mental model core dump 4 
after prompt or during later stages of interview 2 
confused theme (not clear whether participant understands theme) * 
fragmentary beliefs (i.e. the theme was mentioned but without context or was 
talked about without reference to SLC) 
# 
Table 14: Coding framework for public meta-influence diagram, PPP1 
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Where a participant suggested that something might be linked to SLC, it was coded as present in 
their mental model. This is because a) one cannot know how certain a participant is; women for 
example tend to express more uncertainty than men (Rapoport, 1985), and b) the experts are also 
uncertain about many aspects of the model, so uncertainty would be a poor reason to omit 
something.  
These content analyses facilitated the development of a combined public mental model of the risks 
in the form of a meta-influence diagram, which graphically shows knowledge gaps and the most 
salient concepts. To create the diagram, the scores for each theme were summed, and were assigned 
varying shades depending on the number of people who discussed them. The result is a choropleth-
style meta-influence diagram, where the nodes mentioned by the most people are represented by 
darker blues, and the nodes least mentioned are represented by light blues.  
Interpretive analyses of non-knowledge / contextual themes  
An interpretive thematic analysis of the interview transcripts addressed non-knowledge themes 
such as worldviews, trust and efficacy. A structured coding system (c.f. Hansson & Bryngelsson, 
2009) was developed largely from notes made during transcription. The themes were identified 
during a process of ‘analytic induction’ (Carolan, 2010, p. 310) that is, the concepts ‘emerged’ from 
the interviews, and the codes were developed to fit the data. These predefined codes included 
concepts such as ‘future thinking’ and ‘care’. Codes were added to and refined during the coding 
phase. The final coding framework is shown in Table 15.  
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Table 15: Coding framework for thematic analysis of PPP1 interviews 
Codes and sub-codes Example  Code 
frequency  
Communication, rationale  I’ll be really interested to know if it is rising or falling – Christine, Uphill 22 
Content    
First thoughts big green banks and a bore wave – Betty, Bridgwater 31 
How much SLC  I don’t know. Feet? A few feet? Three feet? – Anthony, Bristol  51 
Importance of issues the flooding is a big, big issue – Ruby, Penarth  45 
Known from experience and 
from talking with people 
The Severn bore thing is to do with the tides, but again, because I’m not a sailor I haven’t got any 
knowledge of it – Lynne, Coedkernew 
104 
Known from media I’ve seen programmes on the TV which show ice caps melting and that kind of stuff – Paul, Bristol 28 
Known from school / 
university 
I think I’m just making it up, but it might be a bit of my old geography degree from 15, 20 years ago, I 
don’t know [laughs] – Jessica, Cardiff 
12 
Main issues before SLC 
mentioned 
probably renewable energy, I would say. And then maybe pollution – Darren, Gloucester  32 
Uncertainty  experts say one thing and then somebody else says something else, and I don’t know – Yasmine, Caldicot 6 
Influences    
Affect    
Agency  global warming, which we can’t do much about – Christine, Uphill 28 
Avoidance  I do try not to think about it too much – Ellen, Oldbury  7 
Care we have to do the right thing by our kids – Betty, Bridgwater  42 
Excitement, 
enjoyment  
Flooding happens. It is quite exciting at the time. That’s terrible, isn’t it. It’s nice going out and seeing- it’s 
fascinating – Karen, Gloucester  
11 
Negative experience having been flooded it’s not a nice experience – Steve, Kingston Seymour 10 
Feelings I feel actually quite sad – Paul, Bristol  18 
Humour Me mate lost nearly all his turkeys [laughs]. No, that was pretty horrendous that was – Terry, Wick St 
Lawrence  
26 
Optimism/pessimism Trying to think positively. I think over the next 200 years we’re going to run into peak oil – Jessica, Cardiff  36 
Personal experience  It’s always been a part of my life. So maybe there are things that happen and things that are different 
because of the Severn than elsewhere. But I don’t notice them – Lee, Frampton 
3 
Worry, concern  I can’t do anything about it, I can’t worry about it – Karen, Gloucester  61 
Continued… 
 101 
 
Table 15 continued: Coding framework for thematic analysis of PPP1 interviews 
Codes and sub-codes Example  Code 
frequency  
Environmental Justice I guess some people would benefit, some people would suffer. It’s kind of the way, isn’t it – Lee, 
Frampton 
8 
Blame  Giant international conglomerate, contributing greatly to all sorts of dreadful things, including no-doubt, 
sea level, because they’re just evil – Betty, Bridgwater  
27 
Dissatisfaction & 
unfairness 
It seems a bit unfair in some ways that they needed the extra land here [for managed realignment] rather 
than spread out along the whole length of the estuary – Steve, Kingston Seymour 
107 
Distrust  I’m plucking figures out of the air. A bit like some of the people seem to as well [moderator: scientists?]... 
yeah. – Anthony, Bristol 
28 
Government You could call that on the parliament, and cause them to change it that way.  Decrees and stuff like that – 
Owain, Marshfield  
33 
Self interest I don’t care if they do it in about 80 years time, when I’m about to die. But I don’t want it now – Lee 
Frampton 
5 
Trust  I kind of have a trust in people and in God – Betty, Bridgwater  10 
Future thinking  I can’t see that far into the future. You know, it’s difficult to tell, isn’t it. who knows what will have 
happened by then [2100]  - Darren, Gloucester 
44 
Heuristics  dramatic pictures on the news of the flooding in Gloucester, you know, it sticks in peoples’ minds you 
know – Laura, Barry 
4 
Place & Identity The tide’s very important to Weston. Because we have a wonderful beach [...] the beach at Clevedon is a 
rubbish beach – Christine, Uphill (Weston-Super-Mare) 
73 
Community  it’s like anything with the British isn’t it, anything with a bit of a crisis, people pull together – Karen, 
Gloucester 
22 
Psychological distance  Bangladeshis – that’s quite a low lying country, isn’t it? “White man will always be ok”. [Moderator: do you 
think that’s true?] yeah, to be honest at the moment I do – Darren, Gloucester 
97 
Values   I like the country. I don’t like big cities – Lee, Frampton  3 
Climate scepticism  I’m not a believer in all that stuff to be honest with you – Darren, Gloucester  30 
Gaia, people, nature  it’s not the world that’s going to end, its only the people who are on it – Glenda, Chepstow 85 
God  I think eventually the Sahara will be covered in water, because I think a lot of the biblical prophecies 
come- well, that’s only personal – Christine, Uphill  
5 
Continued… 
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Table 15 continued 
Codes and sub-codes Example  Code 
frequency  
Human world & false 
sense of security 
We just kind of feel like we’re in a safe little bubble and nothing will really hurt us – Anthony, Bristol 46 
Money  Money’s linked to everything. Everything. – Lee, Frampton  15 
Nature of science I know computer modelling is amazing, but can you really tell what’s going to happen when you put a 
barrage up? – Christine, Uphill  
52 
Mental model structure  I’m trying to make something very complicated, and by its nature, I’m trying to simplify it into something, 
you know, that makes some sense, but it doesn’t really – Anthony, Bristol 
22 
Cause-effect  I have a systems brain, so I see things as inputs and outputs – Betty, Bridgwater 16 
Spontage60 keep giving it the kinetic energy the sunlight’s keep reflected in, so there’s not enough time for the, as 
soon as the water molecules evaporate – Owain, Marshfield 
8 
Model construction from 
fragments & theories  
we’ve got the hole in the ozone layer, which is theoretically something to do with the build-up of 
greenhouse gases – Yasmine, Caldicot 
40 
Positives & negatives  That’s the negatives, that’s the positives, that’s the contingencies – Lynne, Coedkernew 3 
Spontaneous models versus 
reflective models  
I’d say I’ve probably thought about most of them before, but not terribly deeply, which is why I wasn’t 
able to give great deep answers – Glenda, Chepstow  
15 
Methodology The pictures were a great help in a way because you know, I hadn’t really a direction for my thoughts. But 
that has helped me. Crystallise what I think – Christine, Uphill  
34 
Miscellaneous  And with SLR, it’s bound to happen more frequently, as you know, the dice is rolled, you don’t need a 
quadruple 6 anymore, you just need a triple 6 to get your house flooded – Fred, Oldbury 
44 
Table 15: Coding framework for thematic analysis of PPP1 interviews 
 
                                                   
60 The term ‘spontage’ was coined to refer to when participants used ‘spontaneous geographical terminology’, volunteering technical geographical terms without context. This would 
relate to the concept of ‘ownership’ posited by Kearney and Kaplan (1997). They suggest that a verbal understanding of a concept, i.e. being able to name a concept and perhaps 
state which words are appropriately associated with it, should be distinguished from owning a concept, i.e. having a deeper grasp of the concept and what it refers to, being able to 
use it confidently and apply it to real situations (Kearney & Kaplan, 1997, p. 588). 
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5.2.3 Limitations and reflexive account of PPP1 
Sampling  
Samples can be a source of error when they do not adequately represent the population upon which 
they are drawn, and when members of the sample refuse to participate or selectively avoid or refuse 
to answer some of the questions (Fowler & Mangione, 1990). Although the geographical spread, 
age range and gender split of participants was good, the sample was skewed towards highly 
educated home-owners, which may have biased the results. However, representativeness was not 
essential in this research stage because its purpose was to scope the variety of beliefs held by the 
public rather than gauge the prevalence of these beliefs. 
Methodology 
If a participant did not talk about a particular theme, it does not necessarily mean that (s)he did not 
know about it. It might be because (s)he did not want to talk about it. Or it might be because the 
mental models interview, card sorting task and cognitive mapping task did not elicit their thoughts 
on that topic. It might also have been because the interviewees did not have time to talk about all 
that they wanted to. Indeed, interview lengths varied; Steve’s transcript was over 24,000 words long 
(compared to the shortest transcript of 4749 words, and an average transcript length of 11,566 
words) and although I was happy to sit for hours, some participants gave themselves much less 
time to talk about the issue than others. Participants seemed to enjoy the experience; with some 
explicitly stating that it had been fun (Quote Box 6). Others commented that they had learnt about 
SLC during the interview process. Some of their comments (Quote 26 and 27) lend support to the 
rationale behind this research: Christine’s comment for example suggests that if she knew that sea 
levels were rising by more than an inch per year, she may consider moving. Sea levels are not yet 
rising by this amount, but if they were Christine would want to know about it.  
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21. “It’s been a really interesting morning” – Christine 
22. “I’ve quite enjoyed it [laughs]” – Karen 
23. “Well that [the picture sorting task] was fun” – Glenda 
24. “I haven’t really ever heard of the issue [SLC on the Severn Estuary] before” – Anthony 
25. “I suppose I’ve tended to think about it in the past as a bit science fiction. [...] it’s interesting 
to bring things together, yes, to think of how they interconnect” [...] “I think people should 
think about a lot more than they do” - Betty 
26. [Moderator: how do you feel about the issues that we’ve talked about so far?] “Well, I don’t 
feel, at the moment, they’re relevant. I mean if sea levels were definitely rising, like if they 
rose an inch last year and forecast to rise another inch this year, I suppose we might think 
about selling our house. [...] Because there’s obviously a lot I don’t know about the 
consequences of presumably sea-level rise or even sea-level fall, because either would be bad, 
for us. So I’ll be really interested to know if it is rising of falling. Because I’ve sort of 
assumed that you know, the sea is the sea, and it’s always there in the same place. [This 
session] has made me think, and it’s made me much more aware [...] So you’re doing me a 
favour” – Christine  
27. “You don’t get really a lot of information about [SLC] apart from this whole thing that you 
know, it’s going to rise and flood us. [...Moderator: do you think people will be interested in 
knowing more about it, or-] well I hope so, I am. After doing this, you know, it’s been really 
interesting, yeah. It’s made me sort of think a bit more- made me realise, oh god, you know, 
I don’t really pay as much attention as I should probably. Especially locally. Because you 
know, you always hear about the wider issue, don’t you, the climate change. And with the 
Maldives and Bangladesh and stuff, but locally, what is going to happen? What is potentially 
going to happen, I suppose. I want to know” - Ruby 
28. [Moderator: how do you feel about the issues that we’ve talked about so far today?] 
“probably not that strongly because I don’t really know about any of them” - Yasmine 
Quote Box 6: Participants’ comments on the interview process, PPP1 
While the use of three different methodologies was an efficient and engaging way to elicit a wealth 
of information in a relatively short period of time, there were of course drawbacks and limitations 
to each stage, discussed below. 
Mental models interview  
Some participants felt that the mental models interview was like a test, with Paul (Bristol) 
exclaiming “Oh God! This is like a test! Its general knowledge” and Lee (Frampton) asking “Is this 
a geography lesson?” Although I tried to make it seem less like a test by telling participants that I 
was more interested in “perceptions and views; what you think” than in facts, it was impossible to 
ignore that I was interested in what people know about SLC.  
Picture sorting task  
The picture sorting task was a popular part of the interview, with Ellen commenting that it was 
accessible to people who might struggle with more wordy tasks; she said “I applaud you for your 
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pictures”. People approached the task in different ways. For example, some were very specific, 
only putting pictures in the linked pile if they could give detail on the link. Others guessed links or 
tried hard to think up relationships between the picture and SLC. For example, one participant 
exclaimed “I know it’s linked but I’m not sure how”, and another said “anything with water goes 
in that pile”. Indeed, the pictures ‘induced inferences’ (Morgan et al., 2002), with Anthony inducing 
from a picture of molecules that sea levels would rise because they are hotter, and Ellen inducing 
that ‘according to that [picture about isostatic subsidence], we’re sinking’.  
Some of the photographs were perceived as emotive by some participants, which may have 
influenced answers. For example, Henry noted unhappy-looking people in Asia (picture 64), while 
Anthony stated he did not see any association between a happy-looking father and child (picture 
10) with flooding. These photographs were not chosen to reflect happiness/unhappiness in either 
country, but were interpreted this way. These factors may have introduced bias into this stage, 
which should be noted when considering the data. Regardless of these drawbacks, the methods 
worked as they were designed to: they prompted thoughts and encouraged participants to talk 
around the subject, in some cases thinking about aspects that they had never considered before.  
Cognitive mapping task  
The mapping stage was also popular. Kearney and Kaplan (1997, p. 611) found that participants 
of the 3CM approach discovered relationships they were previously unaware of and found the 
process ‘satisfying and enlightening’. This was echoed in this research, with Christine stating “well 
it’s not very neat, but I think that sums up what I feel. But you’ve helped me to think about it. 
Thank you”. Another way to look at this is that the 3CM model may force participants to think 
about the themes in a way in which they usually would not. Anthony (Bristol) thought that the 
method “structures something that is not structured”.  
As suggested by (Ozesmi & Ozesmi, 2004), I constructed my own cognitive maps before beginning 
the interviews so that I could question my own assumptions and not let my own ideas about the 
system influence participants. However, there will always be an element of bias from my own input, 
which was substantial in this stage. Although participants created their own maps and were free to 
organise, group and link themes in any way that they wanted to, topics in cognitive maps were 
dependent on the pictures in the picture sort and what I wrote down on the protocol sheet during 
the mental models interview. Although participants were invited to add to the list of post-it notes 
used for the cognitive mapping task, few did. Betty noted that she would not have been able to do 
the task without the post-its.  
Interviewer bias 
Interviewers can become a source of error by misreading questions, leading or directively probing, 
through bias from the way in which the interviewer relates to the respondent, and through mis-
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recording answers (Fowler & Mangione, 1990). A degree of interview error was minimized by 
carrying out all of the interviews myself and using a script. These factors led to higher 
standardization of the interviewing process (Fowler & Mangione, 1990). However, the way in 
which interviewers relate to respondents can also introduce bias, and this was the case in these 
sessions. Interviewers should take a neutral, non-judgemental stance to all answers, and should not 
provide any personal information, values or feedback at all during the session as this undermines 
the professional relationship and may directly affect answers, introducing bias (Fowler & 
Mangione, 1990). However, as with the expert interviews (section 3.4), my ‘ethic of care behaviours’ 
(Matteson & Lincoln, 2009) may have influenced results. These behaviours consisted of at times 
agreeing with interviewees in an attempt to put them at ease, particularly when respondents sought 
reassurance.  
Data reduction and analyses  
The subjectivity implicit in deciding whether to code a statement as a 4, 2 or # in the public meta-
diagram will have inevitably introduced some error. For example, an unprompted “I don’t know 
whether they have flood warnings in place” suggests Ruby knows that flood warnings are 
important, so this was coded as a 4 despite nothing more being said about them. However, when 
a participant told me stories that indicated there was community spirit during a flood event, but 
only mentioned it incidentally and did not actually talk about this community spirit per se, it was 
coded as # (fragmentary beliefs). This is because (s)he might not link it to SLC or see it as at all 
important. The coding for this stage was made more difficult due to the complexity of the expert 
map: many themes feed into a number of other themes and sections, and thus decisions had to be 
made as to where in the diagram themes should be coded if they were open to interpretation. Some 
themes in the expert model needed to be adapted slightly (for example split into two separate 
nodes) to allow for public beliefs to be mapped onto them.  
At times during the public meta-model creation stage, I felt uneasy deciding whether public beliefs 
were correct or not because much of the science is conditional, nuanced and uncertain. For 
example, Christine did not think SLC would affect the Severn bore, and it might well not. And 
when Glenda stated that “whether it [the sea level] carries on rising depends on whether we get 
another ice age” she was technically right, even though this would be very unlikely during the next 
few hundred years. Furthermore, some ‘differences’ may not be actually wrong; they are just 
different from the expert views. Each was considered on an individual basis and coded accordingly. 
My own interpretation of the data is also important to consider. For example, when Owain said 
that “80% of the ice is below the sea level and ice is less dense, therefore when it melts into water, 
it will- its density shrinks, well no, its density increases, and therefore its volume shrinks, and 
therefore it would make no change whatsoever” I interpreted this to mean that melting icebergs 
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does not add to SLR, which is in agreement with the expert model. But this was an interpretation 
of what he had said, and he may have meant something else.  
Finally, whether a topic is ‘owned’ by a participant (i.e. the participant knows how to use and apply 
the term), is not clear in the combined public meta-influence diagram. For example, even though 
some people knew about a theory whereby a tsunami caused severe damage to the Severn Estuary 
in 1607 (Haslett & Bryant, 2007), some did not think it was at all a risk to the Severn Estuary. So 
merely mentioning the theme does not indicate that their interpretation of the theme is aligned 
with experts’ interpretation that a tsunami on the Severn Estuary is theoretically possible (Defra, 
2005). Conversely, themes mentioned in the later stages of the interviews were assigned a ‘2’ rather 
than a ‘4’. This does not necessarily mean that themes are not ‘owned’. For example, Steve had so 
much to say about SLC that I didn’t ask him about its causes until during the picture sorting task, 
so he didn’t talk about them before then. Melting icebergs were therefore assigned a 2, when he 
may have known enough about them to warrant a ‘4’. Thus, mentioning a theme does not mean 
that it is ‘owned’, and not mentioning a theme does not necessarily mean that it is not owned. 
Therefore, the combined map must be considered in conjunction with the table of differences 
(Appendix I), and the more detailed public interview results presented in Chapters 6-8. 
 
5.3 Public perceptions phase two methods: quantitative survey 
5.3.1 Introduction  
This section reports the third empirical phase of the study, involving surveys carried out in March 
2013 with members of the public living around the Severn Estuary (N=359). The purpose of this 
phase (PPP2) was to explore public perceptions amongst a wider sample of the Severn Estuary 
population, and to investigate the prevalence of perceptions raised in the qualitative interviews 
(PPP1). PPP2 followed up on a number of findings from PPP1, but was necessarily selective due 
to resource constraints and a desire for a high response rate. 
5.3.2 Rationale and methodology for PPP2 
Rationale 
Qualitative interviews are labour intensive, meaning PPP1 could only focus on a small sample of 
participants. In line with the Mental Models Approach to Risk Communication (Read et al., 1994), 
a wider survey (PPP2) was necessary to explore the prevalence of perceptions raised during PPP1. 
While its primary focus was on knowledge aspects (what people know about SLC), contextual 
 108 
 
themes such as values and concerns were also investigated. There were two key research questions 
for this stage:  
1. Are the findings of PPP1 representative of the wider population around the Severn 
Estuary? It was hypothesised that some of the differences between expert and public 
conceptions of risk (for example the low salience of thermal expansion as a cause of SLC) 
would be common amongst the wider public, while others (such as the idea that sea levels 
were falling) would be less prevalent. These hypotheses are listed in Appendix J, alongside 
the specific PPP2 survey questions that addressed them. 
2. Are contextual themes such as future thinking and values related with perceptions of SLC 
on the Severn Estuary? A number of hypotheses regarding these contextual themes arose 
from PPP1 (and in some cases EPP). For example, it was hypothesised that participants 
who were optimistic may project lower amounts of SLC. These hypotheses are also listed 
in Appendix J, alongside the specific PPP2 survey questions that addressed them.  
Methodology 
Online survey methodologies 
The sampling aim was to recruit a demographically diverse sample of participants who were 
resident around the Severn Estuary. Online surveys have become increasingly popular over recent 
decades (Evans & Mathur, 2005) and have been used to explore a wide variety of subjects, including 
climate change perceptions (e.g. O'Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009) and SLR perceptions (Ryan et 
al., 2012). Research shows that face-to-face questionnaires and internet questionnaires yield 
different results (Aoyagi, 2012). For example, face to face questionnaires increase social desirability 
bias61, but internet surveys may have ‘professional respondents’ who regularly fill out surveys, 
which may also affect their responses (Aoyagi, 2012). Other drawbacks of online surveys include 
low response rates and a bias towards internet users. But they benefit from speed, low 
administration costs and ease of data entry and analysis (Evans & Mathur, 2005). An online 
protocol was deemed appropriate for this study because it meant that the survey could be easily 
distributed over a wide but specifically targeted geographical area, it allowed a variety of question 
styles and formats (including interactive maps), and it was quick to administer and collate results. 
The survey was designed and carried out using the Qualtrics online survey platform (Qualtrics, 
2013). Qualtrics was chosen because of its flexible question formats and data outputs, its 
availability, and its compatibility with Maximiles (2013), which was used to distribute the survey. 
 
                                                   
61 Social desirability bias is caused by the ‘desire of respondents to avoid embarrassment and project a favourable 
image to others’ (e.g. Fisher, 1993, p. 303).  
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Survey content and structure 
Survey content was informed by the results of EPP and PPP1. The public meta-influence diagram 
and list of differences (Appendix I) informed knowledge questions, while the thematic analysis of 
contextual themes informed questions on responsibility, affect and future thinking. It was desirable 
to restrict the survey time to around 20 minutes so as to not dissuade participants and to reduce 
financial costs, so it was not possible to include everything. Items had to be prioritised, and some 
topics that emerged from the qualitative analyses were therefore omitted from the survey. These 
were the wider causes of SLC (e.g. greed and big business), affective themes (e.g. excitement and 
terror), unfairness and blame.  
The survey was 25 pages long, consisted of 18 sections, and took participants a median time of 19 
minutes to complete (a mean of 36 minutes was skewed by participants who paused the survey to 
return after hours or days to complete it). Before launching the survey, it was piloted with family, 
friends and colleagues (N=15) to check for usability, robustness of scientific content and design. 
It was refined during this piloting stage to reduce the number of items and to improve clarity, 
particularly of knowledge items that needed to be both scientifically accurate and relatively jargon-
free. The final survey structure with explanatory notes is shown in Appendix J, and is summarised 
below. 
1. Introduction and Consent. A welcome page contained details of the study, information 
on how data would be handled and stored, contact details, consent details and a consent 
box that had to be ticked before proceeding to the survey.  
2. Issues facing the Severn Estuary (Q1). One multiple-choice question investigated the 
salience of SLC on the Severn Estuary. Participants were asked to tick up to five of 11 
issues (with an additional ‘other issues’ free text box and a ‘no issues’ option). 
3. Rates of sea-level change (Q2-5). This section was designed to investigate how much 
participants thought sea levels would rise or fall in future. It consisted of three questions. 
The first had three simple sliders representing sea-level rise and fall (significant, moderate, 
slight or no change) by 2050, 2100 and 2200. The second consisted of two multiple-choice 
items asking participants to state whether sea-level rise and sea-level fall would pose a 
major risk, slight risk, neither a risk or a benefit, slight benefit or major benefit to the 
Severn Estuary. The third listed 5 items about the future magnitudes of SLC, asking 
participants to state the likelihood of each on a seven point scale from very unlikely to 
very likely.  
4. Concern (Q6). This item was designed to investigate levels of concern. It consisted of a 
single multiple choice question with four response options: not at all concerned, not very 
concerned, fairly concerned and very concerned.  
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5. Causes of SLC (Q7). This item was designed to explore participants’ knowledge of the 
causes of SLC. It asked participants to choose whether 11 statements about SLC were 
false, maybe false, maybe true, or true, with an additional ‘don’t know’ option. Similar 
true/false response scales have been used in previous mental models survey studies (Cox 
et al., 2005; Read et al., 1994; Reynolds et al., 2010).  
6. Scepticism (Q8&9). Participants were asked to what extent they agreed with 10 
statements about climate change and SLC, on a 5-point response scale ranging from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree. The statements consisted of 3 items from a climate 
change scepticism scale developed by (Whitmarsh, 2011), 6 items from the same scale with 
the words ‘climate change’ substituted with the worlds ‘sea-level change’, and an additional 
item “The science of sea-level change is uncertain”. For more information about the scales 
used in PPP2 and their reliability, see Appendix M.  
7. Trust in information sources (Q10). This multiple-choice question asked participants 
to tick up to five of 13 information sources that they would most trust to get information 
about SLC on the Severn Estuary. 
8. Sea-level change information. This section provided a short introduction to SLC, 
outlining its causes and projected magnitude by 2100. Its purpose was to ensure that 
participants had enough information to answer subsequent questions.  
9. Physical impacts of sea-level change (Q11). Using the same true/false format as 
section 5, participants were asked to decide whether ten statements about SLC were false, 
maybe false, maybe true or true, with an additional ‘don’t know’ option.  
10. Socio-economic impacts of sea-level change (Q12). Using the same true/false format 
as sections 5 and 9 above, this question consisted of 14 statements about the possible 
socio-economic impacts of SLC.  
11. Concern about socio-economic impacts (Q13). A multiple-choice question asked 
participants to tick one or more of 17 potential impacts that would personally concern 
them, or to tick none if none concerned them. 
12. Spatial vulnerability (Q14). Participants were asked to click on up to five areas on a map 
of the Severn Estuary, indicating which they thought would be most affected by SLR by 
the year 2050.  
13. Mitigation (Q15). A multiple-choice question asked participants to select up to three of 
seven measures that would be most effective in limiting the amount of SLR on the Severn 
Estuary, regardless of which options they preferred. Two exclusive options were also 
available: ‘NOT APPLICABLE: I don’t think SLC is an issue’, and ‘NOT APPLICABLE: 
I don’t think the amount of SLC can be limited’.   
14. Adaptation (Q16). Using the same format as section 13, a multiple-choice question asked 
participants to select up to five of 11 measures that would be most effective in reducing 
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the impacts of SLR on the Severn Estuary, regardless of which options they preferred. 
Two exclusive options were also available: ‘NOT APPLICABLE: I don’t think SLC is an 
issue’, and ‘NOT APPLICABLE: I don’t think the impacts of SLC can be reduced’.  
Questions 15 and 16 address a knowledge gap regarding public knowledge about the 
climate-related effectiveness of behaviours and policy measures, suggested by Tobler et al. 
(2012) to be a future avenue for research, though they have previously been examined in 
the context of Alpine flash floods and landslides (Wagner, 2007). 
15. Miscellaneous opinions (Q17-18) This section explored a number of constructs, 
including responsibility, efficacy, feelings, informedness and vulnerability. Responses to 
17 statements were measured on a five-point agree/disagree bipolar scale.  
16. Values and Beliefs (Q19-23). This section consisted of five questions designed to explore 
participants’ values and beliefs.  
a. The first question asked participants to state their level of agreement with nine 
statements about the future, derived from van Asselt et al’s (2010) ‘temporal 
repertoires’. I was interested in whether the ways in which the public think about 
the future are related with their perceptions of SLC. To my knowledge, there is 
currently no scale to measure the repertoires, so the items in this question were 
designed to facilitate the development of such a scale.  
b. The second question asked participants to what extent they agreed with ten 
statements constituting an optimism scale (Cronbach’s α = .85) developed by 
Scheier, Carver, and Bridges (1994). 
c. The next three questions asked participants to tick the box next to diagrams that 
best described their relationship with nature, their local community and the 
Severn Estuary. The three scales each consisted of 7 overlapping circles, ranging 
from one (circles not touching) to seven (circles totally overlapping). The scales 
were modified from the Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS) scale originally 
developed by Aron, Aron, and Smollan (1992) and adapted by Schultz (2001).  
17. Demographic questions (Q24-31). These questions were designed to provide a 
demographic profile of the sample and to enable comparisons across groups. They 
consisted of questions about gender, age, children/dependents, living situation 
(owned/rented etc.), previous flood and erosion experience, highest qualifications, highest 
qualifications in a science-related subject, residential area, rurality, distance from the 
Severn Estuary coastline, amount of time resident around the Severn Estuary, and media 
use.   
18. Debrief and further information. A debrief page thanked participants for their time, 
reiterated the purpose of the study and provided contact information. Participants were 
then directed to the Maximiles website to claim payment. 
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Sampling and distribution  
Respondents were recruited by Maximiles (2013), a specialist participant recruitment agency 
specialising in online panels. Maximiles was chosen because they were able to target a specific area, 
were affordable, and had been successfully used by colleagues. Maximiles emailed the survey link 
to members of their panel that lived within ten miles of the Estuary shoreline, shown on the map 
below, courtesy of Kate Walker-Springett who extracted a list of 52,876 postcodes from the region 
using ArcView geographical information systems (GIS). Maximiles used these postcodes to identify 
potential participants, who were rewarded with Maximiles points on completion of the survey. 
 
Figure 15: Ten mile coastal zone sampled for the PPP2 survey  
The zone sampled is shown in blue (map courtesy of Kate Walker-Springett) 
 
Maximiles emailed the survey to a total of 3843 people, and the survey was open for a period of 
four days. The survey response rate, calculated as a percentage of the number of people sampled, 
was 9.6%. Most non-respondents were those who did not respond to Maximiles emails inviting 
them to participate. However, non-respondents also include 45 people who either accessed the 
survey after the cut-off time (5pm 12th March 2013) or began the survey and did not complete it 
within one week. The dropout rate was 12%, with drop outs evenly distributed throughout the 
survey.   
Appendix K shows the sample statistics in detail. In summary, 58% of the sample was female, and 
47% had children/dependents. Fully 38% lived within five miles of the Severn Estuary, and 73% 
had lived around the Estuary for more than ten years. A total of 61% lived in England, 35% in 
Wales, and 2% close to the border (exact locations are unavailable due to response mode; 
percentages do not total 100 due to rounding effects). The age profile was as follows: 17-24 (5%), 
25-34 (20%), 35-44 (18%), 45-54 (23%), 55-64 (21%), 65-74 (10%), 75+ (2%). Appendix K shows 
a comparison of PPP2 survey data with national statistics (England and Wales). It shows that the 
age profile of the survey sample is biased towards middle-aged participants, with an 
underrepresentation of the oldest and youngest groups. The sample is also overrepresented by 
Gloucester 
Bristol 
Cardiff 
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people with higher qualification levels, and is overrepresented by females (58% of PPP2 
respondents were female, compared to 51% of the national population). Rates of home ownership 
are approximately in line with national figures.   
Ethical considerations 
Respondents were made aware of their right to withdraw at any time and could decide not to take 
part in the questionnaire at their own discretion. Aside from the consent box, any question could 
be omitted should the participant not wish to answer it, including all demographic questions. All 
data is held anonymously and cannot be linked back to any individual person. At no point did I 
know the names or addresses of participants. 
Data analysis  
The raw survey data was cleaned before analysis commenced. This involved the removal of 11 
responses from the dataset due to speeding, duplication and flat-lining, leaving a final dataset of 
359 respondents. The following procedure was used to clean the data: 
a) Speeders: Six respondents completed the survey in less than six minutes so were judged to be 
not reading or answering the questions appropriately. The cut-off point was set at six minutes 
in-line with the minimum survey time recommended by Bainbridge (2009), which is 30% of 
the median response time (30% of 19 minutes is 5.7). This seemed sensible considering I was 
able to skim read and answer all questions in no less than 5 minutes 50 seconds. 
b) Flat-liners: Eyeballing each participant’s data identified four respondents as ‘flat-liners’, i.e. 
individuals who had answered every answer the same. 
c) Duplicates: One respondent was identified as having responded from the same Maximiles 
link twice. His second response was deleted.  
Data were screened for outliers, abnormalities and violations of normality, and appropriate tests 
were selected accordingly. Results were analysed using SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences version 12), and Microsoft Excel 2007 was used to summarise and present results. 
Statistical tests included Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests, analysis of variance (ANOVA), Spearman’s 
correlations and multiple regression analyses. Existing scales were used to measure scepticism and 
optimism, and a ‘futures’ scale was developed for the purposes of this research. In addition to 
these, knowledge scales were calculated from participants’ true-false responses, SLC magnitude 
and mitigation efficiency responses. Finally, a concern scale was developed from five items 
embedded throughout the survey. Details of scale development and reliability analyses are 
discussed in Appendix M.  
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5.3.3 Limitations of PPP2 
It was simply not feasible to ask everyone who lives around the Severn Estuary what they think 
about SLC. Therefore, it was necessary to study a sample of the population instead. However, 
sampling introduces the potential for bias when the sample does not adequately represent the 
population upon which it is drawn (Fowler & Mangione, 1990). While 100% of participants in this 
study were internet users, only 80% of households in Britain had internet access in 2012 (Office 
for National Statistics, 2012). People with internet access may be more highly educated, younger, 
and higher earning than those without (Aoyagi, 2012), thus the sampling strategy is likely to have 
introduced some bias in this respect. Indeed, the profile of respondents was more highly educated 
than average. The benefits of using this strategy (reduced potential for social desirability bias, and 
ease of distribution over a wide geographical area) are considered to outweigh these potential costs. 
The low response rate of 9.6% could also raise concerns over bias. However, the demographic 
profile suggests a broad range of participants (Appendix K). The possibility of an ‘interest’ sample 
(one biased towards those already interested in the topic) was minimised by two factors: 
participants were not made aware of the specific topic (SLC) until they had begun the survey; and 
participants were paid for their time via an arrangement with Maximiles. 
Another limitation of this study is that this survey, as with all surveys that use researcher-defined 
rating scales, render participants unable ‘to say what really matters to them about the question 
under investigation’ (Bickerstaff et al., 2006a, p. 5). Furthermore, the analyses of aggregate survey 
data ‘elides individual and group differences in risk perceptions’ (Bickerstaff et al., 2006a, p. 5). 
However, as discussed in section 2.7, a key benefit of employing the mixed-methods approach 
used in this thesis is that these quantitative methods can be complemented by the qualitative data 
from PPP1. For this reason, and to aid conceptual clarity, the results from PPP1 and PPP2 are 
analysed together. It is to these analyses that we now turn.  
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6 PUBLIC RESULTS: ORIENTING 
DISPOSITIONS 
 
This chapter discusses participants’ orienting dispositions; those factors that may predispose an 
individual to make particular choices or decisions, such as their personality and the information 
sources that they use. It begins with a discussion of the sources of public beliefs about SLC, before 
discussing personality variables such as concern and scepticism.  
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6.1 Sources of information about sea-level change  
6.1.1 Introduction  
This section explores the sources of information that public participants use for information about 
SLC, and to what extent such sources are trusted. Figure 16 shows the percent of PPP1 survey 
participants who trust different sources for information about SLC on the Severn Estuary. It shows 
that respondents tend to most trust the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales62 (66% 
respondents), with scientists a close second (63%). Trust has been shown to be an important 
consideration in risk perceptions, with distrust in information sources constituting a barrier to 
public engagement with climate change (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). Trust is discussed further in 
section 7.3.3, while the rest of this section explores information sources in turn.  
 
Figure 16: Trust in information sources, PPP2 
Responses to PPP2 Q10 "Which sources of information would you most trust to get information about 
sea-level change on the Severn Estuary?” Respondents could tick up to five sources. N=358.  
6.1.2 Formal education  
PPP2 respondents rated teachers and lecturers relatively low on their list of trusted sources of 
information about SLC on the Severn Estuary, with just 9% of respondents ranking them in the 
top five (Figure 16). Geography was the main subject cited by interviewees for information about 
SLC (Ellen, Jessica, Owain, Ruby, Steve, Yasmine), and Owain also drew on ideas from Chemistry 
                                                   
62 Environment Agency Wales merged with the Countryside Council for Wales and the Forestry Commission Wales 
to form a single environmental body, National Resources Wales, on 1st April 2013. This was after all interviews and 
surveys were carried out. ‘Natural Resources Wales’ was however included in the ‘Environment Agency Wales / 
Natural Resources Wales’ survey category on account of the survey running so close to the merge date. 
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lessons. As discussed earlier, our time exposed to science at school is small compared to our time 
exposed to science elsewhere (Falk & Dierking, 2010)63, and individuals draw on information from 
a variety of arenas. It is to these other sources that we now turn.  
6.1.3 Media  
As shown in Quote Box 7, PPP1 interviewees cited a variety of media sources for their ideas about 
SLC, including national radio, local and national newspapers, and television documentaries. These 
sources provided not only factual information, but also food for thought or a reference point 
(Quote 36). Figure 17 shows media use among PPP2 participants. Results are consistent with 
previous research that shows TV is among the most common sources of scientific information 
(Hargreaves et al., 2003) and information about marine climate change issues (CLAMER, 2011a). 
This may be related to PPP1 interviewees’ desire to see change in order to believe it (see section 
6.1.5). Consistent with other research (CLAMER, 2011b; Hargreaves & Thomas, 2002), TV is also 
among the more trusted media sources (Figure 16). PPP1 respondents expressed more trust in 
sources such as the BBC and Radio 4 than in newspapers (Quote Box 7). ‘Local newspapers & 
magazines’ were also the joint least trusted source of information about SLC by PPP2 respondents, 
with national newspapers and magazines also low on the list.  
Quote Box 7 indicates that the media can be simultaneously trusted and distrusted, consistent with 
previous research (Hargreaves et al., 2003). However, as also noted in other research (e.g. Butler & 
Pidgeon, 2009), Lynne does not passively absorb and blindly trust whatever she does read (Quotes 
35 and 50).  
Figure 18 shows the prevalence of news items relating to SLC in mainstream media. It shows that 
SLR and the Severn Estuary are not covered as widely as climate change and the recession. 
However, SLR did receive significant attention, with 317 articles mentioning SLR on the Guardian 
website in 2012. Despite coverage of SLC in mainstream news media however, PPP1 participants 
noted that sources tended to provide general rather than local information (Quote 30) and that 
they tend to hear about the issue of SLC in relation to other places, not their locality (Quote 31); a 
trend also noted by Harvatt et al. (2011) with regards to flooding and SLR in the UK, and indicated 
in Figure 18 by the low mention of SLR in the Somerset County Gazette (just two articles). Indeed, 
for PPP2 participants, national media was a more trusted source of SLC information than local 
media (Figure 16).   
 
                                                   
63 This paper refers to work carried out in the USA. However, their calculations are broadly in line with the contact 
UK school pupils also receive.  
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29. “I watch BBC Natural World sort of things, that sort of stuff. I try and, you know- the 
odd newspaper article, but they’re generally dramatisations and such, you know, trying to 
sell papers, that I don’t really pay a lot of interest in them. I suppose more like BBC 
programmes or whatever. Or that sort of Natural World kind of thing. You feel that 
they’re probably not trying to dramatise it so much to get figures so much”- Anthony 
30. “I’m led by the media to believe that they’ve risen. I’ve got no reason to doubt that. But 
on a very general- yes, sea levels have risen, and are rising, and will continue to rise. In 
particular to the Severn, I’ve got no knowledge of anything particular” - George 
31. “I don’t really pay as much attention as I should probably. Especially locally. Because you 
know, you always hear about the wider issue, don’t you, the climate change. And with the 
Maldives and Bangladesh and stuff” – Ruby 
32. “I think the radio is actually better because programmes on the radio can be based on one 
element of the news, and they can go into it more fully. Cheers for Radio 4” – Glenda  
33. “I do watch these weird programs on Discovery Channel. And I don’t know how true it 
was, but it seemed quite true because it wasn’t like one of those cheap knock-off 
documentaries. Looked like they’d spent some money on it” – Lee 
34. “I think it’s because of the dramatic pictures on the news of the flooding in Gloucester, 
you know, it sticks in peoples’ minds” – Laura 
35. “I’m the dreaded Daily Mail reader” – Lynne  
36. “When I was about seven or eight, there was a Spitting Image sketch, and it was when 
global warming was first coming in as a theory. It’s the one thing that jumped into my 
mind. And it was the Michael Fish puppet with his glasses on, and it cut to 2050 or 
something, and there was just a big blue screen behind him with a tiny little green dot and 
he said ‘the southeast is going to be very, very wet, apart from the top of Ben Nevis, which 
is going to be very, very crowded’. And that was it. And that’s always stuck with me. That’s 
my first thought about SLR, global warming, is Michael Fish telling me that everyone’s 
clambered to the top of Ben Nevis because everywhere else has flooded. That really is the 
first thing that springs to mind. [...] glaciers melting and Michael Fish telling me that Ben 
Nevis is crowded are my two overriding images of SLR. Yeah” – George 
Quote Box 7: Media use, PPP1 
 
 
Figure 17: Media use, PPP2 
The columns are different heights because participants did not have to answer each question; lower 
column heights indicate lower response rates.  
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Figure 18: British news articles citing SLR and other topics in 2012, by news source64 
The frequencies of articles in the Somerset County Gazette are labelled. 
6.1.4 Science 
Fully 63% of respondents ranked scientists in their top five most trusted sources of information 
about SLC on the Severn Estuary (Figure 16), consistent with previous research showing the high 
trust placed in scientists as sources of information (CLAMER, 2011b; Ding et al., 2011; Hargreaves 
et al., 2003; Whitmarsh et al., 2005). However, a significant proportion of respondents (17%) 
strongly disagreed or tended to disagree with the statement “I trust scientists to tell me the truth 
about SLC” (see section 6.2.2). This distrust was noted by Shuckburgh et al. (2012) in regard to 
climate change, where one third (34%) of respondents disagreed with the statement that ‘climate 
scientists can be trusted to tell us the truth about climate change’. It hints at the complex 
relationship between the public and science, also revealed by PPP1 participants. On one hand, 
participants see science as a beacon of truth, whilst also viewing experts with suspicion and 
sometimes holding expert authority in contempt (Quote Box 9). Some PPP1 respondents appeared 
to perceive science as an inaccessible ‘other’ possessing ‘unique powers’, as noted in previous 
research (Bickerstaff et al., 2008; Bickerstaff et al., 2006a; Michael, 1992). This is demonstrated by 
comments such as “I’m not a scientist, I don’t know” (Quote Box 8).  
                                                   
64 This data was obtained by carrying out a search for articles containing the terms ‘sea level rise’, ‘climate change’ 
‘recession’ and ‘Severn Estuary’ on the respective news websites, May 2nd 2013.  
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37. “I’m not a scientist, but I would have thought that there’s got to be a way of stopping water 
with something” – Lynne 
38.  “I’m not a scientist, I don’t know” – Terry 
Quote Box 8: Science-in-general, PPP1 
These quotes suggest that to some extent, participants hold science on a pedestal. However, it is 
not a simple case of positioning one’s self or one’s own knowledge as subordinate to science. While 
science was at times seen as an inaccessible other, at others it was ridiculed or treated with suspicion 
or contempt, even by the same interviewee (Terry, Quotes 38, 39)65. For instance, Anthony 
remarked that he was “plucking figures out of the air. A bit like [scientists] seem to as well, [...] 
fitting in with whatever they’re trying to argue”. One way in which expert authority is challenged 
is through undermining theoretical knowledge by common sense McKechnie (1996), as indicated 
by Terry (Quote 39), and explicitly referred to by Steve (Quote 40).  
39.  “They came, I said ‘well that ain’t going to work’, he said ‘I know’, he said ‘I know’. But 
their engineers, they done a computer module [sic] and that’s how it’s got to be. Well within 
a month, they’re back there, correcting it. But it’s still not working”. [...] I don’t think some 
of the experts are experts, but that’s a matter of opinion [laughs]” – Terry 
40. “All the locals said ‘that’ll flood, that’s a stupid place to build houses’ but the developers said 
‘no we’re building it there’ so they went to the government. Government said ‘yeah you can 
build there’. They built on it and it flooded. No one was surprised that lived up there, 
because they all knew the local conditions. So that was a case of big business I think 
overruling common sense” - Steve 
Quote Box 9: Challenging expert authority, PPP1 
6.1.5 Experience: direct and vicarious 
Direct experience 
‘By experiencing it myself’ was the fourth most trusted source of information about SLC on the 
Severn Estuary amongst PPP2 respondents (Figure 16), consistent with PPP1 findings (Quote Box 
10) and other research that highlights the high trust placed in personal observation in the context 
of flood risks (Whitmarsh, 2008). For example, PPP1 participant Paul stated that “unless 
somebody’s going to the trouble of faking all this stuff, which would be quite expensive to do, then 
you have to go with your own eyes”. Indeed, the interview theme ‘known from experience’ was 
the second most commonly coded theme in PPP1 interviews (Table 15).  
Individuals gain local knowledge through a variety of experiences. Quote Box 10 shows that 
participants had learnt through direct experience of SLC processes (Glenda), impacts (Henry, 
                                                   
65 Note that Terry’s initial comment ‘I’m not a scientist, I don’t know’ could have been ironic.  
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Karen, Steve) and alleviation measures (Lee). Some participants also gained local knowledge 
through working as part of or alongside organisations such as the drainage board or the 
Environment Agency (Laura, Steve, Lynne and Terry). Direct experience of actual events however 
is unnecessary, and PPP1 results show that knowledge can also be induced66 from local 
observations as shown in Quote Box 11.  
41. “when we went to Alaska, we could see this glacier that is you know, disappearing” – 
Glenda  
42. “We had a major flood in 1980 I think it was. When the sea water came up to the field at 
the bottom here [...] I’ve been affected by it because I couldn’t get to work one day because 
the levels had flooded” - Henry 
43. “So I had a phone call at work ‘the water’s coming in, I can’t keep it out’, ‘ooh, Dad, I’m 
coming!’ [laughs]. So I drive up there, and I was wearing flip flops” [...] “The flood of 2007 
is the one that sticks in my mind, obviously, because it was so big. It had an effect on us 
because work was closed, [...] water pumping station for the area got flooded” – Karen  
44. “But we have been overtopped here once, in 1981, and we had salt water up through the 
house here” – Steve  
45.  “I only know about the [stop-lock] in Epney because it’s right by my house and I used to 
play there as a kid” – Lee 
46. “That’s what I’ve learnt by being with the water company. That when sea levels rise, 
drainage is the big problem” – Lynne  
47. “I have had a little bit of insight into it because I have had meetings with the Environment 
Agency” [...] “That’s [knowledge about flood defence budgets] from my bit of knowledge 
picked up on these committees I’ve been on” – Steve 
Quote Box 10: Direct experience, PPP1 
 
48.  “I thought to myself when I had just moved here, the way those large pieces of tree are 
lying about, you’d think they’d been left there by a river going away”- Glenda  
49. “We had to fly across the tip of Greenland and the pilot said “we’re just going over 
Greenland now” he said, he says “some of those mountains you see there, is just the tops 
of the mountains” he says “there’s something like 3 miles of ice or snow” it was miles deep 
on the internal part of Greenland. And you couldn’t imagine it. So I was thinking if- that’s 
an awful lot of fresh water up there being stored. So if it did melt I mean we would be in 
trouble I think” – Steve 
Quote Box 11: Induction from experienced observations, PPP1 
 
 
                                                   
66 Induction is a ‘bottom-up’ approach to reasoning whereby specific observations are generalised into broader 
theories. Induction is discussed further in section 7.2.7.  
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Vicarious experience  
Experience can also be vicarious, through other peoples’ experiences. Amongst PPP2 respondents, 
friends and family were the joint least trusted source of information about SLC on the Severn 
Estuary (6%). However, this contrasted with indications from PPP1 respondents, who often cited 
information provided by friends and family (Quote Box 12). This difference might be due to a 
social desirability bias whereby PPP2 participants felt that friends and family were not externally 
viewed as reliable sources of information, even though they are implicitly trusted. Lynne felt there 
was a conflict of information between media sources and what her family had told her (Quote 50).  
50. “And [my nephew] said it was twice as deep, the ice cap, when he first started taking notice 
and interest in skiing and walking groups up there. So that’s in his lifetime, so you could 
have said in the last 30 years, it’s about 10 years ago I was talking to him. So although 
underneath I’m sceptical, that is one fact that has been verified by somebody I know. Not 
by a friend of a friend. You know, when you know something first hand, it does make you 
pull up a bit. Every other bit of information I’ve had is sort of second or third or fourth 
through either Radio 4 or the Daily Mail. You know. I think it’s conflicting” - Lynne 
51. “I haven’t seen that [flooding] happen, but you know, talking to other dog walkers, that’s 
what they’ve been telling me” – Glenda  
52. “I was chatting to an old seadog sailor up at the pub last week, and he told me [the local 
power station] was nuclear” – George 
53. “And the time when it flooded before that was [when] my grandmother [was] probably a 
very young child, about the turn of 1900s or 1890s, and the old lady that used to live here, 
[...] she came here once and she was in her 80s then, she said “when I was a little girl” she 
said “my mother was upstairs having one of my sisters or brothers or something and 
having the baby at home” she said, “and I was only about three or four, but my job was 
just run down the stairs and tell them how high the water is coming”. That was her 
memory. She died probably in about 1980, I expect, and she could remember that when 
she was a very small child. So that was the previous time to that when the sea had come in” 
– Steve  
54. [Facilitator: where’s that come from for you? Is that from seeing stuff or reading stuff or-] 
“more from being with him [boyfriend]; it wouldn’t have occurred to me previously except 
that his uncle goes up to the shooting range, which you know, [you] hear bits of 
conversations” – Yasmine 
Quote Box 12: Vicarious experience, PPP1 
The importance of local knowledge  
A number of participants directly referred to the importance of local knowledge. For example, 
Steve (Kingston Seymour) noted that some people who do not closely experience the estuary do 
not have such local knowledge, stating “I don’t mean someone who lives in town that’s looking at 
[...] national trends, but if you lived down here, you’d know that there’s less bird life than there 
used to be [...] there’s a lot of people that live in the village, they’ve never been down there, they 
don’t know what the issues are”. This local knowledge could be called ‘local knowledge-in-general’, 
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after Michael’s (1992) ‘science-in-general’. In Michael’s account, the public address science as ‘an 
abstract entity or principle’ (p313) and differentiate themselves from it, being ‘not mentally 
equipped to comprehend science’ (Michael, 1992, p. 318). During PPP1 interviews, local 
knowledge-in-general emerged as a special kind of knowledge that was only accessed by privileged 
groups such as ‘old timer families’ (Ellen, Quote 55) and people who have lived around the Severn 
for some time; a rich local knowledge that is respected by others, as noted by  McKechnie (1996). 
While science-in-general is ‘an other from which one is permanently banned from entering’ 
(Michael, 1992, p. 319), local knowledge-in-general can be entered through experience. A number 
of respondents spoke of learning about the estuary from sailing on it, and Lynne noted that she 
didn’t know about the Severn bore because she wasn’t a sailor. Irwin et al. (1999, p. 1319) suggest 
that forms of local expertise are ‘intimately linked’ to specific activities such as these. For PPP1 
interviewees, sailing (Jessica, Fred, Ellen, Laura, Darren, Steve) and farming (Steve, Terry) were 
dominant activities.  
55. “Old timer families around here very readily trip off these little tales. So I think it’s 
something people are conscious of, and I suspect people generally have a better 
understanding about tides and flooding [...] than they do in other places” – Ellen 
56.  “The Severn bore thing is to do with the tides, but again, because I’m not a sailor I haven’t 
got any knowledge of it” – Lynne  
57.  “People that just buy a nice little house from Barratt homes [have] no connection to the 
local- they just think they’re living in a nice housing estate. And then all of a sudden you 
know, nature comes knocking on the door. [I] can imagine that being a different 
perception of risk and a lot more pain and shock and distress as a result, but my friend 
lives in Granny’s house, “oh yeah, Granny’s house always used to get flooded” um. So I 
think the older communities have learnt.” – Fred, Oldbury 
Quote Box 13: Local-knowledge-in-general, PPP1 
 
Local experience should not be underestimated (Irwin et al., 1996). One PPP1 participant in 
particular could be described as an ‘experience-based expert’, having gained knowledge through 
experience rather than through qualifications (Collins & Evans, 2002). This is Steve from Kingston 
Seymour, whose highest science-related qualification is a Geography O’Level, but whose 
experienced-based knowledge of the Severn Estuary rivals those with more formal knowledge. He 
covered the greatest proportion of the expert model of all participants (Figure 19), and had 
ownership (a working understanding) of many of the more complex issues in the expert model, 
including recurrence intervals, coastal squeeze and isostatic subsidence (Quote Box 14).  
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Figure 19: Steve's PPP1 interview data mapped onto the expert model  
Dark blue nodes are those that he mentioned during the 'core dump' phase (during the mental models 
interview); light blue nodes were mentioned during the rest of the interview session. Nodes not mentioned at 
all are white.  
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Recurrence intervals and concurrent events  
58. “Whereas it might be only once or twice a year when you get a very high tide and there’s 
risk of it coming over [...] there’s going to be more tides which will fall into the category in 
100 years time if you’re two foot higher or a foot higher. Because if you get a bit of wind 
behind it, obviously you increase the risk of it coming over.” 
Bum in the bath67  
59. “The other things is they say ‘well if you develop in the floodplain’, which is fair enough, 
you’re pushing the water onto somewhere else.” 
Coastal configuration  
60. “We’re in the perfect shape here aren’t we, because we’re a funnel” 
Coastal squeeze and managed realignment  
61. “Well you put a bank there and a bank there, the water can’t spread out, so it’s got to go 
up. So I can understand that point, so why they want to basically bring the banks back to 
allow for these greater areas” 
Building resilience  
62. “you cannot say ‘there’s no development going to take place in the floodplain’ but what 
you can say is that houses have to be more flood resilient [...and] if you’re putting in a 
substation somewhere obviously you’ve got to build that up on a certain height” 
Isostatic subsidence  
63. “Yeah I know this part of the country is sinking isn’t it. Yeah we’re basically capsizing I 
suppose” 
Knock-on impacts  
64. “Because everyone’s going to be affected [...] if you’re looking at the world scheme of it, 
there’s obviously countries would be flooded, those people have got to go to other places 
in the world, crowded world, so they’ll be habituating [sic] land which aren’t going to flood, 
where there’s people already living, so I think that’s going to affect people who have a 
knock on effect all round the world.” 
Quote Box 14: Complex knowledge, PPP1 participant Steve (Kingston Seymour) 
 
Experiential knowledge is important because people new to the area may have less relevant 
knowledge than those who have lived in the area for a long period of time (Fred, Quote 57). 
Wagner (2007, p. 676) for example found that the ‘biggest differences in the completeness of the 
                                                   
67 ‘Bum in the bath’ was a term used by EPP expert James. It describes the scenario in which a structure on the 
floodplain displaces the water around it, causing water levels to rise (like the water rises around you when you get in 
the bath). 
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mental models [of Alpine flash floods and landslides] were between newcomers and inhabitants 
with long hazard experience’. Indeed, Steve, with the most complete mental model, has lived within 
about a mile of the Severn Estuary for 53 years. The second and third highest scorers (Ellen and 
Laura) had lived around the Estuary for 16 and 60 years respectively. The lowest three scorers 
(Yasmine, Owain and Darren) had lived around the Estuary for 5 years, 17 years, and 2 months 
respectively (though Owain is 18 so much of these 17 years would have been spent as a child and 
perhaps not thinking about the Severn Estuary a great deal!). Indeed, there is a significant positive 
correlation between the amount of time that PPP1 respondents had lived around the estuary and 
their mental model completeness score68 (rs = .47, p<.05). It should be noted however, that this 
sample was very small (N=20), and there could be a number of factors that could have affected 
these results. For example, those who have lived around the estuary for longer tend to be older 
(although there is no significant correlation between age and mental model completeness scores), 
and tended to talk for longer, perhaps due to their affiliation with the Estuary.  
Learning from experience does have its drawbacks. Weber (2010) suggests that learning about 
climate change from personal experience is difficult because observations are spaced in time and 
memory of past events can be faulty; I would argue this is the same for SLC. Indeed, no lay 
participants said that they had noticed or observed SLC, and some noted that it was too slow to 
notice (Quote Box 30). Second, as discussed in section 7.2.7, inducing from local observations can 
cause problems when inducing from ‘erroneous’ premises.  
6.2 Personality variables 
6.2.1 Concern 
When asked directly about their level of concern about SLC, PPP2 respondents were evenly split, 
with 51% being fairly/very concerned and 49% being not at all/not very concerned (Figure 20). 
Responses tended to be conservative, clustering around the middle options rather than the 
polarised “not at all concerned” and “very concerned” options. PPP1 responses were mixed, with 
comments ranging from Darren’s “[SLC] wouldn’t be the end of the world” and Owain’s “neither 
here nor there” to Henry stating that he feels “passionate” about the issues. Generally, SLC is not 
something that PPP2 respondents think about a lot, nor is it something that frightens a large 
                                                   
68 Mental model completeness scores have been calculated using the following method. At the first instance a theme 
was mentioned in a manner consistent with the expert model, it was coded with a score of 4 if it was mentioned in 
the core dump and 2 if it was mentioned later. The total scores were then summed to give a completeness score. See 
5.2.2 for methodology and Appendix H for completeness scores for each participant.  
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proportion of individuals (Figure 21 and Figure 22). PPP2 respondents expressed lower concern 
about SLC than that expressed by the wider European public69 and by respondents in the USA70.  
 
Figure 20: Concern about SLC, PPP2  
Percent responses to Q6: To what extent are you concerned about future sea-level change on the Severn 
Estuary? (N=359) 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Thoughts about SLC, PPP2  
Percent of PPP2 respondents agreeing with bipolar statements "I think a lot about SLC" and "I never think 
about SLC" (Q18). N=353. Bipolar response scales were unlabelled apart from the ‘opinion’ at each end of the 
scale, thus the five response options represent an opinion somewhere between the two extremes (see 
Appendix J for question structure) 
 
 
Figure 22: Fright about SLC, PPP2 
Percent of PPP2 respondents agreeing with bipolar statements "SLC frightens me a lot" and "SLC does not 
frighten me at all" (Q18), N=354 
 
 
These findings are significant for communications because unconcerned individuals who do not 
think about SLC a lot and are not frightened by it may be less inclined to seek related information. 
                                                   
69 70% of CLAMER respondents reported being concerned about SLR (CLAMER, 2011a) 
70 70% of respondents to Hamilton’s polar survey said they would be bothered a great deal if sea levels rose 20 feet, 
flooding coastal areas (Hamilton, 2008). Note that Hamilton’s question is very different from that asked in the 
current survey, because it explicitly links SLR with coastal flooding. Hence it is not surprising that participants were 
more concerned. 
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However, people who are not frightened may be less likely to engage in avoidance behaviour 
(section 8.3.2). Indeed, fear is a complex issue (see Spence & Pidgeon, 2010 for a discussion), and 
if it is used in communications it should be done carefully. Concern is also complex. Quote Box 
15 shows that participants’ concern includes concern for one’s self and for others, concern for now 
and concern for the future. Some interviewees expressed their level of concern as a function of 
their character, for example some were fatalistic or saw no point in worrying if they could not do 
anything about it (also see Efficacy, section 7.3.2). Some respondents expressed a lack of care for 
the future, a subject considered in section 6.2.4.  
65. “I’m fairly philosophical about it. I think well if it’ll happen it’ll happen” - Betty 
66. “This sounds really pathetic. I try not to be too concerned with things. I try not to let 
things wind me up or get me down, or worry me. If there’s something happening that I can 
do something about, that’s fine. But if I can’t do anything about it, I can’t worry about it.”- 
Karen 
67. “I don’t really think about SLC too much. I’m a little bit- what I don’t see doesn’t hurt 
me, if you know what I mean” – Lee 
68. “Whether I’m just getting more scared in old age. Because when you’re younger you’re a 
bit cavalier about everything” – Lynne 
69.  “It worries me more for my niece I think, because she’s six, and you know, what her world 
is going to be like. Because in 50 years time, I might not be here. You know, but she’ll still be 
alive hopefully, and then her children, I do worry for the future” – Ruby 
70. “I just worry about the poor people, I suppose” – Betty  
71. “2100. Do you know how old I am? Do you think I even care? No, that’s a little harsh; of 
course I care” - Paul 
Quote Box 15: The intricacies of concern, PPP1 
 
Concern about impacts  
Figure 23 shows the percent of respondents concerned about given SLC impacts, colour coded by 
type of impact (physical impacts and immediate/lagged socio-economic impacts). It suggests that 
immediate socio-economic impacts (dark orange) and physical impacts (green) are of more concern 
than lagged socio-economic impacts (light orange)71. A total of 58% of PPP2 participants are 
personally concerned about flooding, which was also the most salient node in the public mental 
model from the PPP1 interviews (see also Quote Box 16). However, the high level of concern 
amongst PPP2 respondents regarding travel disruption from flooding (about which 37% 
respondents were concerned) contrasts with PPP1 findings that showed that inconvenience scored 
                                                   
71 Note that impacts were subjectively categorised into physical/socio-economic and immediate/lagged during data 
analysis; respondents were not asked directly about these three categories. 
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just 20% salience72. Low concern about lagged socio-economic impacts amongst PPP2 participants 
may be due to a temporal distancing of the risks, whereby future impacts are seen as less concerning 
(see Psychological Distance, section 6.2.5).  
 
Figure 23: Concerns regarding SLC impacts, PPP2 
Percent respondents personally concerned about impacts of SLC (N=359). Green = physical impacts, dark 
orange = immediate socio-economic impacts, light orange = lagged impacts 
 
72. “I suppose yes, [flooding] would be a concern for me” – Anthony, Bristol  
73. “Flooding is always an issue, it’s never far from peoples’ minds” – Fred  
74. “I do worry about flooding” – Lynne 
75. “Flooding definitely I think is the main problem” – Karen 
76. “My wife and I have given reasonably serious thought to whether we should move, because 
we’re only a couple of metres above sea level here, which is not a lot in the grand scheme of 
things” – Henry 
Quote Box 16: Concern about Impacts, PPP1 
 
Concern relative to other issues  
While many PPP1 participants expressed concern about SLC, it did not factor highly when 
compared with other issues (Quote Box 17). They tended to be more concerned about issues such 
as the economy, poverty, local nuclear power, personal/family concerns, sustainability and the 
potential for a Severn barrage. Some participants did however express concern about flood 
                                                   
72 Salience is calculated as a percentage of PPP1 participants who mentioned a node in the expert model (see 5.2.2). 
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defence, managed realignment and climate change per se; factors that are linked with SLC. Ruby 
alluded to the ‘finite pool of worry’ discussed by Weber (2006), noting that there are levels of 
concerns about things, and that her main concerns are more society-based. Previous research has 
similarly found that climate change receives a low priority compared to day-to-day issues, 
particularly personal economic security (Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Zsamboky et al., 2011).  
77. [Facilitator: how do these issues compare in importance to other issues that might concern 
you today?] “Not even the slightest, to be honest with you [laughs]” – Anthony 
78. “Well, I don’t feel at the moment [the issues] are relevant” – Christine 
79. [Facilitator: we’ve all got lists of things that worry us; would these sorts of things register on 
that list for you?] “Not very high, no” – George 
80. “I’m not going to worry too much about the Severn Estuary. Maybe I should of course. I 
think it’s quite high for me actually. [Facilitator: SLC per se rather than on the Severn 
Estuary, or-] “Yes, personally yes. On a broad scale” – Paul 
81. I suppose there’s like levels of concern about things. [... SLC] is lower down, because it is 
just a big thing. And I suppose my concerns are more social concerns. You know. About 
how society is going, I think it’s more human based [...SLC] doesn’t come very high, but it’s 
always there” – Ruby 
Quote Box 17: Concern about SLC in relation to other issues, PPP1 
  
In relation to other risks specific to the Severn Estuary, PPP2 respondents factored SLC relatively highly 
when presented with a list of potential concerns. Responses are shown in Figure 24, which shows 
that SLC is joint third on that list. Flooding, which is expected to be the main physical impact of 
SLC on the Severn Estuary, featured most highly.  
 
Figure 24: Main issues of concern on the Severn Estuary, PPP2 
Responses to Q1: Please read the list below, and tick those that you think are main issues of concern around 
the Severn Estuary today and for the next 20 years (tick UP to 5) 
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6.2.2 Uncertainty and scepticism  
Uncertainty  
Perceived scientific uncertainty was a theme in both PPP1 and PPP2. A total of 28% of PPP2 
respondents agree with the statement “The science of SLC is uncertain”, while 21% disagree (a 
slight majority of people, 51%, neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement). The perceived 
uncertainty amongst PPP1 interviewees (Quote Box 18) is unsurprising. Over the period 1989-
2009, the reported range of SLR projections and the uncertainty associated with them increased in 
newspaper reports (Rick et al., 2011), for example. Quote Box 18 shows that PPP1 participants 
perceive uncertainty in a number of aspects of SLC, not just the rates of rise. This indicates that 
whilst amongst experts there is little uncertainty that SLC is happening (Solomon et al., 2007), 
genuine uncertainty about rates may be spreading to generate uncertainty about other aspects 
amongst the public (termed 'uncertainty transfer' by Spence et al., 2012). 
82. “Other scientists say it [climate change] isn’t [happening], but most seem to think it is. Some 
still don’t believe in global warming at all. They say it’s just a fantasy” - Betty 
83. “I can’t give you a figure [for SLC]. The experts can’t agree on a figure” - Henry 
84. “And you keep hearing contradictory views. One minute the ice cap is melting and the sea is 
going to rise, and then the next minute you get another professor somebody or other saying 
it’s not fact at all, it’s all- it depends how you interpret what’s happened” - Lynne  
85. “There seems to be these people on one side, who kind of say ‘[climate change is] absolute 
baloney; it’s just nonsense’ [...] and they seem to be scientists and things, and they don’t seem 
to be connected to the oil industry or anything of that nature that might have an axe to 
grind” - Paul  
86. “There’s such a variation, if you have one expert that says something’s going to happen, I’m 
sure you’d find another expert that would say almost the opposite is happening. [...] The only 
consistent thing I’m really finding is that most people seem to think that tides are rising, but 
they don’t know at what speed. There’s one lot that says ‘not hardly at all’ and the other ones 
says a metre, you know, in 100 years” – Steve 
Quote Box 18: Perceived scientific uncertainty, PPP1 
 
Scepticism  
Interviewees held a range of opinions about the reality of climate change (Quote Box 19). Darren 
is “not a believer in all that stuff”, while at the other extreme Ruby and Laura perceived that they 
had actually noticed change. There was a common perception that climate change was caused by a 
combination of natural causes and human agency, while Terry expressed the belief that climate 
change might have been exaggerated.  
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87. “I’m not a believer in all that stuff [climate change] to be honest with you” – Darren  
88. “I don’t know whether global warming is ENTIRELY man-caused” – Christine 
89. “We’re definitely contributing to it” - Jessica 
90.  “I think the jury’s out on it still, in my opinion, but there probably is an impact that man has 
made on it. I would say” – Steve  
91.  “I’m one of those people that says ‘but hasn’t that [SLR] been happening since the ice age?’ 
you know [laughs]. I have no doubt its speeding up, but then it’s probably always has been 
speeding up. So I’m not quite sure where I sit on it” - George 
92. “There is slight climate change, increase, say the Berwick Swans will always go to Slimbridge, 
they’re staying up North now, rather than flying down [...] well probably its global warming, 
but um, I’m er, not totally convinced on that one actually [laughs]. I think it’s a good way of 
frightening people and then they cough up a lot of tax because they think they’re saving the 
planet. But [laughs]. [...] I think a lot of people make a lot of money out of these things. [...] 
I’m not over convinced on global warming” [...] [Facilitator: SLC might not be happening, is 
that right?] “Yep. Well no, it’s happening, but not on their grand scale. Yep. That is the main 
thing [...] obviously global warming does cause SLC. Well that’s what I think [...] well, it’s 
rising sea levels, but not- don’t go over the top on it mind” [Facilitator: ok. Shall I put rising 
sea levels question mark?] “Yeah yeah. Well done” – Terry  
93. “I’m not a denier [...] but I think there is a multitude of things that play a part in the change” 
[...] “It does seem to be there seems to be many more natural disasters occurring. Whether 
that’s a greenhouse gas thing or whether it’s just a natural course of the Earth’s cycle, I don’t 
know”  – Ruby  
94. “We don’t get seasons like we used to” – Laura 
Quote Box 19: Climate change scepticism, PPP1 
 
PPP2 results show that SLC and climate change scepticism among PPP2 participants is relatively 
low (Figure 25), with the majority of respondents agreeing (tend to agree or strongly agree) that 
climate change (66%) and SLC (69%) is really happening. However, a significant proportion of 
PPP2 participants were sceptical about some aspects of SLC, with 20% agreeing that “I am 
uncertain that SLC is really happening”. And while most think that SLC is a real problem, 12% do 
not. Fully 18% think that the evidence for SLC is unreliable, and 17% agree that “too much fuss is 
made about SLC”. SLC and climate change scepticism amongst PPP2 respondents were highly 
correlated: people who are sceptical about climate change are also sceptical about SLC (rs = .78, 
p<.01). This is unsurprising considering that participants perceive climate change as the main driver 
of SLC (Section 7.2.3). Levels of climate change scepticism and SLC scepticism are not significantly 
different73. 
                                                   
73 SLC scepticism (M = 1.50, Mdn = 1.50) is not significantly greater than CC scepticism (M = 1.46, Mdn = 1.33), z 
= -1.77, n.s. 
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Figure 25: Climate change and sea-level change scepticism, PPP2 
Percent respondents agreeing with statements regarding SLC and climate change 
 
6.2.3 Values and worldviews 
Values were not followed up in detail in PPP2 due to space and time constraints, but as they form 
an important part of risk perceptions (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983), this section briefly considers 
relevant findings from PPP1. A dominant worldview articulated by PPP1 participants regarded the 
power of the Earth and the insignificance of humans (Quote Box 20).  
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Earth is powerful and resilient 
 
95. “I think of Slimbridge. The birds and all those big open grasslands. To me it’s a very pure 
thing. A very primeval kind of- Gaia, Mother Nature thing. Very powerful. [...] Gaia kind of 
re-sorts herself” – Betty 
96. “I am aware that the old timers say ‘it’s all very well having a sea wall, but if the river wants 
to come and join us, it will’. [...] At some point, man will be defeated, and the results will be 
catastrophic” [...]“The more effort than man puts in to keep nature at bay, the eventual 
breakdown will be worse” - Fred 
97. “Even with better sea defences we’d probably still be at risk of flooding [...] If we had a 
tsunami of course, sea defences wouldn’t be a lot of good, so we’d all flood” - Steve 
98. “I suppose part of me thinks that nature will do what nature always does, which is recover 
from these situations” – Anthony  
99. “There may not be people on it, but the Earth will be ok” – Betty  
 
Humans are small and insignificant 
 
100. “It almost reminds me of how small we are, you know, bustle about doing these really 
important things, we’re so worried about it all [...] I think sometimes we have a bit of an 
inflated sense of our own importance. [...] I wonder if we’re just like a flea on the skin of 
something and it’s like- yerouh!- just flick it off” - Betty  
101. “[SLC] is just something that happens. You know, I think we’re making too much of it. 
Yeah. We think we’re too important or something [...] We’ll be alright, and if we’re not, so 
what?” – Darren  
102. “I think people are temporary on the planet” – Ellen  
103. “The Earth will carry on regardless of what we do” - Fred 
104. “It’s not the world that’s going to end, its only the people who are on it” - Glenda 
105. “I think we always think we’re somehow superior. I think, but really, we have no control 
over things that are stronger than us. And more powerful than us” - Ruby 
106. “Things change, you know. People don’t like it [laughs], but things change” – Laura 
107. “I’m not anxious about things generally, I have a- I kind of have a trust in people and in 
God, I suppose. And what goes on, and so I tend to think well, it is as it is. I don’t think 
we’re going to get anywhere by ever panicking, or- and I think our efforts are so puny” – 
Betty  
Quote Box 20: ‘Powerful and resilient Earth’ worldview, PPP1 
 
Such worldviews are important because they can affect the ways in which people expect nature to 
respond to change (Tansey & O'Riordan, 1999), and can influence perceptions of self-efficacy. For 
example, Betty has a ‘trust in God’ (Quote 107), which research suggests may affect risk her risk 
perceptions (Alam, 1990; Slimak & Dietz, 2006). Sims and Baumann (1972) suggest it is the belief 
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that the locus of control lies with an external power (i.e. a personal lack of agency) that affects 
behaviours: those ‘who believe that God (or fate or luck) controls their lives [...] confront a tornado 
in a manner that is consistent with their attitudes [...]; they await the fated onslaught, watchful but 
passive’ (Sims & Baumann, 1972, p. 1391). This idea of agency is why beliefs regarding the Earth’s 
power and resilience are so important in risk perceptions. ‘Externally-oriented respondents [...] 
tend to refrain from action, express feelings of powerlessness, [and] experience debilitating rather 
than facilitating anxiety’ (Baumann & Sims, 1978, p. 190). Thus, people who think the Earth is all-
powerful may refrain from personal engagement. On the other hand, inaction may also be justified 
by a worldview perhaps antithetical to the ‘powerful Earth/insignificant humans’ view: that is, the 
view that humans are resilient to these ‘big forces’ (Quote Box 21). For example, Christine, Henry, 
Terry, and Fred all have faith in their local flood defences. Such faith in anthropogenic structures 
can lead to a ‘false sense of security’ and can in some cases increase vulnerability (Baumann & Sims, 
1978, citing an unpublished NOAA manuscript 1972). This is discussed further in section 7.3.3.  
108. “I think human beings are very adaptable” – Betty  
109. “Power station. They’re well built, they’ll survive [...] we’ve got good engineers so they can 
deal with [SLC] perhaps?” – Jessica  
110. “I think things are going to change quite quickly in terms of technology. There’s such 
wonderful technology coming along now. Especially by 2050, I wouldn’t expect anyone to 
be contributing in the way we are now to the effects of climate change”- Laura 
111. “I reckon eventually it would change and go back to freezing. [Facilitator: naturally or…] 
Naturally, but I reckon we could intervene if we needed to” - Owain 
112. “We’ve been flooded in our garden before. But there’s defences been built since then. [...] 
Over the past two or three hundred years Uphill’s flooded about every 80 years. But it won’t 
anymore. [...] I mean it’s made a huge difference to us. Knowing that [...] if a really high tide 
is forecast, half an hour before it comes, they shut them. It’s really good” – Christine  
113. “I feel pretty comfortable about the defences- they look pretty robust. So that does fill me 
with confidence, yes” – Henry  
114. [Facilitator: so the flooding thing doesn’t worry you because the defences are there, or- ?] 
“Yeah, Yeah. No, they’re good defences” – Terry 
115. “I’m not too worried at the moment, here, and also you could say that we’re hiding behind 
the power station [which has good defences]” - Fred 
Quote Box 21: ‘Powerful and resilient Humans’ worldview, PPP1 
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6.2.4 Future thinking 
As discussed in section 2.6.1, van Asselt et al (2010) identified two ‘temporal repertoires’ to describe 
how experts think about the future: historic determinism and futuristic difference. In section 4.2.3 
we saw that experts interviewed for this study showed varying reliance on each of the two 
repertoires. This was also the case during the public interviews (PPP1), as shown in Quote Box 22.  
 
Historic determinism: the future is determined by the past and the present  
 
116. “I would be happier if I looked into the past to give me some idea” – Lee   
117. “I remember the old meandering rivers thing from school, where they get cut off and then 
go straighter and then it happens again. But again, it’s taken hundreds of years to do that. It 
doesn’t happen overnight, [...] you can only see it happening with hindsight over a lot of 
years [Facilitator: so why do you not think it might change quickly now?] well why would 
it? I can’t see… I mean the only thing that might make it is something like science fiction 
type thing, where maybe a massive meteorite hit us” - Lynne  
118. “That’s 40 years then isn’t it? Near as damn it. In 40 years. I don’t know, they’d probably 
extrapolate and say between the last 40 years its risen this much or within the last 10, 15, 20 
years its risen this much and take it forward” - Paul 
119. “It’s a lot easier to say, this is what we think has happened in the past; this is what we think 
is going to happen in the future” – Andrew, Expert (Academic)  
 
*** 
 
Futuristic difference: relationships between the past, present and future are looser; 
discontinuity is key 
 
120. “The future’s a long time, isn’t it [...] something pretty major might have happened by 2100 
[Facilitator: like what?] ANYTHING” – Darren 
121. “I had a nightmare that there was a tidal wave coming up on the Knap (Barry). Like a 
tsunami, and I woke up and I thought “wow, that’ll NEVER happen here” and then you 
hear about the Canaries, and the fact that you know, it might fall into the sea, and we might 
get- so, who knows? [laughs]” - Laura 
122. “These [extreme scenarios] can all potentially happen” – Sandra, Expert (Government) 
 
Quote Box 22: Temporal repertoires, PPP1 and EPP 
 
Although Darren and Laura expressed a futuristic difference standpoint, interviewees tended to 
place a strong emphasis on historical determinism, often talking about evidence and using the past 
to think about the future. This is important because people who subscribe to this approach may 
be less likely to consider the possibility of surprises such as a big event on the Severn that has not 
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happened before. See ‘temporal distance’ below for a further discussion of findings relating to how 
PPP1 and PPP2 participants think about the future.  
6.2.5 Psychological distance 
Figure 26 shows PPP2 survey results pertaining to social, geographical and temporal psychological 
distance. Findings relating to each of these from PPP1 interviews and the PPP2 survey are then 
considered in turn.  
 
Figure 26: Psychological distance, PPP2 
Percent agreement with bipolar statements relating to social, geographical and temporal distance. Q17: 
“Please indicate which opinions about sea-level change you most agree with” 
 
Geographical distance 
PPP1 participants tended to view SLC as something that would affect other places worse than it 
would affect their local area. As shown in Quote Box 23, a number of participants felt that SLC 
would greatly affect other parts of the world, particularly Thailand, The Maldives and India. Closer 
to home, PPP1 participants talked about SLC and flooding as a risk to the south and east of the 
UK, London, and places around the Severn Estuary other than where they lived (apart from Karen, 
Ruby and Betty who recognise local risks as well).  
Interestingly, significantly more PPP2 respondents thought SLC will affect the Severn Estuary than 
thought it will affect the rest of the world. However, they still tended to believe that SLC would 
affect the rest of the world more than it would affect them personally. Also, it should be noted that 
this survey item was slightly ambiguous: although the Estuary was defined at the beginning of the 
survey as the shaded area on a map including the surrounding land, ‘the Estuary’ could have been 
interpreted as the natural rather than human environment. If this was the case, these results are 
consistent with a recent survey that found Welsh respondents to be most concerned about wildlife 
and the natural world, followed by concern about effects on Wales and developing countries, and 
least concerned about effects on them personally (Capstick et al., 2013).  
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123. “Gloucester doesn’t really stand much chance, does it, in the middle” – Karen, Gloucester 
124. “We’re going to get it first, the impact on us is going to be quite huge isn’t it? As a small 
island that we are” – Ruby, Penarth 
125. “The whole thing fills me with horror when I think of people living in Thailand and these 
very low places where they are living just up off the sea [...] and how devastating that’s 
going to be. [...] I feel quite vulnerable living here- the docks. [...] I’m about zero I think 
here” – Betty, Bridgwater 
126. “In that part of the world [Severn Estuary] I don’t think [SLC is] going to be much of a 
difference” – Darren, Gloucester 
127. “SLC, when I think about it first I always think about on the east coast, which is the coast 
which is being eroded” – Betty, Bridgwater 
128. “For some reason I thought about general SLR elsewhere. East Anglia” – George, 
Portishead  
129. “Gloucester, I suppose I would see as the main area which is affected by SLC. And 
flooding and so on.[...] This again looks like Maldives or somewhere. So I mean they are 
experiencing the same, only worse, than Gloucester. Like people in Gloucester might 
eventually have to move. The Maldives, the whole shebang’s going to have to move by the 
sound of it” – Laura, Barry 
130. “Cardiff is sort of closer to the sea than Bristol. I mean Weston’s obviously close, but as 
it’s further down it might be different” – Christine (Uphill, Weston) 
131. “In England we feel quite safe and secure for one reason or another, and we don’t seem to 
have such terrible things happen to us, you know, ridiculous storms” – Anthony, Bristol  
132. “I can’t see it impacting on the individual so much here, whereas if you’re living in a 
sampan or a little piece of rice paddy just by the water, and that salt comes up, yes” – 
Betty, Bridgwater 
133. “This person represents third world areas, possibly. Particularly Indian subcontinent area, 
where they are much more likely to be impacted by rising sea levels on a very very severe 
level, than anyone in this country is. And indeed they already are to some extent” – Ellen, 
Oldbury 
134. “[SLC is] not good news, especially if your postal address is Bangladesh. Yes, not good. 
I’ve always wondered what- how easy it is to get a long term you know, like a 25 year 
mortgage if you live in Holland” – Fred, Oldbury 
135. “This is going to happen first in Bangladesh and India isn’t it because they’re particularly 
low lying” – Glenda, Chepstow 
136. “People in certain parts of the world, mainly Bangladesh and places, very susceptible to 
SLR” – Steve, Wick St. Lawrence 
Quote Box 23: Geographical distance, PPP1 
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Temporal distance 
There was a widespread belief among PPP1 participants that the impacts of SLC would be felt by 
future generations, rather than themselves, as shown in Quote Box 24. PPP2 participants were 
ambivalent, with a slightly greater proportion of respondents choosing responses closer to the 
statement ‘SLC will only affect people in the future’ (30%) than responses closest to the statement 
‘SLC will affect people now’ (28%). A ‘not in my lifetime’ mentality was also noted by Zsamboky 
et al. (2011). Unlike indications from other research however (c.f. Fernandez-Bilbao, 2012; 
Zsamboky et al., 2011), this view was not limited to older PPP1 participants. Having said this, 
PPP2 results do show that the oldest groups were less concerned about SLC than middle-aged 
groups (see section 8.5.4).  
137. “I don’t think it’ll happen in my lifetime” – Christine, age 69 
138. “SLC in general, I haven’t really thought about it in terms of the Severn Estuary. It seems 
as though it’s something that might happen to somebody in the future” – Jessica, 36 
139. “I just think ‘oh well, I won’t be around by the time it rises to a serious level’.  How selfish 
is that, but that’s the way you think” – Karen, 48 
140. “I don’t think anything is going to happen in the short term, and probably after I’d died. If 
I was honest. I don’t think anything’s going to move that quickly” – Lynne, 66  
141. “If [SLC] does happen through natural causes it will be long after I’ve gone, or I’d like to 
think so anyway, you know” – Paul, 59 
Quote Box 24: Temporal distance, PPP1 
 
Despite a ‘not in my lifetime’ mentality, some residents voiced concerns about the impacts of SLC 
on future generations, as shown in Quote Box 25. Indeed, PPP1 participants expressed variable 
feelings of compassion for the future, which are both evident in these quotes from public 
participants, and also in expert interview results (Quotes 153 and 154). PPP1 participants who 
expressed a lack of concern for the future sometimes couched their comments in a joke or a 
flippant remark that was then retracted (Paul, Quote 146). It is impossible to gauge participants’ 
actual concern; it can only be surmised from what they have said. Furthermore, these comments 
should be taken in context of the rest of the interviews; for instance in another part of Paul’s 
interview, he stated that he is ‘quite sad’ about the issues. Also, as discussed later in section 7.2.7, 
PPP1 participants’ views may have been constructed on the spot, and may change with reflection, 
as indicated in Paul’s retraction in this quote. However, if participants do not care about the future, 
and it is not unreasonable to suggest that some will care about the future less than others, this may 
have a bearing on how they respond to the risks of SLC. For example, those who do not care about 
the future they may be less inclined to support long term mitigation or defence proposals.  
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142. “We have to do the right thing by our kids” – Betty 
143. “It worries me more for my niece... I do worry about the future” – Ruby 
144. “It’s not fair on the people to come, is it?” – Glenda 
145. “Once you’ve got kids, you definitely start considering the world beyond your lifespan” - 
Laura 
146. “2100. Do you know how old I am? Do you think I even care? No, that’s a little harsh; of 
course I care” – Paul 
147. “At the end of the day, how long have I got? 20 years? I’m not going to be worrying for 20 
years. And it probably won’t happen in the next 20 years” - Lynne 
148. “I don’t care if they [build a barrage] in about 80 years time, when I’m about to die. But I 
don’t want it now” – Lee  
149. “It’s going to be such a long time in the future... It’s human nature; you don’t worry about 
something now that you could put off until tomorrow. And it’s something that’s creeping 
up, isn’t it. Rather than just happening instantly”- Anthony 
150. “I think if people knew that if they changed their behaviour they’d have jam tomorrow, 
they would deal with it, they would get on with it, or most- more people would. But if you 
tell people that if they change their behaviour their great grandchildren might live in a 
better, safer world, they know that nobody else will do it either. So they don’t do it”- Ellen 
151. “300 years is nothing really is it, in the grand scheme of things, but to us, its 300 years, well, 
we’re going to be gone so [laughs], you know. But hopefully it won’t happen in 10 years”- 
Ruby  
152. “[The Environment Agency is] looking at the long term view of if you build a house it’s got 
to be there for 100 years. So in 100 years time, obviously they’ve got to try and think what 
the conditions will be in 100 years. Whereas, I’m looking for my lifetime or my son’s 
lifetime, which isn’t 100 years, you know. But it could be in my grandson’s time, you 
know” – Steve 
*** 
153. “I won’t be around to find out anyway” –  Matt, Expert (County Council)  
154. “If it goes over 2m, I’m not going to be here, what do I care?” – Daisy, Expert 
(Government) 
Quote Box 25: Thinking about the future, PPP1 
 
Social distance: the ‘other’  
Social psychological distance refers to the perceived remoteness of people who are deemed to be 
‘unlike me’. Social psychological distance was mainly expressed through reference to people in 
other countries, rather than people perceived to be different within the UK (see spatial distance 
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above). Indeed, participants stated that quite opposite to a social distancing effect, “SLC would 
affect everyone” (Steve) and “be no respecter of age, disability or how nice they are” (Ellen). 
Darren was the only participant who hinted that SLC risks might be different for socially distant 
people than they would be for him, a 28 year old White Briton (Quote Box 26).  
155. “Bangladeshis – that’s quite a low lying country, isn’t it? ‘White man will always be ok’. 
[Facilitator: do you think that’s true?] yeah, to be honest at the moment I do” – Darren  
156. “[Old people will] probably be top of the list to be moved” – Darren 
Quote Box 26: ‘The other’ distance, PPP1 
 
Psychological distance: summary  
The findings from this study should be taken in context. PPP2 and PPP1 participants tend to think 
that SLC will affect the rest of the world more than it will affect them, and this is valid if we take 
the rest of the world to mean places like the Maldives and Bangladesh, which will probably be 
affected more than the Severn Estuary. On a more local scale, while Weston may be affected to a 
similar to extent to Cardiff (in contrast to Christine’s Quote 130), Barry is unlikely to be as severely 
affected as Gloucester (consistent with Laura’s Quote 129). Also, PPP1 participants widely talk 
about SLC predominantly affecting future generations (PPP2 responses are ambivalent on this 
subject), which is also likely to be true when we consider future rates of rise and time lags (see the 
expert model in Appendix O).  
The psychological distancing of SLC can thus be interpreted in a variety of ways. First, it can be 
interpreted as a rational evaluation of the evidence: the impacts of SLC are indeed expected to be 
greater in future, and in low-lying developing countries (Nicholls & Cazenave, 2010). Second, it 
can be interpreted in the context of the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Ruby 
for instance thought Gloucester was vulnerable to SLC, and linked it to recent events there that 
she easily recalled: “I mean there was the huge flood wasn’t there? A few years ago, Gloucester 
way”. Finally, such downplaying of risks to an individuals’ self could be interpreted as ‘a 
manifestation of a personal denial about direct effects and, more importantly, dissociation from 
any personal involvement in possible solutions’ (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006, p. 82). 
6.2.6 Emotions  
SLC evokes negative feelings amongst PPP1 interviewees, who described SLC and its impacts as 
“quite frightening” (Ruby), or something that fills them with “horror” (Betty). The influence of 
such negative feelings upon SLC perceptions were not followed up in PPP2, but it would be remiss 
not to include a brief discussion here because such feelings have been shown to be key 
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considerations in risk perceptions (Slovic et al., 2004). SLC is an emotionally charged subject for 
many, especially those who are set to be impacted by managed realignment schemes, which is one 
governmental response to SLC on the Estuary. Interview participants talked about their own 
feelings during and after flood events, or imagined how flooding would feel (Quote Box 27).   
157. “That was quite horrific really [...] I was so frightened. It really was a scary thought, that, it 
really felt like the car was being washed away at times” - Karen 
158. “Having been flooded it’s not a nice experience.  When you see all these pictures of 
flooding they had up around Tewkesbury a couple of years ago, my heart went out to them 
because I know exactly what’s it like, and everyone would tell you the same thing, you get 
this stinking layer of mud there, and it is, it’s really evil, it just gets everywhere” – Terry 
159. “It’s a terrifying thing, water, when it does that. And people coming out of their houses 
with all this stuff wrecked. We’re so territorial, and we kind of like our little houses. All 
ruined. All the carpets”- Betty 
160. “Because we’d just insured everything new for old [laughs] and my husband was beckoning 
it in [laughs]. No, we wouldn’t really want to be flooded. It would be dreadful. It was 
dreadful for the people who lived at the village, because a lot of old people here, and all 
their memories were destroyed, all their photos, and [exhaled breath]. It was so sad for 
them [...] it must be SO dreadful. To be forced out of your home” – Christine  
161. “Even if you are insured it’s just a hideous thing to have to go through” - Ellen  
162. “Severn mud. Can you imagine if you got flooded? F*** that would be crazy. All that clean 
up. It stinks as well. It absolutely stinks” - Lee 
Quote Box 27: Negative feelings associated with SLC, PPP1 
 
Although PPP1 respondents largely associated SLC and flooding with negative feelings, it should 
be noted that a number of interview respondents talked about the excitement associated with 
flooding, SLC and extreme events, as long as their own property was not affected (Quote Box 28). 
Stories of past flood experiences were also sometimes told with humour (Quote Box 29). This 
humour may have been a reaction to shyness or feelings of awkwardness during the interview 
process; indeed, George, Karen and Ruby laughed a lot throughout the interview regardless of 
what they were saying. It may also have served as a coping strategy for a difficult or sensitive 
subject, providing emotional release after traumatic events. Humour can also provide a means of 
saying the unsayable in ways that are culturally permissible (Parkhill, Henwood, Pidgeon, & 
Simmons, 2011). For instance Ruby used humour to describe the potential plight of the city of 
Cardiff. Finally, laughter may have been a reflection on how much participants had enjoyed the 
interview process! 
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163. “Flooding happens. It is quite exciting at the time. That’s terrible, isn’t it? It’s nice going 
out and seeing- it’s fascinating. Yeah, you can drive out and you can see all the floods [...] 
Whilst it is terribly upsetting for a lot of people to have their houses or whatever flooded, 
for the people that haven’t quite got flooded, it is quite exciting” – Karen  
164. “But it’s no good just sitting in victim hood, because it’s happening, you know, its part of a 
bigger scheme of nature, so you know. Enjoy it if you can, I suppose [laughs]” - Laura 
165. “It used to flood in the town. The teenagers in the town used to love it because it used to 
flood Etams shop [...] It used to be a good way of getting a spring frock” – Betty  
166. “Being a scientific person, I was thrilled to wake up on the last morning to hear the [flood] 
sirens go off [in Venice]” - Fred 
Quote Box 28: Excitement, PPP1 
167. “Me mate lost nearly all his turkeys [laughs]. No, that was pretty horrendous that was” – 
Terry  
168. “People say, it’s almost a bit of an assumption in Portishead, of this new estate bit, you 
know, ‘oh be careful of the flooding’ [small laughs]. Um” – George  
169. “So I had a phone call at work ‘the water’s coming in, I can’t keep it out’, ‘ooh, Dad, I’m 
coming!’ [laughs]. So I drive up there, and I was wearing flip flops. And a skirt” - Karen  
170. “She was a lovely old lady; she was a farmer’s widow up the road. Well I suppose you’d 
class her as eccentric. But oh, she was so funny. And [laughs] they had her in the boat. Oh, 
we laughed and laughed over that [laughs]” – Terry  
171. “Because it’s your time on the planet, but things change so much, so- you know, what we 
can’t envisage now, in a few hundred years time, ‘oh that city, Cardiff, that existed all those 
years ago’ [laughs] you don’t know, do you? [laughs] that’s quite doom and gloom [laughs] - 
Ruby 
172. [Facilitator: thank you for participating] “I’ve quite enjoyed it” [laughs] - Karen 
Quote Box 29: Humour, PPP1 
6.3 Demographics  
Demographics, including factors such as age, gender and place of residence, could also be described 
as orienting dispositions. They are discussed in section 8.5, which presents the results and 
discussion of regression analyses on various factors, including demographics. Raw demographic 
data is presented in Appendix L.  
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6.4 Summary: orienting dispositions for sea-level change 
perceptions 
Results show that orienting dispositions for SLC perceptions include a variety of factors including 
sources of information and personality variables such as worldviews and emotions. Regarding 
information sources, PPP2 respondents most trust the Environment Agency and Natural 
Resources Wales (66%) for information about SLC, with scientists coming a close second (63% of 
respondents). Individuals tend to place a lot of trust in experience, and learn about SLC through 
personal and vicarious experiences. Local knowledge is important, accessed by certain groups such 
as ‘old timer families’ and through engaging with certain activities such as sailing and farming. 
Although scientists were highly trusted sources of information about SLC, a significant proportion 
of respondents do not trust them to tell them the truth about it. Indeed, PPP1 participants had 
complex relationships with science, which was both revered and challenged.  
Respondents tend to express relatively low concern about SLC, with few being very concerned 
about it. SLC is not something that people think about much, is not something that frightens many 
people, and is of low concern relative to other issues such as the economy. Flooding is considered 
to be the highest SLC concern. Generally, physical impacts such as flooding and erosion, and 
immediate socio-economic impacts such as travel disruption, are more concerning than lagged 
socio-economic impacts such as decreased house prices. Perceived scientific uncertainty (both 
founded and unfounded) was a common theme, although scepticism regarding SLC was relatively 
low.  
Some PPP1 participants prescribe to worldviews that place the locus of control for SLC in the 
hands of external powers, and others have a faith in flood defences that fosters a false sense of 
security. Interviewees tended to emphasise the role of history in predicting the future, which may 
lead to a reduced capacity to think about potential extreme events or ‘surprises’. Individuals tend 
to think that SLC is something that will be worse in other places, and affect people in the future 
more than today; though these views should be taken in context (SLC is indeed likely to be worse 
in other places and in the future). When people do think about climate change and SLC, they tend 
to associate them with negative feelings. The relationships between these orienting dispositions 
and other factors are shown in Chapter 8. First, Chapter 7 considers factors constituting a risk 
appraisal.   
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7 PUBLIC RESULTS: RISK APPRAISAL 
 
This chapter addresses the components of a risk appraisal of SLC, including the factors that 
constitute a threat appraisal and a coping appraisal. The chapter begins with a discussion of the 
salience and understanding of issues regarding SLC on the Estuary, including public expectations 
of future SLC magnitudes. A few remarks on public terminology are followed by a discussion of 
knowledge structures, i.e., the ways in which individuals organise their beliefs about SLC. The 
chapter then presents findings regarding the factors constituting a coping appraisal: public 
perceptions of responsibility, efficacy and trust.  
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7.1 Introduction  
A risk appraisal can be conceptualised as consisting of a threat appraisal and a coping appraisal 
(Bubeck et al., 2012). In this analysis, a threat appraisal consists of the salience and knowledge of 
a risk, including knowledge about different aspects of that risk. Coping appraisal includes 
perceptions of self-efficacy, trust and responsibility. 
Unlike Chapter 6, much of this chapter compares public perceptions with expert perceptions. As 
discussed in 2.4.2, a criticism of the mental models approach is that this comparison implies that 
the expert model is correct or true, while the public model is not; and this is not necessarily the 
case (Edge, 1995). However, while it is recognised that the expert model is not one of ‘truth’, it is 
necessary to somehow compare the two in order to develop risk communications that take into 
account differences between expert and public perceptions. Therefore, throughout this 
comparison, for brevity and for consistency with previous mental model studies (Morgan et al., 
2002) the terms ‘true’ and ‘false’ refer to ideas consistent and inconsistent with the expert model.  
7.2 Threat appraisal  
7.2.1 Self-reported informedness 
 
Figure 27: Self-reported informedness of climate change and SLC 
Percent responses to Q18: “Please indicate which of these opinions you most agree with...” 
 
Survey results show that in general, people do not feel well informed about SLC. Respondents felt 
significantly more informed about climate change (Mdn = 3, M = 3.14) than they did about SLC 
(Mdn = 3, M = 3.41) (z=-7.02, p<.001), but self-reported informedness was still low (Figure 27). 
PPP2 respondents feel less informed about climate change and SLC than participants in other 
4.0
2.3
18.1
12.5
47.5
42.8
20.9
27.2
9.6
15.3
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
I am not well informed 
about climate change  
 
 
I am not well informed 
about SLC 
I am well informed about 
climate change (N=354) 
 
 
I am well informed about 
SLC (N=353) 
 149 
 
recent studies do74. These differences may in part be due to the positioning of the question within 
the survey. In the current study, the question was placed relatively near the end of the survey, after 
participants had been asked questions about their knowledge of the issue. The equivalent question 
did not follow any ‘knowledge test’ type questions in the Shuckburgh et al. (2012) and CLAMER 
(2011a) surveys. Question wording and format were also different.  
A Spearman’s correlation showed no significant relationship between knowledge scores and self-
reported informedness (rs = -.098, ns). In other words, people who felt they were more informed 
about SLC did not tend to score higher or lower on the summed knowledge scale. This supports 
previous work in disparate fields (Crosby & Yarber, 2001), but is contrary to climate change 
research that shows a positive relationship between knowledge scores and perceived understanding  
(Hamilton, 2008; McCright, 2010).  
7.2.2 General salience and understanding of sea-level change on the Severn 
Estuary  
This section presents an overview of results from the qualitative interviews (PPP1) and quantitative 
survey (PPP2) before each theme in the expert model is examined more closely. Both the salience 
of the themes, and the understanding of them are considered, because salience can be high in an 
individual’s mental model without that theme also being understood or ‘owned’, to return to the 
terminology of Kearney and Kaplan (1997).  
SLC was not immediately salient to PPP1 respondents when asked open questions about the 
Severn Estuary and the issues that face it. When asked at the start of the PPP1 interviews “what 
comes to mind when I say ‘Severn Estuary’?”, participants thought of a number of topics, including 
the Estuary’s geographical form, mud, tides, bridges, a Severn Estuary barrage, sailing, Wales, 
development, the landscape, the Bristol Channel and the Severn bore; but no interviewee 
mentioned SLC. The next question, “what are the main issues facing the Severn Estuary?” elicited 
a similar response, with only one participant mentioning SLC. However, flooding, global warming, 
a ‘huge wave’, erosion, and managed realignment were mentioned, all of which are linked with 
SLC. Other issues included pollution, alternative energy and a barrage, ports, nuclear power, 
development, shipping, the bridge toll, and the decline in old traditions and industries such as 
salmon fishing and boat building. However, when PPP2 respondents were presented with a list of 
potential concerns including SLC, the issue featured relatively highly (see Figure 24, Chapter 6). 
                                                   
74 Forty-one percent of UK survey respondents know a fair amount or a lot about climate change (Shuckburgh et 
al., 2012), and 43% of European respondents felt informed about SLR (CLAMER, 2011a) 
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Figures 32 and 33 show choropleth-style meta-influence diagrams summarising public salience75 of 
beliefs (PPP1), mapped onto the expert model. The nodes mentioned by the most people are 
represented by darker shades of blue, and the nodes that were mentioned least are represented by 
lighter shades. Nodes not mentioned at all are white. Figure 32 shows the nodes that were discussed 
during the core dump phase of the mental models interviews, i.e. the issues that required minimal 
prompting. Figure 33 shows nodes discussed during the whole interview process, including the core 
dump, follow-up questions, picture sorting and cognitive mapping tasks. See section 5.2.2 for 
methodological details and Appendix G for the salience data tables used to create the maps.  
Flooding was the most commonly mentioned theme (dark blue), and was discussed by all 
respondents without prompting (Figure 32). This was followed by anthropogenic climate change, 
flood defences and glacio-eustacy (ice melt), each mentioned by 16 participants without prompting. 
Homes and property damage, tides, storms and natural cycles were mentioned by 14, 13, 12 and 
12 people respectively. Topics not mentioned at all during the core dump phase include the North 
Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), isostatic subsidence and personal sensitivity factors such as age and 
mobility.  
Wisdom of the crowd 
When PPP1 participants’ data are aggregated in this way, the maps show that the majority of nodes 
were mentioned by someone at some stage during the interview process: 65% of nodes are covered 
in the core dump diagram and 78% in the full diagram. Likewise, when PPP2 survey results are 
averaged, mean answers tend to be in agreement with the expert model. This is illustrated in Figure 
31, which shows the means of true/false answers and their standard deviations. Positive means 
indicate that the consensus amongst respondents is that the statement is true, while negative means 
indicate that the consensus amongst respondents is that the statement is false. The expert model 
consensus is shown by colours: red indicates false statements, and green indicates true statements. 
Where a red bar has a positive mean (i.e. it is on the right of the y-axis) or a green bar has a negative 
mean (is on the left of the y-axis) this indicates a widely held misconception amongst the public, 
and is circled in blue. The figure shows that when averaged, only five out of 34 topics were answered 
incorrectly. However, this ‘wisdom of the crowds’ (Galton, 1907) belies a more nuanced picture. 
The next sections examine each model theme in turn, discussing topic salience and understanding 
amongst interviewees and survey respondents. It shows that despite the crowd consensus being 
highly consistent with the expert model, there is much uncertainty and a number of differences 
between expert and public perceptions. 
                                                   
75 As discussed in section 5.2.2, salience is calculated as a percentage, where 100% indicates that everyone mentioned 
the topic in the core dump phase, and lower percentages indicate that fewer people mentioned the topic or that it 
was mentioned during the later stages of the interviews. 
 151 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Key for public meta-influence choropleth diagrams (overleaf) 
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Dark colours represent themes most commonly coded.
Figure 29: Public mental models ‘core dump’ themes mapped onto expert model 
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Figure 30: All public themes mapped onto the expert model 
Including data from PPP1 mental models interviews, picture sorting task and cognitive mapping task. Dark colours 
represent themes most commonly coded. 
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Drivers of sea-level change 
 
Physical impacts of sea-level change  
 
Socio-economic impacts of sea-level change  
 
Figure 31: Average PPP2 responses to true/false questions, with standard deviations  
Positive means indicate that the consensus amongst respondents is that the statement is true, while negative 
means indicate that the consensus amongst respondents is that the statement is false. Expert model consensus 
is shown by colours: red indicates false statements, and green indicates true statements. Question wording 
has been modified to fit the page. “Increased capability of shipping/ports” (pink) is a particularly uncertain 
theme in the expert model. Widely held EP differences (differences between expert and public perceptions) 
are circled in blue. 
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7.2.3  Salience and understanding by theme  
This section shows parts of Figure 33 in more detail76. While the maps show if a node is salient, 
they do not show how well it is understood. Understanding is therefore further explored with 
reference to PPP1 and PPP2 findings.  
Drivers of sea-level change  
 
Figure 32: Public salience of drivers mapped onto expert model, PPP1 
 
The most salient drivers amongst PPP1 respondents were ice melt (glacio-eustacy) and 
anthropogenic climate change (ACC), while the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) and lunar cycles 
were not discussed at all77. Sixteen participants talked about ACC without being prompted, 
indicating that participants closely link ACC and SLC. Christine summed up this link, noting that 
“you can’t divorce rising sea levels from climate change”. 
                                                   
76 Data from the whole PPP1 interviews are presented rather than solely the ‘core dump’ stage, because the core 
dump risks overlooking topics.  
77 The NAO is a key driver of storminess on the Severn Estuary, and lunar cycles cause great variations in tidal 
amplitudes (see Expert Model, Appendix O) so both are important drivers of SLC. It is debateable though whether 
concepts such as these should be included in risk communications because they do not directly influence behaviour 
(Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006). 
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Figure 33 and Figure 34 show survey responses to true/false questions about the drivers of SLC. 
The graph with the green background shows the percentage of true/false responses to statements 
for which the expert consensus is that they are true. The graph with the red background shows the 
percentage of true/false responses to statements for which the expert consensus is that they are 
false. Large percentages of respondents stating that the statement is false (red bars) on the green 
background indicate a widely held misconception that a true statement is false. Likewise, large 
percentages of true answers (green bars) on the red background indicate a widely held 
misconception that a false statement is true. Widely held differences between expert and public 
perceptions are circled in blue.  
 
Figure 33: True/false responses (%) to TRUE statements about the causes of SLC, PPP2 
Question wording has been modified to fit the page. 
 
Figure 34: True/false responses (%) to FALSE statements about the causes of SLC, PPP2 
Question wording has been modified to fit the page. 
 
 
Figure 33 and Figure 34 show that while mean public understanding is consistent with the expert 
model for most of the true statements (i.e. the majority of respondents state that the true statements 
are true), the graphs show that there is a lot of uncertainty (denoted by the wide white ‘don’t know’ 
bars), and a number of differences, particularly when framed as false statements. Differences 
between the public and expert models can be summarised as follows:  
 Most SLR is caused by melting icebergs/sea-ice. 69% of PPP2 participants thought 
the (false) statement ‘Most global sea-level rise is caused by melting icebergs/sea-ice’ is 
true, while 8% thought it is false. 
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 Thinning of the ozone layer causes global SLR. 49% of respondents thought the 
(false) statement ‘Thinning of the ozone layer causes global sea-level rise’ is true, while just 
16% thought it is false, echoing previous studies showing misconceptions regarding ozone 
layer depletion as a cause of climate change (Bord et al., 2000; Bostrom et al., 1994; Tobler 
et al., 2012). 
 Isostatic subsidence is not causing local SLR. 28% of respondents thought that the 
(true) statement ‘The land around the Severn Estuary is sinking in response to the last 
glacial period, and therefore causing local sea levels to rise’ is false, while 22% thought it 
is true. Misconceptions regarding local subsidence were also found by Akerlof (2012).  
 Coastal erosion causes sea levels to fall. 24% respondents agreed with this (false) 
statement. 
 Global warming causes increased evaporation, leading to sea-level fall. 17% 
respondents agreed with this (false) statement.  
 Climate change does not cause thermal expansion. 17% respondents disagree with the 
(true) statement that climate change causes thermal expansion, leading to sea-level rise. 
The low awareness of the importance of thermal expansion has also been found by other 
researchers (Read et al., 1994; Reynolds et al., 2010; Tobler et al., 2012).  
 Isostatic uplift is causing local sea-level fall. 14% respondents agreed with this (false) 
statement.  
There is strong public consensus about some drivers of SLC, but more varied opinions about other 
factors. In the expert model, the two most dominant drivers of long-term mean SLR are glacio-
eustacy and thermosteric SLR. Fully 75% of PPP2 respondents agree with the (true) statement that 
‘as land-based ice melts, the addition of water to the oceans causes global sea-level rise’, and just 
5% disagree, indicating strong public agreement about this factor. However, there is much more 
variation in responses to the statement ‘Climate change causes the water in the oceans to expand 
as it gets warmer, and therefore causes global sea-level rise’ with 49% agreeing and 17% disagreeing. 
This is supported by qualitative interviews, whereby SLC caused by thermal expansion had a 
salience score of 26%, while glacio-eustacy was much more salient with a score of 85%. The high 
salience of ice-melt has also been found in studies of the images that the public most readily 
associate with climate change (Lorenzoni et al., 2006).  
The high frequency of ‘don’t know’ responses is not insignificant. Although it could show an 
element of ‘flatlining’, where respondents just pick the middle option for all questions, or 
indifference, it is likely to indicate issues that respondents literally do not know about (Durand & 
Lambert, 1988; Grichting, 1994). The issues with the greatest number of ‘don’t know’ responses 
are also those with the greatest proportion of misconceived responses. They are: isostacy, 
evaporation, the ozone layer, coastal erosion and thermal expansion. It should also be noted that 
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there is likely to be an element of availability bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) in some of the 
responses, whereby participants associate concepts with others that more easily come to mind. For 
example, if a person has heard of ozone in relation to the health of the environment, they may be 
more likely to associate it with SLC when presented with the two topics together. There may also 
be an element of acquiescence bias (Jackson & Messick, 1958) whereby respondents are more likely 
to agree with a statement than disagree with it. This may mean that differences on the true chart 
(Figure 33) are more significant than differences on the false chart (Figure 34), because disagreeing 
with a true statement such as “The land around the Severn Estuary is sinking in response to the 
last glacial period and causing local sea levels to rise” may take more cognitive effort than agreeing 
with a false statement.  
 
Physical impacts of sea-level change  
 
Figure 35: Public salience of physical impacts mapped onto the expert model, PPP1 
 
Figure 35 shows that the most salient physical impacts amongst interviewees were flooding and 
ecological change. Changes in surge characteristics, biochemical cycling and carbon and heavy 
metal sequestration/release were not mentioned at all, which is unsurprising as they are arguably 
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more peripheral topics, and are rarely mentioned in mainstream media sources78. The salience of 
flooding is reassuring from a communications perspective, as this is widely believed amongst 
experts to be the greatest impact of SLC on the Severn Estuary. This high public salience is also 
unsurprising considering the historical record of flooding on the Estuary (Haslett & Bryant, 2004; 
Horsburgh & Horritt, 2006; Proctor & Flather, 1989; Zong & Tooley, 2003).  
Interview findings were broadly supported by survey results, which on average showed that public 
understanding of physical impacts is broadly consistent with expert understanding (Figure 36 and 
Figure 37). The main exception regarded tidal range, which 62% of PPP2 respondents thought 
would increase with SLR, in contrast to the expert view that tidal range is more likely to decrease 
with SLR. It was also the most salient EP difference amongst PPP1 respondents (Appendix I). 
This is not a surprising finding, because an increase in tidal range is perhaps a more intuitive 
response. Furthermore, this response may be due to confusion with the term ‘tide’, which PPP1 
participants sometimes used to refer to general sea level (see section 7.2.6).  
 
Figure 36: True/false responses (%) to TRUE statements about the physical impacts of SLR, PPP2 
 Statements have been shortened for clarity. 
 
 
Figure 37: True/false responses (%) to FALSE statements about the physical impacts of SLR, PPP2 
 Statements have been shortened for clarity. 
 
There was much uncertainty among many survey responses, particularly regarding statements 
about freshwater contamination, pollution, and decreased water levels outside of the estuary. 
Survey results indicate the following EP differences regarding the physical impacts of SLC:  
                                                   
78 Confirmed with a search of these topics on Google News, September 2013.  
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 SLR causes an increase in tidal range. 62% respondents thought that this (false) 
statement was true.  
 SLR on the Severn Estuary causes sea levels to fall elsewhere. 37% thought this 
(false) statement was false, but a significant portion (17%) thought that the statement was 
true, indicating underlying differences between expert and lay beliefs about the processes 
of global SLC. 
The bias in this survey item should be noted. Physical impacts are wide ranging and were difficult 
to frame as ‘false’ statements in the PPP2 survey. Therefore, eight of the ten statements were ‘true’, 
meaning acquiescence bias and flatlining may have affected the results differently than with the 
more equally weighted true/false statements used for drivers and socio-economic impacts themes. 
 
Socio-economic impacts of sea-level change  
 
 
Figure 38: Public salience of socio-economic impacts mapped onto the expert model, PPP1  
 
Damage to homes and property was the most salient socio-economic impact amongst interviewees, 
scoring 73% salience. Inconvenience scored just 20% salience, and few respondents mentioned 
health (13%), services (13%), and impacts on the cultural environment and heritage (5%). These 
findings indicate that indirect impacts such as these are less salient than direct impacts such as 
damage to homes and property. This is unsurprising as people are perhaps more likely to think 
about impacts that directly concern them, as discussed earlier. Other studies have also shown that 
public knowledge of climate change consequences tends to focus on immediate physical impacts 
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such as flooding rather than more indirect impacts such as social disruption (Capstick et al., 2013; 
Lorenzoni et al., 2006).  
The high salience of home and property damage is echoed by survey results, which show that very 
few people (2% of respondents) disagree that SLC would cause damage to or loss of private 
property. The same proportion of survey respondents (2%) disagreed with the statement that SLC 
would cause difficulties in obtaining home insurance, which achieved a lower salience score of 30% 
during the public interviews.  
 
Figure 39: True/false responses (%) to TRUE statements about the socio-economic impacts of SLR, PPP2 
 
 
Figure 40: True/false responses (%) to FALSE statements about the socio-economic impacts of SLR, PPP2 
 
On average, survey respondents exhibited an understanding of the socio-economic impacts of SLC 
broadly consistent with the expert model, as shown in Figure 39 and Figure 40. Also, relatively few 
survey respondents answered ‘don’t know’ to the socio-economic items, particularly the true 
statements. This may be for two reasons: a) social impacts may be more salient or better understood 
than drivers or physical impacts, or b) the statements are perceived as intuitive or obvious. It should 
be noted that a number of socio-economic impact items are subjective and/or open to 
interpretation. For instance, who is to say whether someone will find the landscape less attractive 
after sea-level rise? Furthermore, there may indeed be increased job opportunities for some sectors, 
e.g. coastal engineers. This reflects an underlying difficulty of this research, whereby a model of 
‘truth’ cannot be definitively constructed. Survey results indicate the following differences between 
expert and public perceptions:   
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 The only mean public response in disagreement with the expert model is “increased 
capability of shipping/ports”, which is itself a particularly uncertain area in the expert 
model. This finding was supported during public interviews, where Laura, Lee, Ellen, Steve 
and Henry thought that the impacts of SLC on shipping and ports might be positive. This is 
not a surprising result, as raised sea-levels may logically be related to more available water for 
shipping. The relationship with storminess (leading to decreased viability of shipping/ports) is 
perhaps less obvious. 
 Fully 23% respondents thought that the statement that SLR would cause decreased health 
and wellbeing was false or maybe false. This may indicate a misconception, but it may also 
be a value judgment or a reaction to a perceived negative framing of the issue, prompting 
participants to ‘look on the bright side’ in response to a long list of negative implications.   
Vulnerability  
Figure 41, Figure 42 and Figure 43 show the salience of vulnerability themes among PPP1 
participants, organised into the three relevant themes in the expert model: physical sensitivity & 
adaptive capacity, socio-economic sensitivity and socio-economic responses. Findings are then 
discussed in relation to specific vulnerability factors. 
 
Figure 41: Public salience of physical sensitivity and adaptive capacity, mapped onto the expert model, 
PPP1 
 
Figure 42: Public salience of socio-economic sensitivity mapped onto the expert model, PPP1 
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Figure 43: Public salience of socio-economic responses mapped onto expert model, PPP1 
 
 
Gradual versus sudden impacts of sea-level change  
As outlined in the expert model, the drivers and impacts of SLC may be slow and incremental, for 
example through gradual erosion of salt marsh by ‘average’ sea conditions, or more sudden through 
event-driven changes like storm-induced flooding. This is an important part of the model because 
the vulnerability of the Severn Estuary will depend in part on whether impacts are slow or fast. 
During interviews, SLC and its effects were generally seen as a distant, ‘creeping’ problem, which 
are too gradual to notice, though Ruby and Henry did acknowledge that future change might be 
fast (Quote Box 30). Indeed, the majority of survey respondents (60%) believe that the impacts of 
SLC will be gradual rather than sudden (Figure 44).  
 
 
 
Figure 44: Percent respondents who think that SLC impacts will be gradual versus sudden 
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173. “It’s something that’s creeping up isn’t it, rather than just happening instantly” – Anthony 
174. “It’s not noticeable. Not in my lifetime anyway” – Steve  
175. “I don’t think it’s supposed to be enough that it’s going to be noticeable in our lifetime” - 
Yasmine 
176. “I don’t know how fast it’s going to happen. You know, it’ll probably take us by surprise 
won’t it I think” – Ruby 
177. “I suspect the change won’t be gradual. Or it will be gradual if you measure the level of the 
increase in the seawater will be gradual, but I suspect that will keep going and then there 
will be some fairly major catastrophic event, so that change won’t be gradual” - Henry 
178. “I have my own managed retreat policy, sell up before [SLC] materially affects the value of 
this house” – Fred 
Quote Box 30: Perceived gradual versus sudden impacts of SLC, PPP1 
 
Some of the impacts of SLC may be slow and others fast, and experts are not agreed on which will 
be dominant (see the expert model in Appendix O for more information). However, sudden 
catastrophic changes through storm events and even tsunamis remain a possibility (Defra, 2005; 
Horsburgh, 2011). The widely held perception that SLC will be gradual is therefore important; 
people who hold this view may be unprepared for surprises, as summed up by Fred (Quote 178), 
who plans to sell his house before SLC affects its value.  
 
Spatial vulnerability  
Figure 45 shows that the majority of respondents selected low-lying coastal areas such as Berkeley, 
Caldicot, Weston and Thornbury as being at greatest risk from SLC. This aligns with the expert 
model. However, exposure and therefore vulnerability is not straight forward: wave overtopping is 
a problem in the outer estuary, while the greatest flood risk in the uppermost reaches of the estuary 
is from high river flows (Environment Agency, 2011b) and tidal currents (Severn Estuary Coastal 
Group and ATKINS, 2010b). As well as spatial heterogeneity in natural protection, there is 
variation in the amount and quality of protection provided by flood defences. Due to these nuances 
and methodological limitations, the main EP differences are tentative. They are as follows: 
 21% of respondents ranked the Vale of Glamorgan amongst the top five areas at risk, 
when the low lying regions of Newport and Cardiff further are more likely to be 
affected. Newport and Cardiff are ranked relatively low (12% and 11% of respondents 
respectively), but this may be due to these regions being represented by smaller areas 
on the map: larger areas may have been more attractive to survey respondents because 
they covered more regions deemed to be at risk.  
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 Although Gloucester was the area most often cited by interview respondents to be at 
risk, it was only chosen by 23% of survey respondents as amongst the top five areas 
at risk, despite recent floods there (Prior & Beswick, 2008). This also might have been 
due to the small size of the section on the map.  
 
Figure 45: Choropleth showing regions perceived to be most at risk of SLC on the Severn Estuary, PPP2 
Numbers show the percent of respondents who think the region is one of up to five areas that would be most 
affected by sea-level rise by the year 2050 (N=324). Darker greys denote areas perceived by more people to be 
at risk; white boxes denote regions chosen by less than 1% of respondents. 
 
Socio-economic vulnerability  
The interview protocol did not directly address socio-economic vulnerability apart from the 
inclusion of the following pictures in the picture sorting task: an elderly couple sign, a father and 
child, an Asian mother and child, and a corner shop. Bearing this in mind, there was a striking low 
salience of socio-economic sensitivity nodes during PPP1 (Figure 42), which may indicate a lack of 
knowledge about the people who are most at risk from SLC on the Severn Estuary. While some 
interviewees talked about SLC affecting everyone and being no respecter of age (Quote Box 31), 
vulnerability was talked about extensively in relation to people in other places and at other times, as 
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discussed in 6.2.5 (Psychological Distance). Darren mentioned elderly people being the first to be 
moved, a comment indicating that he thinks they may be vulnerable, which is a belief consistent 
with the expert model. 
179. “the impact for people of SLC in the Severn Estuary is that it will affect all age groups and 
be no respecter of age, disability or how nice they are” – Ellen 
180. “It affects everyone though, climate controls [sic], SLC would affect everyone. No one 
would be immune from it” – Steve 
181. “Yes, how other countries will be affected, because well, they will be won’t they? Sea levels 
are global, aren’t they” – Christine 
182. “If the sea level rises everywhere, then it’s going to you know, affect the Severn, as well as 
everywhere else” [Moderator: same sort of amounts or not?] “Yes. But we don’t live quite 
as close to the water as they do in Bangladesh and people on the coral islands and so on”  - 
Glenda 
183. “Old people. A lot of old people in seaside towns. Maybe they’ll have to move. 
[...facilitator: are they more vulnerable or not really?] Oh, they’ll be alright. They’ll probably 
be top of the list to be moved” – Darren  
Quote Box 31: Perceived vulnerability, PPP1 
Vulnerability of rural and urban areas  
While PPP1 interviewees expressed mixed views about the relative vulnerability of rural and urban 
areas (Quote Box 32), PPP2 survey respondents tended to think rural areas would be most affected. 
Forty-one percent respondents thought that SLC will affect people in rural areas more than people 
in urban areas, compared to 10% who thought it will affect people in cities most. This view is valid 
in the current legislative climate, where the cost-benefit analyses of coastal defence planning 
favours larger, more economically diverse settlements (Fernandez-Bilbao, 2012). There was 
however much uncertainty regarding this question, with 49% respondents choosing the middle 
option on the bipolar scale.  
 
Figure 46: Perceived vulnerability of people in rural and urban areas, PPP2 
Percent of respondents who believe that SLC will affect people in cities most vs people in rural areas most 
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184. “I think parts of Bristol are at risk from flooding if we had a major rise in the tides here, 
because if you think of the Cumberland Basin all up around through there, it’s all, round 
the docks there, it’s all at sea level. So cities would flood, probably the same over in Wales 
as well, Cardiff and Newport probably. A lot of that’s round the docks, isn’t it. Quite 
vulnerable from it” – Steve, Kingston Seymour  
185. “I think cities might find it harder to manage than small villages and towns, to be honest. 
[…] You’ve got more volumes to deal with. More people, even more properties to 
renovate. One property affecting another” – Lynne, Coedkernew  
186. “…rural Britain […] I suppose they’re probably the most affected areas, because they’re 
going to be cared about less to prevent issues, and I suppose I think of places like 
Boscastle that got massive floodings. And they were pretty rural” – Anthony, Bristol  
187. “I personally feel a bit safer in a city and I feel that if I’m in a city more is being done about 
it.  And I think you’re less at risk. I think people are less likely to let stuff happen to a city 
than they are happen to a little Victorian coastal town.” – George, Portishead  
Quote Box 32: Perceived rural and urban vulnerability, PPP1 
Mitigation and adaptation measures  
 
Figure 47: Perceived effectiveness of mitigation measures, PPP2 
Percent of respondents selecting item as one of the three most effective ways of limiting the amount of SLR on 
the Severn Estuary. Red bars indicate measures that are deemed to be the least 2 effective measures (N=358). 
 
The survey item addressing mitigation measures (Q15) was not a true/false item so cannot easily 
be compared to the expert model. It is also possible that responses contain an element of 
preference, despite the question being prefaced with “regardless of which you prefer...”. However, 
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some conclusions may be drawn from the responses. Most notably, 31% of respondents thought 
that increasing dredging in the estuary would be amongst the three most effective measures in 
limiting the amount of sea-level rise there (Figure 47). Although dredging can affect waves, tidal 
currents and sediment deposition (Tillin, Houghton, Saunders, Drabble, & Hull, 2011), I am not 
aware of any direct impacts of dredging on average sea levels. Also, 12% rank recycling home waste 
amongst the top three, echoing previous research (e.g. Lowe et al., 2006; Read et al., 1994) showing 
that recycling is consistently cited as a key mitigation measure, when its effect is small compared 
to other measures.  
 
Figure 48: Perceived effectiveness of adaptation measures, PPP2 
Percent of respondents selecting item as one of the five most effective ways of reducing the impacts of SLR on 
the Severn Estuary (N=358). 
The survey item addressing adaptation measures (Q16) was also not a true/false item, but instead 
asked about the effectiveness of different measures (Figure 48). It cannot be directly compared 
with the expert model because effectiveness was not explicitly included in EPP. PPP2 findings 
support PPP1 findings, which showed that flood defences were the most salient adaptation 
measure for interviewees (Figure 43). A barrage (55% salience) and flood warnings (25%) were also 
discussed during interviews, and were high on the list of most effective measures from survey 
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respondents (Figure 48). The measure deemed fourth most effective by PPP2 respondents was 
managed realignment. Overall salience of managed realignment during the PPP1 stage was 
relatively low at 15%. However, for some interview respondents it was a particularly salient issue, 
and constituted a large proportion of their interview session. Managed realignment is a 
controversial issue on the Severn Estuary, and an emotive subject for some interviewees, as 
discussed in section 7.3.3.  
7.2.4 Projections of sea-level change 
In line with previous research that shows the public expect sea levels to rise in future, (Akerlof, 
2012; CLAMER, 2011a), the majority of PPP2 respondents thought that sea levels on the Severn 
Estuary will rise between now and 2050, 2100 and 2200 (Figure 49). Having said this, interview 
and survey results both showed that some participants thought that sea levels might fall between 
now and 2050, 2100 and 2200 (Figure 49, Quote Box 33). PPP1 participants were generally unsure 
of how much SLC is expected in future (Quote Box 33). Some estimates were in the right ‘ballpark’ 
range of between a few inches and a few feet (Anthony, Fred), but many were not aware of the 
broad order of magnitude expected by experts (Christine, Darren, Ellen, Paul). 
188. “I don’t know. Feet, a few feet? Three feet?” – Anthony 
189. “But its mean levels to rise, is it half a metre in 100 years, or a metre in 100 years. But I 
certainly know that sea level has gone up and down tens of metres if not one or two 
hundred metres in geological timescales” – Fred 
190. “I’ve no idea [laughs] [...] I mean I mustn’t assume its rising, must I. It could be rising, it 
could be falling” – Christine 
191. “I wouldn’t have a clue” – Darren 
192. “I’ve got no idea, and I wouldn’t even guess” – Ellen 
193. “I can’t tell. I mean you can’t tell without measurement” – Betty 
194. “I could pluck three feet out of the air out of the air or 30 feet and I have no idea. No 
idea” – Paul 
Quote Box 33: Public uncertainty in SLC projections, PPP1 
 
The uncertainty expressed by PPP1 participants was echoed by PPP2 survey results, which showed 
a broad range of opinion. Two survey questions, framed in different ways, asked about future SLC. 
Question 2 consisted of three simple sliders representing sea-level rise and fall (significant, 
moderate, slight or no change) by 2050, 2100 and 2200. Question 5 listed five amounts of SLC and 
asked participants to state the likelihood of each on a seven point scale from very unlikely to very 
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likely. The results from these questions are shown in Figure 49 and Figure 51 (Q2) and Figure 50 
(Q5).  
 
Figure 49: Perceived sea-level rise or fall for 2050, 2100 and 2100, PPP2 
Percent respondents who believe sea levels will fall, stay the same, or rise by 2050, 2100 and 2200 (Q2: Move 
the sliders to show roughly how much you think sea levels are likely to rise or fall by the years shown, 
compared with today) 
 
Figure 50: Perceived likelihood of sea-level change magnitudes by 2100, PPP2 
By frequency of respondents (Q5: Please indicate whether you think the following amounts of sea-level 
change on the Severn Estuary are likely or unlikely by the year 2100, relative to today) 
 
Results show that most participants think that sea-level fall is unlikely. The majority think that sea-
level rise of more than 6mm is likely by 2100 (Figure 50), but as projections become more extreme, 
uncertainty increases as shown by the increasing ‘don’t know’ responses (grey). Perceived 
likelihoods also decrease as the magnitude of SLC increases. Once the suggested SLR reaches 
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60cm79 public responses are ambivalent: 35% think that SLR over 60cm is likely (somewhat likely, 
likely or very likely), while 30% think it is unlikely (somewhat unlikely, unlikely, or very unlikely). 
When the SLR estimate reaches six metres by 2100 (deemed very unlikely by experts), 22% of 
PPP2 respondents still think the magnitude is likely (somewhat likely, likely or very likely). This 
reflects the PPP1 finding that while some participants tend to know there will be a rise, some have 
“no idea” of its magnitude (Ellen). 
Figure 49 shows that just 5% of respondents believe sea levels will fall between now and 2100 
when asked to indicate their beliefs on a sliding scale. However, when the question is framed as 
perceived likelihoods on a Likert scale (Q5, Figure 50), 14% respondents thought that more than 
6cm of sea-level fall was likely (somewhat likely, likely or very likely). The way in which questions 
are structured and worded is known to affect answers (Oppenheim, 1996). In this case, bias may 
have been due to one format encouraging respondents to express a general trend rather than exact 
amounts, due to acquiescence bias in question Q5, due to a greater range of attitude expression in 
Q2, or perhaps due to misreading questions.  
Comparison of public and expert sea-level change estimates  
The uncertainty expressed by PPP1 and PPP2 participants regarding future SLC is unsurprising 
considering the expert uncertainty in future projections (Chapter 4). As noted by Expert James, “If 
we as the scientific community and the engineering community that are involved in looking at these 
things can’t make up our mind what the risk is and how it’s going to change, how on earth do we 
communicate that to the wider public?” 
Figure 51 shows the responses to PPP2-Q2 plotted as box plots. As with expert results, the plots 
show that while mean and median estimates of future SLC are all positive (i.e. on average 
respondents believed that sea levels will rise), there is a wide variation in estimates for all epochs, 
with the variability in projections increasing for longer time periods (denoted by wider ranges and 
variance between percentiles). Unlike expert projections however, the average responses indicate a 
gradual increase in sea-levels over time (denoted by the stepwise increase in estimates over 2050, 
2100 and 2200). Expert’s projections, as shown in Figure 52, tended to show a spreading out of 
estimates over time, indicating that rates of SLR in 2200 will be more extreme. The expert 
projections unsurprisingly better reflect the scientific literature, which predicts that rates of SLR 
will increase (Nicholls, 2011). However, it should be remembered that the expert and public 
questions were framed differently, and explicit values were not obtained from public participants.  
                                                   
79 IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) estimates global mean SLR of 18cm to 59cm (model-based range for six 
emissions scenarios, compared to 1980-1999) at the end of the 21st Century (IPCC, 2007), but these estimates are 
thought to be too low (Nicholls et al., 2011b; Rahmstorf et al., 2012). EPP median estimates of sea-level rise 
(compared to the 2011 level) ranged from 20cm to 100cm in the year 2100. 
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Figure 51: Public SLC projections expressed as box plots, PPP2 
The plots summarise public responses to the question “Move the sliders to show roughly how much you think 
sea-levels are likely to rise or fall by the years shown, compared with today” for 2050 (red), 2100 (blue) and 
2200 (green). Vertical tick marks indicate 90% percentiles, and boxes denote 50% percentiles. Open circles 
indicate medians, solid triangles indicate means. 
 
Figure 52: Example expert SLC projection: box plots, EPP 
Sandra’s elicited relative SLC on the Severn Estuary in 2050 (red), 2100 (blue) and 2200 (green). Vertical tick 
marks indicate 90% confidence intervals, and boxes denote 50% confidence intervals. Open circles indicate 
medians, solid triangles indicate ‘best estimates’ (value chosen if the expert were to bet money on it). 
Question marks show where no absolute maximum or minimum was stated, and dashed lines show where no 
explicit probability or very low probabilities (1/105 to 1/109) were estimated. 
 
7.2.5 Sea-level change as a threat 
 
Figure 53: Perception of SLC risk versus benefit, PPP2 
Q3&4: Do you think sea-level rise / fall would be an overall risk or an overall benefit to the Severn 
Estuary? 
 
As shown in Figure 53, SLR is perceived to be an overall risk by most survey respondents (79%), 
while 8% think SLR poses an overall benefit. As Carolan (2010) laments, survey data do not provide 
the underlying reasons for such answers. But PPP1 interviewees’ responses may shed some light 
on this. PPP1 respondents alluded to potential benefits of SLR including an increase in habitats, 
increased fertility of farmland due to flooding, increased viability of shipping and more power from 
a Severn Estuary barrage. Opinion is more divided over whether sea-level fall would be a risk or 
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benefit80. Quote Box 34 shows that the perception of how much SLC constitutes a threat varied 
among PPP1 participants with some participants believing a few inches would cause problems, and 
others not.  
195. “I can imagine that just a small rise could cause a devastation” – Betty 
196. “Well a foot, I don’t know whether that‘s quite a sizable change really, I would have 
thought” – Jessica 
197. “Obviously a foot is quite a lot, and three feet would be an awful lot. A metre would be an 
awful lot in 100 years [...] Whereas one inch is, you can probably cope with, 18 inches, if it 
went 18 inches one extreme in 50 years, that’s obviously a major problem” – Steve  
198. “They do say, having read another article somewhere, but I can’t remember all of it, that 
that would be catastrophic. Even a rise of two or three inches. But for the life of me I can’t 
see why” – Lynne 
199. “If someone said to me it’s going to rise a metre a year, or its going to rise a metre every 
100 years, I’d probably say ‘oh right, ok’ [laughs]” – George 
Quote Box 34: SLC as perceived threat, PPP1 
7.2.6 Sea-level change terminology  
The terminology used by public interviewees is an important consideration for communication 
design. Many participants used concepts and terms in ways consistent with the expert model (e.g. 
see Steve’s responses in section 6.1.5), but the terms tides, tidal surge and tsunami were sometimes 
confused or misused (Table 16).  
Term   Description and examples  
Tides, 
tidal 
surge  
Tides, tidal surges and sea levels were conflated by some respondents:  
 
“I suppose if we all rode more places on our bicycle, less CO2, less greenhouse gases, less risk of 
global warming affecting the tides” – Yasmine  
 
“I know that the Severn Estuary has got a very big tidal surge, I think the biggest one is 
somewhere in Canada” – Anthony 
 
Tsunamis  Tsunamis were sometimes confused with weather events (perhaps typhoons):  
 
“I can’t imagine us having bad enough weather to have a tsunami” – Yasmine  
 
“I thought [tsunamis] were a south sort of Asian phenomena, to do with very intense cyclonic 
weather, the sort of we wouldn’t get here. You never know I suppose” – Jessica 
 
This association between the climate and tsunamis was also made by 2% of 
respondents in the European CLAMER survey (CLAMER, 2011b).  
Table 16: Confused terminology, PPP1 
                                                   
80 The utility of these data is limited because risks such as SLC can be perceived as being both high risk and high 
benefit, and this question did not allow for expression of this. 
 176 
 
7.2.7 The structure of public beliefs about sea-level change 
This section discusses the ways in which the public might structure a threat appraisal. Participants’ 
cognitive maps are shown below, apart from Fred’s because he did not have time to draw one. It 
should be noted that maps bear an imprint of the interview process, reflecting the structured 
approach to map creation81.  
 
 
Henry 
 
Owain 
 
Paul 
 
Glenda 
                                                   
81 Maps were influenced by the following instructions and suggestions during the mapping task. Participants were 
asked to put the post-its on a large piece of paper in a way that shows how they come together in their mind. It was 
suggested that they might want to group them or draw lines between those that are most related to each other, and 
participants were provided with a set of post-its (consisting of their own comments) as an aid. They were also 
shown an example of a map illustrating the factors that I think influence whether I get sunburnt. 
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Yasmine 
 
Karen 
 
Anthony 
 
Ellen 
 
George 
 
Jessica 
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Steve 
 
Lee 
 
Lynne 
 
Ruby 
 
Christine  
 
Laura 
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Terry 
 
Betty 
 
Darren 
Figure 54: Cognitive maps, PPP1. 
 
The cognitive maps illustrate that participants structure themes in different ways. While Glenda, 
Anthony, George, Ruby, Christine, Darren and Terry solely grouped items, Paul, Karen, Ellen, 
Jessica, Lynne, Laura, Betty and Steve82 grouped them and drew arrows between the groups. 
Owain, Yasmine, Lee and Henry drew arrows between the themes themselves, creating intricate 
webs of ideas. The ways in which themes were grouped varied. Delineations included ‘impacts and 
processes’, ‘big impacts and lesser impacts’, and the most common, ‘cause and effect’ (also referred 
to as contributors and impacts). This common way of thinking about the issue was probably in 
part due to the structure of the earlier mental models interview, which asked about causes and 
effects. But it may point to a potential way of communicating the risks in future. During pilot 
interviews, one participant noted that he was only interested in impacts, not causes, implying that a 
clear distinction between the two is important (Quote Box 35).  
 
                                                   
82 Steve talked through his links rather than drawing them. 
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200. “Who cares why it is happening? What is happening. [...] I don’t care if the tides change; 
only if it affects me. So that’s what is most important” – Victor, pilot interviews.  
Quote Box 35: Preferences for cause and effect information, PPP1 pilot participant Victor 
 
Induction  
Quote 201 below shows that to create his ‘pseudo-attitude’ (Terpstra et al., 2009), Owain pieced 
together his fragmentary beliefs into a ‘theory’ of how SLC works. This is induction; a ‘bottom-up’ 
approach to reasoning whereby specific observations are generalised into broader theories: I’ve 
only seen white swans, and therefore I reason that all swans are white83. Induction is a valid mode 
of reasoning, but can cause problems when the premises are wrong, as shown in Quote Box 36. 
Yasmine’s prior perception of moorland as being on high ground, and having heard the levels 
referred to as moors, led her to induce that sea-levels are falling. Having seen glaciers melting in 
Norway and not having heard of thermal expansion, Glenda inferred that because glaciers are 
‘relatively small’, sea-level rise ‘wouldn’t be more than an inch or so’.  
201. “I’ve taken my knowledge and applied it to this, and then just gone ‘well if that’s going to 
happen, I know this will happen because I know this, therefore such and such will happen 
or could happen if we expand it and take it on in exactly the same line its going’” – Owain  
202. “Has it risen much in the past 20 years, does anyone know? because I don’t know” 
[Moderator: do you think it would have done?] probably, if they say the ice caps are going 
then you’d imagine so, but I don’t know by how much. It’s got a lot of place to fill up, 
hasn’t it?” - Darren 
203. “Well I know there’s quite a lot of moorland and stuff under the bridges, so presumably 
historically, the sea levels would have been a lot higher. Which kind of implies they’re 
going down and out. A little bit, which is funny because when they say about global 
warming, and everyone goes on about sea levels rising” – Yasmine  
204. “It’s a very large world, and the glaciers are relatively small. So I would expect it wouldn’t 
be more than an inch or so. It wouldn’t be feet, I don’t think” – Glenda 
Quote Box 36: Inducing erroneous inferences, PPP1 
 
Reflection 
Quote Box 37 illustrates the importance of reflection and deliberation in thinking about SLC. As 
discussed in section 2.4.1, the degree of deliberation in decision making can vary due to the 
familiarity of the subject, the ease at which beliefs and ideas come to mind, and the time available 
                                                   
83 Deduction, on the other hand works from the more general to the specific: All swans are white; there is a swan next 
door; therefore the swan next door is white. 
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for reflection. For example, even on a timescale of a minute or two, allowing Henry to reflect on 
his initial comments about tsunamis meant he could search his mental contents for more 
information and to retract his initial statement (Quote 207).  
 
205. “I hadn’t really thought about the whole thing before” – Christine  
206. “I don’t think about this very often, if ever. To be honest” – Darren  
207. “Tsunami’s the result of weather change caused by global warming, which is the reason 
why the sea level’s going to rise in the Severn Estuary. So- is that ok?” [Moderator: That’s 
fine. So it is linked but not really in the Severn Estuary. Is that right?] “It’s linked- I mean- 
the sea-level rise in the Severn Estuary is caused by global effects, as are tsunamis. So 
global warming’s- actually, I say tsunamis, I suppose technically they’re not really. They’re 
caused by earthquakes really. [...] I’ve talked myself out of that one” – Henry  
208. “What’s that, is that the nuclear thing at- [Facilitator: yes]. That’s the worry about sea 
change, thinking about it” - Lynne 
Quote Box 37: Reflective mental models, PPP1 
 
7.3 Coping appraisal  
7.3.1 Responsibility for sea-level change  
Responsibility for the causes and impacts of SLC 
Consistent with previous studies, participants located the responsibility for causing and mitigating 
climate change with others (Darier & Schüle, 1999; Lorenzoni et al., 2007). While nature could not 
be blamed because “when the sea comes to get you it doesn’t mean anything by it” (Ellen), PPP1 
participants laid the blame for SLC with a variety of actors including corporations, rich people, city 
people, ignorant people, fat Americans, mindless behaviour, government, aristocracy, wasteful 
people, western greed, China, short-termism and other countries (Quote Box 38). More specific 
factors such as badgers (Terry, Quote 214) were also cited for specific risks (flooding), echoing 
previous research that shows factors such as blocked drains, local development and road 
resurfacing are seen as primary causes of flooding (Harvatt et al., 2011; Whitmarsh, 2008). Such 
factors might indeed be to blame; indeed, local knowledge of such issues should not be 
underestimated, as discussed in earlier.  
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209. “People will forgive the river because it’s there, it does its thing, we choose to live here, if it 
comes to join us occasionally, well you just have to learn to live with it. But what people 
DON’T like around here, [...] is fresh water flooding runoff from Thornbury” – Fred 
210. “I feel fairly easy about more natural events, aware that SLC is not a natural- there is a bigger 
issue around that, but when the sea comes to get you, it doesn’t mean anything by it”- Ellen 
211. “Giant international conglomerate, contributing greatly to all sorts of dreadful things, 
including no-doubt, sea level, because they’re just evil” – Betty 
212. “I could tell you about methane from cattle that are being put on the land that’s being 
chopped down by people wanting more hamburgers in America to make them fatter and 
fatter when they don’t need it” [...] “I’m going to put that in the middle” [Facilitator, reading 
from cognitive map: western greed unsustainable] “that’s my key driver” – Henry  
213. “I don’t see our country necessarily as one of the worst polluters in the world. [...] I don’t 
really blame our country. [...] Other countries are far worse than us. So I blame them 
[laughs] before I blame us” – Lee 
214. “The tide came in where you’re sat, what was it ’82, 3? [...] the bank breached down here. But 
that only breached because of badgers. Because they were in the second bank, the outer 
bank, which is only when the tide comes over once in a blue moon, it saves it, and where 
these badgers had their hole, pshw” – Terry 
Quote Box 38: Perceived responsibility for causing SLC and flooding, PPP1 
 
 
Responsibility for responding to SLC  
As shown above, the responsibility for the causes of SLC lay with a number of actors, but notably 
not with individuals. Results indicate that the responsibility for responding to the impacts of SLC 
follows a similar theme. Figure 55 shows PPP2 responses to the question “regardless of which you 
prefer, which of the following measures do you feel would be most effective in reducing the 
impacts of sea-level rise on the Severn Estuary?” The graph has been colour coded to reflect those 
measures for which the main responsibilities lie with the government (blue), the individual (orange) 
or have mixed responsibility (green). It shows that adaptation measures deemed to be most 
effective tend to be those for which the government is responsible. This may be because these 
measures are indeed perceived to be most effective on account of being on a larger scale. But this 
may again reflect an externalisation of responsibility, as shown in Quote Box 39. 
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215. [Facilitator: if there are problems around the Severn Estuary, do you think the government 
will help people?] “Yes I think it will. It’s quite a rich area, isn’t it? Gloucester and all these 
places. So yes, I think so, because I think the government generally does” – Betty 
216. “You could call that on the parliament, and cause them to change it that way [sic]. Decrees 
and stuff like that”- Owain 
217. “You’d go on to the government, who would then have their contingency plans” – Lynne  
218. “Are they going to harness it [build a barrage] - you know, somehow protect us?” [...] “I 
would hope that they’re putting something in place, [...] They must be doing something, I 
assume” - Ruby 
Quote Box 39: Perceived governmental responsibility, PPP1 
 
Figure 55: Perceived effectiveness of adaptation measures, PPP2 
Percent respondents selecting item as one of the five most effective ways of reducing the impacts of SLR 
on the Severn Estuary (N=358). Colour coded: blue = governmental responsibility, green = mixed responsibility, 
orange = personal responsibility 
PPP2 results lend support to PPP1 responses. While 37% and 32% of survey respondents thought 
that it is their responsibility to act to reduce the causes of SLC and the impacts of SLC respectively, 
a higher percentage of respondents (61%) thought it is the government’s responsibility to protect 
residents from flooding (Figure 56). Findings are consistent with previous research that shows that 
responsibility for climate change, SLR and flooding tends to be ascribed to powerful external 
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actors84. One reason for placing the responsibility with other parties might be to reduce cognitive 
dissonance (Festinger, 1962). Another might be that the public does not feel that they are personally 
able to make a difference. It is to this lack of self-efficacy that we now turn. 
 
Figure 56: Perceived responsibility for action on causes and impacts of SLC, PPP2 
 
7.3.2 Self-efficacy  
A common theme among PPP1 participants was that SLR is happening and we cannot do much 
about it, that power is in the hands of few, and most of us are helpless, as shown in Quote Box 40. 
This indicates feelings of low self-efficacy in relation to SLC, a finding supported by PPP2 results 
(Figure 57), which show that on average, people feel unable to do much about the causes and 
consequences of SLC. 
219. “The two issues of SLC are either global warming, which we can’t do much about; or 
man-made, because there is talk that the Severn barrage, [which] would alter the sea level at 
Weston” - Christine 
220. “I do find this kind of stuff quite frightening, and I do- it makes you feel powerless as 
well, doesn’t it” [...]“I think ‘well what can I really do, myself?’ as you know, one human 
being” - Ruby 
221. “There’s certainly nothing I can do personally, it’s happening” – Fred  
222. “There’s no point in worrying about the big picture, is there. Because there’s not a lot you 
can do about the big picture” – Glenda 
223. “As for the sea level rising, there’s not a lot we can do about it” – Lee 
Quote Box 40: Perceived efficacy, PPP1 
                                                   
84 Transferral of responsibility for climate change has been found in the UK and Australia (Poortinga et al., 2006) 
(Capstick et al., 2013; Pidgeon, 2012; Ryan et al., 2012; Spence et al., 2010b). It has also be found for groundwater 
flooding (Kreibich et al., 2009) and for SLR (Harvatt et al., 2011). 
5.6
5.1
28.2
31.4
27.0
32.8
39.5
42.3
30.2
14.4
16.5
6.8
9.0
9.1
2.0
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
It is my responsibility to act 
to reduce the causes of sea-
level change
It is my responsibility to act 
to reduce the impacts of sea-
level change
It is the government’s 
responsibility to protect 
residents from flooding
It is NOT my responsibility to act 
to reduce the causes of sea-level 
change (N=354)
It is NOT my responsibility to act 
to reduce the impacts of sea-level 
change (N=352)
It is NOT the government’s 
responsibility to protect residents 
from flooding (N=351)
 185 
 
 
Figure 57: Perceived personal efficacy for causes and impacts of SLC, PPP2 
7.3.3 Trust  
Although the responsibility of responding to SLC is generally transferred to powerful external 
actors, at the same time, these actors are not fully trusted to carry out these responsibilities 
effectively, as shown in Figure 58 and Quote Box 41. PPP1 interviewees particularly voiced distrust 
in the government and the Environment Agency, consistent with other research that shows low 
levels of trust in the agencies perceived to be responsible for flood and SLR protection and 
information dissemination (Evans et al., 2012; Fernandez-Bilbao, 2012).  
 
Figure 58: Public trust in the government / Environment Agency, PPP2 
 
224. “This is not going to end well for South Gloucestershire. And even less well if the 
Environment Agency don’t do their thing with their locks, which they sometimes do fail to 
do” – Ellen 
225. “I can’t believe that no one’s working on a solution. But they probably aren’t. But, you 
know, at the end of the day, they’re telling people to get in a supply of sand bags. Well I’m 
sorry, that was pre first war. And that is still the solution to people who might have floods 
coming through. Move your furniture to the top floor, and put a load of sand bags on your 
doorstep. Well, I mean. It’s just ridiculous really” [...]“Parliament, I don’t know. I don’t think 
it’s up to much really. We’re relying on people who don’t know what they’re doing” - Lynne 
226. “Management retreat [sic] [is an] absolute disgrace, it is abysmal what they’ve done over 
there. [...] It’s the way it’s all been done behind our backs, and not up front. I just, I can’t put 
it into words. It’s an absolute disgrace. [...] absolutely annoys me, the way that people can 
come and just walk all over you”  – Terry  
227. “The time it took to build that small [local] bridge, [...] I mean, you know, are we ever going 
to get a [Severn Estuary] barrage built? [laughs]” – Ruby  
Quote Box 41: Distrust in government and agencies, PPP1 
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Distrust in agencies was accompanied by a perceived unfairness of these agencies’ decisions and 
scepticism over their intentions (Quote Box 42). Some PPP1 participants voiced dissatisfaction 
with the Environment Agency, whom they felt had not been upfront with regard to managed 
realignment and had been acting with a lack of evidence for SLC to justify their actions. There was 
also dissatisfaction surrounding perceived double standards regarding floodplain planning (Steve, 
Terry, Fred) and flood mapping (Lynne). These results suggest that the public has a ‘critical trust’ 
(Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003; Walls, Pidgeon, Weyman, & Horlick-Jones, 2004) in the agencies 
perceived to be responsible for acting on SLC, whereby they do not distrust the agencies outright, 
but do not uncritically accept their decisions either; instead viewing them with an amount of 
scepticism.  
228. “It seems to me that there’s this plan, that if you’re a big developer and you argue your case, 
you can get away with it, but they try and stop the small people trying to make a living, 
actually making it very difficult for us” - Steve 
229. “Weston were going to do all the air field, which is on a floodplain, so it’s alright in Weston. 
But if one little bloke wants to build a house out Kingston for his son, he got to have it right 
in the neck” – Terry  
230. “When we built the garage, we were initially refused planning permission, [by the 
Environment Agency...] because they complained, said we were consuming the 
floodplain.[...] well what was interesting was when it comes to build a new nuclear power 
station, three buildings of 6 reactors, the fact that that will consume 100 acres of floodplain 
doesn’t matter. Hence come back to my point about there’s rules for us little people, but 
when it comes to big businesses like that ‘oh no this is judged by different criteria’” - Fred 
231. “I don’t think this publishing of the flood map or anything has helped me. Because they’ve 
actually crystallised my fears and put it in writing so somebody else can actually pick up on it. 
And you know, it could stop us selling our house if something happened [...] I don’t think 
they’ve helped anybody except the insurance companies” – Lynne  
Quote Box 42: Perceived unfairness and scepticism regarding responsible agencies’ decisions, PPP1 
 
A degree of critical (dis)trust in government agencies can be a good thing, and studies show that 
trust in public flood defences is negatively related to flood preparedness and mitigation (Kellens et 
al., 2013), and flood defence improvements contribute to low concern (Harvatt et al., 2011). This 
is important when we consider that these defences sometimes fail; famously during Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005 (Jonkman, Maaskant, Boyd, & Levitan, 2009) and more locally in Weston-super-
Mare. The following story recently ran on the Guardian newspaper website ‘There were protests 
in Weston-super-Mare on the Somerset coast after flooding hit shops and restaurants following a 
tidal surge. Warnings did not reach the area in time for the storm gates to be closed on a new £29m 
protection system’ (Wainwright, 2012). Having said this, there was also recognition amongst PPP1 
interviewees that big events like tsunamis could overpower coastal defences. Indeed, PPP2 survey 
results showed that respondents tend to think people are not well protected by flood defences 
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around the Estuary. Only 7% of respondents agree that people are currently well protected by 
flood defences around the Severn Estuary, compared to 50% who do not. (Figure 59). A large 
proportion (43%) do not know if they are well protected; an unawareness also voiced by Ruby 
during PPP1 interviews.  
 
Figure 59: Perceptions of the protection afforded by flood defences, PPP2  
(Q18: Please indicate which of these opinions you most agree with...) 
7.4 Summary: public risk appraisal of sea-level change  
The Severn Estuary public does not feel well informed about SLC, but their perception of how 
informed they are does not correlate with how much they actually know. SLC is not a highly salient 
issue, and while mean public understanding of drivers is well aligned with expert perceptions, there 
is much uncertainty and a number of differences between expert and lay models. Particularly, a 
number of lay participants believe that most SLR is caused by melting icebergs/sea-ice, that 
isostatic subsidence is not causing local SLR, that the thinning of the ozone layer causes global 
SLR, that coastal erosion causes sea levels to fall, that global warming causes increased evaporation, 
and that isostatic uplift is causing local sea-level fall. Importantly, the salience of thermosteric SLC 
is low compared to glacio-eustatic SLC.  
The most salient physical impacts amongst interviewees are flooding and ecological change. 
Generally, the public’s understanding of physical impacts is well aligned with expert perceptions. 
There was however much uncertainty regarding freshwater contamination, pollution, and 
decreased water levels outside of the estuary. The most salient socio-economic impact was damage 
to homes and property, while indirect impacts such as inconvenience and impacts on health and 
services were less salient. Individuals expressed few beliefs inconsistent with the expert model 
regarding socio-economic impacts, but there was some disagreement between experts and the 
public about potential changes in the viability of shipping and ports, and the impact of SLC on 
health and wellbeing.  
The majority of survey respondents believe that the impacts of SLC will be gradual rather than 
sudden, perhaps rendering them less prepared for surprises. Generally, public and expert 
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respondents agree about the areas of the Severn Estuary that are most at risk, but the Vale of 
Glamorgan was perceived to be at disproportionately high risk by PPP2 respondents. Factors that 
affect socio-economic sensitivity, such as age and transience, were of low salience (PPP1). 
Individuals tended to think that rural areas would be worse affected than urban areas, but views 
were mixed. The main EP differences regarding mitigation responses were that recycling home 
waste and increasing dredging in the estuary would limit the amount of sea-level rise. Flood 
defences were the most salient adaptation measures, and were perceived to be the most efficient, 
followed by flood prediction, emergency planning and warning. Compensation and flood insurance 
were perceived to be the least effective measures.  
Most individuals think that sea levels will rise on the Severn Estuary in future, though some believe 
that they will fall. Respondents are generally unsure of how much SLC there will be, with many 
not knowing the broad magnitude of expected change. Like with expert projections, uncertainty 
increases when public respondents are asked about longer timescales. The perception of how much 
SLC constitutes a threat varies, but sea-level rise per se is generally perceived to be a risk to the 
Estuary. Participants structure their beliefs about SLC in different ways, but a ‘cause and effect’ 
model is common. Induction is used to reason about unfamiliar topics, but can be problematic 
when the initial premises are wrong. Time to reflect on the issues is shown to be important, raising 
the possibility that deliberation might be a valuable communications tool. 
Respondents tend to place the blame for causing SLC with external parties, and place the 
responsibility for responding to SLC elsewhere. The transferral of responsibility to others may be 
related to feelings of low self-efficacy, which are common amongst PPP1 and PPP2 respondents, 
who tend to feel unable to do anything about the causes or impacts of SLC. However, this 
transferral or responsibility to other agencies is accompanied by a critical (dis)trust in these 
agencies: participants do not tend to feel well protected by flood defences, and in some cases 
agencies are deemed to be acting unfairly in their response to SLC.  
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8 PUBLIC RESULTS: RESPONSES and 
RELATIONSHIPS 
 
This chapter has two parts. First, it discusses active responses to SLC such as actions currently 
being taken to adapt to the risks, and inactive responses such as denial. The chapter then presents 
and discusses the results of statistical regression analyses (PPP2) on factors influencing SLC risk 
perceptions, exploring the relationships between various factors pertaining to public perceptions 
of SLC.  
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8.1 Introduction 
As discussed earlier, the investigation of public perceptions was exploratory and not designed to 
test any particular model of risk perceptions or behaviour. Individual responses to SLC were not 
discussed unless they were raised by participants; and this was rare. Thus, analysis of responses is 
short, consisting of a brief discussion of active responses, followed by a discussion of the inactive 
responses that emerged during PPP1 interviews (optimism and avoidance). The second part of this 
chapter investigates the relationships between factors by way of five hierarchical linear regressions 
carried out on PPP2 data.  
8.2 Active responses 
Although mention of responses was rare during PPP1, some participants talked about their current 
active engagement by way of mitigation and adaptation responses (Quote Box 43). Regarding 
mitigation measures, Ellen and Fred Smith spoke of never using a tumble drier, and Betty talked 
about her solar water heater, while Lynne and Paul both recycle but recognise that it may not be 
very effective in reducing climate change. As landowners bordering the Estuary, Steve and Terry 
are currently involved in adapting to SLC through potentially surrendering their land for managed 
realignment, though they are opposed to the scale and nature of these measures. Henry has 
considered moving away from the area but has not, while Christine and Fred may consider moving 
if and when they perceive the threat to be great enough, which they currently do not. 
Quote Box 43: Active responses to SLC, PPP1 
232. “I lived in a mobile home with three children under the age of 6, and I still didn’t have a 
tumble drier. It’s quite possible for everybody else to live without a tumble drier. They use 
up masses of electricity” - Fred 
233. “I have a water heater on my roof - a solar water thing” – Betty  
234. “One tries to do all the recycling and all things like that, I mean, you think ‘what difference 
does this make’ but, I don’t know, but it must make some” - Paul 
235. “Putting out the recycling. I don’t really believe it’s going to make a blind bit of difference, 
but I’m neurotic about it. You know, I separate it all. And I don’t have a problem with 
doing it, although I’d like a few less bins, but deep down, I don’t think we’re going to 
achieve anything by doing all that” - Lynne 
236. “It seems a bit unfair in some ways that they needed the extra land here [for managed 
realignment] rather than spread out along the whole length of the estuary” – Steve 
Continued… 
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         Continued… 
237. “I’ve agreed to let them have some management retreat [on my land, sic]” [...] “Over 
Kingston, what they’ve done management retreat, a small bit, it’s an absolute disgrace, it is 
abysmal what they’ve done over there”  – Terry  
238. “My wife and I have given reasonably serious thought to whether we should move” - 
Henry 
239. “I have done the calculation and the answer is don’t panic yet. [...] at the moment I think 
it’s a gamble worth taking. Because this ticks so many other boxes of you know, living here 
and bringing up the family and stuff like that, but it’s far too big for my wife and I once the 
kids have gone, so as long as you know, we can sell up, and- so, and to be honest I will 
certainly give more than a passing thought to where my next house is located with regard 
to flooding, but not just sea-level rise” - Fred 
240. “If sea levels were definitely rising, like if they rose an inch last year and were forecast to 
rise another inch this year, I suppose we might think about selling our house and moving a 
bit higher up” - Christine 
Quote Box 43: Active responses to SLC, PPP1 
8.3 Inactive responses  
8.3.1 Optimism 
In Quote Box 21 (worldviews, section 6.2.3), PPP1 participants alluded to the belief that 
‘technology will save us’: Owain thought that we’ll soon be able to ‘intervene’ with climate change, 
and Jessica felt that engineers ‘can deal with’ SLC. This is technological optimism: the belief that 
technological improvements will sustain life as human populations soar (Basiago, 1994). Indeed, 
optimism was explicit and implied throughout PPP1 interviews, and was also noted during expert 
interviews (Quote Box 5). While Ellen was not optimistic, other PPP1 participants talked both 
implicitly and explicitly about being optimistic (Quote Box 44).  
 
241. “Do you think we might have pulled ourselves together by then and done something about 
it? Because there are things that people can do, aren’t there?” [Facilitator: do you think we 
might have done?] “What, given a few hundred years? Oh please, yes. Yes, you do hope 
so” [...] “I’m an optimistic sort of person” – Glenda  
242. “I think there is warming happening, but I don’t know if it’s- I’m hoping it’s going to be 
cancelled out by the next little ice age. Possibility, maybe. Trying to think positively” - 
Jessica 
243. “I don’t see it being a big permanent rise, not really. I have to say. I’m probably a bit half 
full person really” – Lynne  
244. “I don’t think it will just all be alright” – Ellen 
Quote Box 44: Optimism, PPP1 
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8.3.2 Avoidance 
A number of interviewees talked about trying not to think about the issues of SLC and climate 
change because they find them depressing, frightening, worrying, too big to deal with or because 
they make them angry (Quote Box 45). Ruby and Ellen talked about deliberately not watching films 
and programmes about climate change. This ‘active silencing of risk’ has also been noted in relation 
to nuclear risks (Bickerstaff & Simmons, 2009). While such avoidance may provide a way of coping 
with SLR and flood risks (Harvatt et al., 2011), the implications are that they will not be ameliorated 
by mitigation and adaptation.  
245. “I do think [SLC] is a worry. The more I talk about it the more I start thinking- because I 
do try and put it to the back of my mind” – Lynne 
246. “I deliberately didn’t watch [Inconvenient Truth] because I do find this kind of stuff quite 
frightening. It makes you feel powerless as well” – Ruby  
247. “I do find the whole environmental thing a bit- well more than a bit depressing. I do try 
not to think about it too much. I avoid watching television programs about it. It makes me 
angry, I think it’s a bit hopeless to be honest. Um the broader issue, you know” [...] “most 
people know but they shut their eyes and stick their fingers in their ears and it’s too big for 
people to deal with” – Ellen 
248. “The whole thing fills me with horror when I think of people living in Thailand and these 
very low places where they are living just up off the sea [...] and how devastating that’s 
going to be. I almost can’t think about that” – Betty 
Quote Box 45: Avoidance, PPP1 
8.4 Summary: public responses to sea-level change 
While public responses to SLC were not actively investigated during this study, some participants 
were already engaging with the issue (voluntarily or involuntarily) or were thinking about doing so. 
However, participants also exhibited inactive responses with optimistic biases and avoidance, both 
of which may act as barrier to active engagement (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). Indeed, the relationships 
between factors discussed in the next section indicate that these inactive responses may affect risk 
appraisals. 
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8.5 Relationships between factors  
8.5.1 Introduction  
This thesis has shown that knowledge is only one aspect of SLC perceptions on the Severn Estuary. 
This section presents the results of five regression analyses on PPP2 survey results that investigate 
how some of the many factors might influence perceptions. The first regressions investigate the 
factors that might influence knowledge about SLC on the Severn Estuary: the regression presented 
in section 8.5.2 investigates predictors of knowledge about expected magnitudes, causes, impacts 
and mitigation measures of SLC on the Estuary; the three regressions presented in 8.5.3 further 
investigate one aspect of this knowledge, that is, the factors that predict how much future SLC is 
expected. The fifth regression investigates concern, which has been shown to be one of many 
factors that might influence SLC perceptions (section 8.5.4). The main rationale for including 
variables in these regressions was that they emerged from the PPP1 interviews as potentially 
important factors in public SLC perceptions. However, it was not possible to include all of the 
factors because statistical power is lost when too many independent variables are included relative 
to the sample size (Field, 2009). Therefore variables had to be selected based on the literature and 
specific ideas emerging from the findings. The hypotheses and rationales for including each 
variable are provided for each regression, before regression results are presented and discussed. 
Each regression table includes the individual contribution of the variable if all other effects are held 
constant (B), the standard error (Std. Error), the standardised importance of each predictor (Beta), 
and the variance inflation statistic (VIF). The VIF is a measure of multicollinearity, indicating 
whether an independent variable has a strong linear relationship with any of the other independent 
variables85. VIF > 10 indicates high collinearity (Myers, 1990). The VIF statistics reported in the 
regression tables indicate that multicollinearity is not of concern in the models (the largest VIF is 
3.374). Furthermore, when the regression results are compared with independent correlations 
(Appendix N), we find that the direction of the relationships and relative importance of the 
independent variables are consistent, indicating that multicollinearity has not affected the relative 
importance of the predictors in the regression model.  
 
                                                   
85 Multicollinearity occurs where there is a strong linear relationship between two or more independent variables. 
While low levels of collinearity pose little threat to model estimates, high levels make it difficult to assess the individual 
importance of predictors, limit the size of the variance explained by the model (because two predictors are accounting 
for much of the same variance in the dependent variable), and affect the models ability to make ‘trustworthy’ 
predictions (Field, 2009; Myers, 1990).   
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8.5.2 Predictors of sea-level change knowledge  
Table 17 lists the independent variables entered into a hierarchical linear regression on total 
knowledge scores (the summed knowledge scores for magnitudes, causes, physical impacts, social 
impacts and mitigation measures). The table shows the variable, why it was included, the 
hypothesis, and an indication of whether the hypothesis is supported (S), partially supported (~S) 
or unsupported (US) by regression results (Sup. column). 
 
Table 17: Independent variables included in regression analysis on knowledge scores 
Variable Rationale Hypothesis Sup. 
Education and 
science 
education 
PPP1 results (6.1.5) indicated that perceptions of 
SLC are strongly influenced by experience and 
cannot be expected to arise from education alone. 
Indeed, other research indicates that higher 
educational levels do not necessarily mean higher 
scientific literacy (Hargreaves et al., 2003). 
Education level 
does not predict 
knowledge about 
SLC.  
 
 
S 
SLC 
Scepticism  
Although in general scepticism about SLC was 
shown to be quite low around the Severn Estuary, 
a number of PPP1 and PPP2 respondents 
expressed sceptical beliefs, which have been 
shown in previous research to be a barrier 
towards climate change engagement (Lorenzoni 
et al., 2007). While knowledge has been found to 
be a poor predictor of scepticism (Whitmarsh, 
2011), I was interested if there was a relationship 
in the other direction (i.e. if scepticism could 
predict knowledge). I expected scepticism to 
predict lower knowledge scores due to lower 
information seeking behaviour among sceptical 
individuals.  
SLC scepticism 
predicts lower 
knowledge scores. 
 
 
S 
Concern Concern was found to vary amongst PPP1 and 
PPP2 respondents. It is hypothesised that 
concerned individuals may engage in more 
information seeking behaviour, or that greater 
knowledge could lead to increased concern. 
Higher concern 
predicts higher 
knowledge scores.  
 
 
S 
Efficacy Kahlor and Rosenthal (2009) found that worry 
did not correlate with knowledge, but suggest that 
this may be the result of suppressor effects of 
self-efficacy. Efficacy was therefore included as a 
potential moderator.  
Efficacy interacts 
with other 
variables to affect 
knowledge scores.  
 
S 
Age  Of PPP1 interviewees, those with the highest 
mental model completeness scores tended to be 
older (Steve 53, Ellen 45, and Laura 63), while 
those with the lowest scores tended to be younger 
(Yasmine 30, Owain 18, and Darren 28), perhaps 
because they have had more time to learn about 
SLC from experience.   
Older groups are 
more 
knowledgeable.  
 
 
~S 
Gender  Research indicates that women may have greater 
scientific knowledge of climate change than men 
do (McCright, 2010). 
Women have 
higher knowledge 
scores.  
US 
Continued… 
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Table 17 continued  
Variable Rationale Hypothesis Sup. 
Experience of 
flooding or 
erosion  
Section 6.1.5 discussed the importance of direct 
experience in SLC perceptions around the 
Estuary. Previous research indicates that 
experience of a risk may predict greater awareness 
or knowledge of the risk (Wagner, 2007; 
Zsamboky et al., 2011). 
Experience of 
flooding or 
erosion predicts 
higher knowledge 
scores. 
US 
Time lived 
around estuary 
PPP1 results indicate the importance of direct 
experience in SLC perceptions (6.1.5), and 
research suggests that individuals with greater risk 
experience know more about that risk (Wagner, 
2007; Zsamboky et al., 2011). It is hypothesised 
that people who have had more time to 
experience SLC around the estuary may know 
more about it. 
People who have 
lived around the 
Estuary for longer 
have higher 
knowledge scores 
US 
Rurality  PPP1 interviewees living in rural areas (e.g. Steve, 
Ellen, Fred) tended to talk more knowledgably 
about SLC than those living in more urban areas, 
drawing on their local knowledge of the issues 
(section 6.1.5). 
People living in 
rural environments 
have higher 
knowledge scores 
US 
Distance from 
estuary 
PPP1 interviewees indicated that local knowledge 
was an important factor influencing risk 
perceptions (6.1.5). It is hypothesised that this 
local knowledge might be related to how far an 
individual lives from the Estuary.  
People living 
closer to the 
Severn Estuary 
know more about 
SLC 
S 
Relationship 
with local 
community 
Section 6.1.5 discussed the importance of 
vicarious experience and local knowledge in SLC 
perceptions. It is hypothesised that such 
influences may be greater in individuals with close 
links to the local community.  
Individuals with a 
close relationship 
with the local 
community have 
higher knowledge 
scores 
US 
Relationship 
with the 
Severn Estuary  
Section 6.1.5 discussed the importance of 
experience, which may be expected to be greater 
amongst those with a closer relationship with the 
Severn Estuary. For example, some PPP1 
participants gained local knowledge through 
working as part of or alongside organisations 
such as the drainage board or the Environment 
Agency. 
Individuals with a 
close relationship 
with the Severn 
Estuary have 
higher knowledge 
scores 
US 
Table 17: Independent variables included in regression analysis on knowledge scores 
Sup. column shows whether hypothesis is supported (S), partially supported (~S) or unsupported (US) by 
regression results.  
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 B Std. Error Beta VIF 
Step 1  
(Constant) 23.988 3.180   
Education (no formal quals/GCSE)     
A-Level or higher -.535 .926 -.035n.s. 1.159 
Science education (no formal quals/GCSE)     
A-Level or higher -.278 .838 -.020n.s. 1.147 
SLC Scepticism  -.449 .136 -.319** 2.929 
Concern scale (5 items) .412 .186 .221* 3.109 
Efficacy (causes) -.867 .416 -.130* 1.208 
Step 2: age & gender  
(Constant) 23.587 3.251    
Education (no formal quals/GCSE)     
A-Level or higher -.213 .913 -.014 n.s. 1.191 
Science education (no formal quals/GCSE)     
A-Level or higher -.398 .831 -.029 n.s. 1.188 
SLC Scepticism  -.413 .135 -.293** 3.014 
Concern (5 items) .410 .184 .220* 3.209 
Efficacy (causes) -.463 .418 -.069 n.s. 1.286 
Age (45-54)     
17-24  -3.449 1.920 -.108 n.s. 1.194 
25-34  -2.698 1.192 -.151* 1.465 
35-44  -1.876 1.109 -.112 n.s. 1.440 
55-64  1.518 1.068 .096 n.s. 1.500 
65-74  -.352 1.363 -.016 n.s. 1.285 
75+  -2.122 2.994 -.041 n.s. 1.087 
Gender (men)     
women -.750 .763 -.057 n.s. 1.094 
Step 3: local knowledge factors  
(Constant) 24.762 3.616    
Education (no formal quals/GCSE)     
A-Level or higher -.351 .912 -.023 n.s. 1.267 
Science education (no formal quals/GCSE)     
A-Level or higher -.552 .814 -.040 n.s. 1.216 
SLC Scepticism  -.415 .132 -.294** 3.107 
Concern (5 items)  .365 .183 .196* 3.374 
Efficacy (causes) -.571 .429 -.085 n.s. 0.446 
Age (45-54)     
17-24  -2.227 2.014 -.070 n.s. 1.401 
25-34  -2.110 1.243 -.118 n.s. 1.700 
35-44  -1.581 1.140 -.094 n.s. 1.623 
55-64  1.181 1.059 .074 n.s. 1.571 
65-74  -.207 1.354 -.009 n.s. 1.353 
75+  -3.038 2.981 -.058 n.s. 1.149 
Gender (men)     
women -.623 .762 -.047 n.s. 1.164 
Experience of flooding or erosion      
property damage .888 2.573 .021 n.s. 1.273 
disruption 1.128 1.083 .065 n.s. 1.391 
Affected others  1.552 .802 .117 n.s. 1.277 
Time lived around estuary (0-10yrs)     
>10yrs .720 .960 .046 n.s. 1.324 
Rurality (urban)     
Rural  .782 .964 .046 n.s. 1.140 
Distance from estuary -1.049 .423 -.150* 1.280 
Relationship with local community .210 .273 .049 n.s. 1.417 
Relationship with the Severn Estuary  .052 .293 .012 n.s. 1.669 
R2 = .24 for Step 1 (p<.001), ΔR2 = .06 for Step 2 (p<.01),  ΔR2 = .07 for Step 3 (p<.01),   
n.s. non-significant , *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
Table 18: Hierarchical linear regression for factors predicting knowledge of SLC on the Estuary, PPP2 
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Table 18 shows the results of the hierarchical linear regression on total knowledge scores, with 
significant predictors shown in red. The model predicts 36% of the variance in knowledge scores 
(R2 =.36). The greatest proportion of variance is predicted by SLC scepticism, with lower levels of 
scepticism predicting higher knowledge scores. We cannot draw conclusions about the causality of 
relationships, but there are a few potential interpretations. Firstly, we could speculate that knowing 
more about SLC leads to less scepticism. Alternatively, less sceptical individuals could engage in 
more information seeking behaviour, thus increasing their knowledge of the issue. Or people who 
have higher knowledge about SLC could also happen to have less scepticism due to a third variable 
such as the media sources they use. Finally, the relationship could be due to the ways in which 
sceptical people answer knowledge questions: they might know as much about the science as less 
sceptical individuals do, but be less inclined to agree with it. This final suggestion is supported by 
research by (Tobler et al., 2012), which shows that while greater knowledge of climate change 
causes, consequences and actions predict lower scepticism, higher physical knowledge (e.g. about 
methane, the ozone layer and plant respiration) predicts higher scepticism. In contrast to Tobler et 
al’s (2012) research however, educational level does not predict knowledge scores.   
After scepticism, concern is the next largest predictor of knowledge scores, with those who are 
more concerned scoring higher on the knowledge scale. This finding supports previous work that 
shows that individuals with better knowledge of Alpine flash floods and landslides express greater 
fear about the hazards (Wagner, 2007). Again, we cannot infer causality, but more knowledge about 
SLC could lead to more concern, or more concerned individuals could engage in more information 
seeking behaviour. Or again, the relationship could be due to some other factor that correlates with 
both. 
Efficacy is a significant predictor in Step 1, but becomes insignificant when age and gender are 
added to the model. When efficacy was omitted from earlier analyses (not reported here) concern 
was not a significant predictor of knowledge scores. This indicates an interaction effect where 
concern only predicts higher knowledge scores when efficacy is included in the regression (low 
efficacy + high concern predicts higher knowledge scores). This supports findings by Kahlor and 
Rosenthal (2009) who suggested that their finding that worry did not correlate with knowledge may 
have been the result of suppressor effects of self-efficacy. Again, we cannot infer causality, but one 
explanation may be that individuals who know more about SLC also believe that they cannot do 
much about it and feel more concerned.  
In Step 2, age and gender improve the model, increasing the R2 value to .30 (i.e. predicting 30% of 
variance). However, gender is not a significant predictor of knowledge. Middle-aged groups are 
most knowledgeable, but the only significant effect is for 25-34 year olds, who have lower 
knowledge scores than the reference group (45-54 year olds) in step 2 – but this effect is made 
insignificant when local knowledge factors are included in Step 3. This may be due to an interaction 
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effect regarding the demographics of those living closest to/farthest from the estuary. ‘Local 
knowledge factors’ (experience of flooding/erosion, time lived around estuary, rurality, distance 
from estuary, relationship with the local community and relationship with the Severn Estuary) 
improve the model, increasing the R2 value to .36. Distance from the estuary is a significant 
predictor, with increased distance from the estuary predicting lower knowledge scores. While this 
could be interpreted as a function of having increased experience of SLC or flooding in the past, 
and therefore knowing more about it, this does not seem to be the case as flood experience does 
not predict knowledge. It may be that distance from the estuary increases knowledge through other 
means, perhaps through increasing general knowledge of the estuary and its processes, facilitating 
a better reflective and inductive understanding of SLC (section 7.2.7). Or perhaps people who 
know more about the Estuary (and the sea in general) have a fondness for sea views and are more 
likely to live close to it. 
8.5.3 Predictors of sea-level change magnitude estimates 
Table 19 shows the independent variables included in three hierarchical linear regressions on PPP2 
Question 2 responses. For this question, participants were asked to move the sliders to show 
roughly how much they think sea levels are likely to rise or fall by 2050, 2100 and 2200, compared 
with today. The sliders marked a scale from ‘significant sea-level fall’ to ‘significant sea-level rise’. 
Each position on the slider was assigned an integer between -10 (significant sea-level fall) and 10 
(significant sea-level rise), but these numbers were not visible to participants (see Appendix J for 
survey layout). Results therefore provide a general gauge of expected SLC magnitudes rather than 
numerical estimates. Regression analyses for three dependent variables (DVs) are presented. The 
first is SLC magnitudes in 2050, and the second is SLC magnitudes in 2200. The third DV is the 
difference between 2050 and 2200 estimates. The purpose of this third DV is to investigate what 
might predict larger perceived increases in SLC over this time period. EPP qualitative analyses 
indicated that the ways in which experts thought about the future (e.g. futuristic repertoires and 
optimism) may affect the extremity of their estimates (Section 4.2.3), so this regression model was 
designed to investigate whether this might be the case for PPP2 participants.  
As mentioned in 8.5.1, statistical power is jeopardised if too many independent variables are 
included in a regression (Field, 2009). It is therefore necessary to select variables for an analyses 
rather than including all of the variables that might possibly be related to the dependent variable.  
The independent variables in this regression were different from those used in the knowledge 
regression above because EPP and PPP1 analyses indicated that additional variables (optimism and 
futuristic difference) might be important for perceptions of the magnitude of future SLC. It was 
therefore necessary to remove some of the other variables from the first analyses. I chose to 
remove ‘local knowledge factors’ (experience of flooding/erosion, time lived around estuary, 
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rurality, distance from estuary, relationship with the local community and relationship with the 
Severn Estuary) because I had no theoretical reason to include them.   
 
Variable Rationale Hypothesis Sup. 
Knowledge Those with greater knowledge of the causes of SLC 
will have a greater understanding of processes, time 
lags and so on, meaning they will predict greater rises 
over longer time periods.  
Knowledge, 
particularly of SLC 
causes, predicts 
greater differences 
in SLC estimates 
(2050-2200) 
S 
Gender Gender has been found to influence interpretations 
of climate change and SLC risks (CLAMER, 2011a; 
Hamilton, 2008; Shuckburgh et al., 2012). This 
variable was included to see if gender would predict 
SLC magnitude estimates.  
This variable was 
included for 
exploratory 
reasons. There was 
no hypothesis.  
- 
Optimism  EPP qualitative analyses indicated that optimism may 
affect expert probability judgements, and PPP1 
results suggested that optimism may also be a factor 
in public responses. 
Higher optimism 
predicts lower SLR 
estimates. 
S 
SLC 
scepticism  
Although scepticism about SLC was shown to be 
generally low around the Severn Estuary, a number 
of PPP1 and PPP2 respondents expressed sceptical 
beliefs. It is hypothesised that sceptical individuals 
are less likely to believe that SLC will occur in future, 
or that the amount of SLC has been exaggerated, 
thus leading to lower SLC estimates.  
Sceptics predict 
lower SLR. 
S 
Concern  PPP1 interviews showed that concern varied 
amongst individuals. This variable was included to 
investigate whether this level of concern may be 
related with the amounts of SLC that people expect.   
Those who are 
more concerned 
about SLC predict 
greater SLC.  
US 
Futuristic 
Difference 
EPP qualitative analyses indicated that the ways in 
which experts thought about the future may affect 
the extremity of their estimates (Section 4.2.3). PPP1 
results indicate that members of the public may also 
subscribe to varying future repertoires, and it is 
hypothesised that these repertoires may affect how 
much SLC they think may occur.  
People who 
subscribe to 
futuristic difference 
think greater 
amounts of SLC 
are possible. 
US 
Efficacy A number of PPP1 participants felt that people could 
not do much to stop SLR. It is hypothesised that 
such beliefs may lead to higher levels of expected 
SLC.  
Higher perceived 
self efficacy 
predicts more 
extreme SLC 
estimates 
US 
Table 19: Independent variables included in regression analysis on SLC estimates 
Sup. column shows whether the hypothesis is supported (S), partially supported (~S) or unsupported (US) by 
regression results. 
Table 20 shows the results of the three hierarchical linear regressions on public SLC estimates86. 
The analyses suggest that knowledge, optimism and scepticism explain some variance in public 
SLC projections, but the explained variance is small. The low explained variance could be partly a 
function of the survey question, which allowed for attitudinal ambiguity, or could be simply 
                                                   
86 Note that the results may not be generalisable to the wider population because post-hoc tests suggest that the 
models may violate the assumptions of heteroscedasiticity and non-linearity. 
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because the dependent variables are noisy (contain a lot of error). The predictive power of the 
model for 2050 estimates is particularly low, with an R2 of .06 for Step 1 (p<.01) and an 
insignificant increase of just .03 (n.s.) for Step 2. Step 2 of the 2050 model had no significant 
predictors at all, with knowledge of social impacts and mitigation measures predicting greater SLC 
estimates in Step 1 only.  
More variance was explained for 2200 estimates, with the model predicting 14% of variance in Step 
1 (knowledge factors), increasing by a further 7% when gender, optimism, scepticism, concern, 
futuristic difference and efficacy are included. Knowledge of causes and social impacts predict 
greater SLC estimates for 2200. Optimism and scepticism both predict lower SLC magnitude 
estimates. This is consistent with the hypotheses that more optimistic people expect lower SLR, 
and that more sceptical people predict lower SLR.  
Optimism and scepticism also predict smaller differences in SLC magnitude estimates between 
2050 and 2200. In other words, those people who are more optimistic expect the difference in SLC 
between 2050 and 2200 to be less extreme than those who are less optimistic. The most significant 
predictor for this regression is scepticism (standardised β = -.26), with higher scepticism about SLC 
predicting smaller differences in SLC magnitude estimates between 2050 and 2200. Knowledge of 
causes and social impacts predict a greater difference in SLC estimates between 2050 and 2200. 
The relationship between causal knowledge and predictions could feasibly be because people who 
know more about the causes of SLC are more equipped to construct an attitude about the extremity 
of SLC through inducing from their mental model. For example, if an individual knew about 
thermal expansion of SLC, they might predict higher amounts of SLC than someone whose mental 
model is restricted to the melting of ice-caps, as Glenda’s was: “it’s a very large world, and the 
glaciers are relatively small. So I would expect it wouldn’t be more than an inch or so. It wouldn’t 
be feet, I don’t think”. Indeed, though the effect size is small, there is a significant positive 
correlation between believing the comment ‘climate change causes the water in the oceans to 
expand as it gets warmer and therefore causes global SLR’ is true, and predicting a higher 
magnitude of SLC in 2200 (rs = .13, p<.05). This reiterates the importance of getting the basic 
premises of inductive reasoning right (section 7.2.7). The relationship between social impacts 
knowledge and magnitudes of expected SLC could be because individuals who expect more SLR 
expect more social impacts, so have beliefs more consistent with the expert model (and thus a 
higher social impacts knowledge score). Gender and age are not significant predictors of SLC 
magnitude estimates. 
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Independent Variable 
(predictor)  
Dependent Variable: SLC by 2050 (N=312) 
R2 = .06 for Step 1 (p<.01), ΔR2 = .03 for 
Step 2 (n.s.)   
Dependent Variable: SLC by 2200 (N=314) 
R2 = .14 for Step 1 (p<.001), ΔR2 = .07 
for Step 2 (p<.01)   
Dependent Variable: difference in SLC 
(2200-2050) (N=307) 
R2 = .12 for Step 1 (p<.001), ΔR2 = .06 
for Step 2 (p<.01)   
 B Std. 
Error 
Beta VIF B Std. 
Error 
Beta VIF B Std. 
Error 
Beta VIF 
Step 1       
(Constant) 1.649 .425   1.253 .678   -.372 .495   
Knowledge              
Causes  .011 .008 .092 1.439 .032 .013 .156* 1.421 .021 .009 .147* 1.442 
Physical impacts -.009 .007 -.093 1.769 -.003 .012 -.020 1.771 .007 .008 .061 1.790 
Social impacts  .013 .006 .137* 1.512 .037 .010 .236*** 1.536 .022 .007 .202** 1.532 
Mitigation  .012 .004 .178** 1.045 .016 .006 .140* 1.049 .004 .004 .046 1.047 
Step 2       
(Constant) .833 1.457   3.224 2.254   2.466 1.667   
Knowledge              
Causes  .012 .008 .097 1.589 .031 .013 .153* 1.554 .019 .010 .135* 1.588 
Physical impacts -.011 .007 -.108 1.814 -.006 .011 -.035 1.822 .006 .008 .048 1.833 
Social impacts  .010 .007 .106 1.641 .026 .010 .167* 1.671 .015 .007 .139* 1.666 
Mitigation  .007 .004 .111 1.208 .006 .006 .051 1.208 -.002 .005 -.025 1.204 
Gender (male)             
Female  -.142 .283 -.029 1.099 .421 .443 .051 1.097 .465 .325 .079 1.098 
Optimism  -.001 .032 -.002 1.060 -.099 .050 -.104# 1.073 -.090 .037 -.133* 1.063 
SLC Scepticism  -.009 .051 -.017 3.119 -.163 .080 -.187* 3.181 -.160 .058 -.256** 3.143 
Concern (5 items) .098 .068 .141 3.149 .046 .106 .040 3.237 -.054 .078 -.065 3.169 
Futuristic Difference  -.036 .078 -.027 1.170 .034 .121 .016 1.173 .063 .089 .040 1.174 
Efficacy              
Causes .130 .227 .052 2.745 .161 .342 .039 2.594 .012 .261 .004 2.767 
Impacts  .130 .221 .053 2.665 .240 .334 .059 2.573 .137 .256 .046 2.713 
n.s. non-significant , *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, #p=.05 
Table 20: Hierarchical linear regression for factors predicting SLC estimates, PPP2 
For 2050, 2200 and for the difference between 2050 and 2200 estimate (data from Q2, sliding scale from ‘significant sea-level fall’ to ‘significant sea-level rise’)
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8.5.4 Predictors of concern about sea-level change  
The final regression was carried out to further investigate the findings of section 6.2.1, which 
showed that concern about SLC varies amongst individuals, is a multifaceted issue, and is 
potentially related with other factors. Table 21 explains why each independent variable was 
included and whether the hypotheses were supported or unsupported (Sup. column). The 
dependent variable was a 5-item concern scale, consisting of the following items from the PPP2 
survey: Q3 SLR as an overall risk; Q6 self-reported concern about SLC; Q9 SLC as a problem; Q9 
too much fuss made about SLC (reversed); and Q18 SLC is frightening. See Appendix M for more 
details of scale construction and reliability. 
 
Table 21: Independent variables included in regression analysis on SLC concern 
Variable Rationale Hypothesis Sup. 
SLC 
scepticism 
Although scepticism about SLC is generally low 
around the Severn Estuary, a number of PPP1 and 
PPP2 participants expressed sceptical beliefs. 
Investigating how scepticism about SLC relates with 
other factors is important because it has been shown 
to be a barrier towards engagement with climate 
change (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). It is hypothesised 
that low scepticism predicts low concern.   
SLC ‘sceptics’ 
are less 
concerned 
about SLC. 
S 
Knowledge Some research suggests that individuals who know 
more about particular aspects of climate change are 
more concerned about climate change and/or SLR 
(Bord et al., 2000; Hamilton, Cutler, & Schaefer, 
2012; Tobler et al., 2012).  
Individuals 
with greater 
SLC 
knowledge are 
more 
concerned.  
~S 
Experience 
of flooding 
or erosion 
Research shows that experiences of specific local 
risks such as flooding are influential in determining 
perceptions of these risks (Baumann & Sims, 1978; 
Harvatt et al., 2011; Siegrist & Gutscher, 2006; 
Spence et al., 2011; Wagner, 2007). 
Experience of 
flooding or 
erosion 
predicts greater 
concern.  
US 
Relationship 
with nature 
Values and worldviews have been shown to be 
important predictors of climate change concern (e.g. 
Bellamy & Hulme, 2011; Brulle, Carmichael, & 
Jenkins, 2012; Tansey & O'Riordan, 1999). 
Worldviews volunteered during PPP1 interviews 
indicated that such views were important factors in 
SLC risk perceptions. While space constraints in the 
PPP2 survey rendered a detailed investigation of 
values unfeasible, a simple diagrammatic 
‘relationship with nature scale’ was included to 
investigate this relationship.  
People who 
feel close to 
nature are 
more 
concerned 
about SLC. 
S 
Education  Research indicates that education level may predict 
views about marine resource use and ocean-related 
environmental issues in Maine, USA (Safford & 
Hamilton, 2012), so this variable was included to see 
whether it might also predict concern about SLC on 
the Severn Estuary. 
Exploratory 
only; no 
hypothesis 
- 
Continued…  
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Table 21 continued 
Variable Rationale Hypothesis Sup. 
Age Some research finds that older people are less 
concerned about or perceive a lower threat from 
climate change (Kellstedt et al., 2008; Whitmarsh, 
2008) and SLR (Hamilton, 2008) than young people. 
However, other research indicates that concern 
about climate change per se and marine climate 
change issues in particular is lowest among younger 
people (CLAMER, 2011a; Shuckburgh et al., 2012). 
Capstick et al. (2013) found that it is the oldest and 
youngest groups who are least concerned about 
climate change. 
The oldest and 
youngest 
groups are least 
concerned 
about SLC  
~S 
Gender Women have been found to be more concerned than 
men about climate change (McCright, 2010; 
Shuckburgh et al., 2012), marine climate change 
issues (CLAMER, 2011a) and SLR (Hamilton, 2008).   
Women are 
more 
concerned 
about SLC 
US 
Expected 
SLC by 2200 
This variable was included to investigate whether 
levels of concern may be related with the amounts of 
SLC that people expect.   
Those who 
predict greater 
amounts of 
SLC by 2200 
are more 
concerned 
US 
Perception 
of SLC 
having 
sudden 
impacts 
Interviews indicated that PPP1 participants perceive 
SLC and its impacts to be gradual rather than sudden; 
a finding which was supported by PPP2 results. It 
was included in this regression because it was 
hypothesised that the perception of slow and gradual 
processes would lead to lower concern.  
Those who 
think SLC will 
have sudden 
impacts are 
more 
concerned 
S 
Optimism  Some PPP1 participants expressed their level of 
concern as being a function of their character. The 
optimism bias causes people to believe that they are 
less likely to experience negative events, and more 
likely to experience positive events than other people 
are (Weinstein, 1980); thus optimistic individuals may 
be less likely to think SLC will be of a concern to 
them.  
Optimistic 
individuals are 
less concerned 
about SLC 
US 
Futuristic 
difference  
PPP1 respondents expressed views aligned both with 
futuristic difference and historic determinist 
repertoires. It is hypothesised that those who 
subscribe to a futuristic difference repertoire may be 
more likely to think about extreme scenarios and thus 
have a greater concern about SLC.   
Those who 
subscribe to 
futuristic 
difference are 
more 
concerned 
about SLC.  
US 
Table 21: Independent variables included in regression analysis on SLC concern 
Sup. column shows whether hypothesis is supported (S), partially supported (~S) or unsupported (US) by 
regression results. 
 
The model predicts 70% of variance in concern levels. Most of this variance is explained by SLC 
scepticism (standardised β = -.71), with more sceptical individuals expressing less concern. This is 
unsurprising (why be concerned about something that you are not sure exists?) and is supported 
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by other research that shows sceptical people perceive lower risks from climate change than non-
sceptical people (Poortinga et al., 2011).  
The effect of knowledge about SLC on concern is small, with higher knowledge of social impacts 
predicting higher concern. Results from other surveys pertaining to the relationship between 
knowledge and concern are mixed. Increased knowledge about climate change has been shown to 
predict higher concern about climate change consequences in polar regions (Hamilton, 2008; 
Hamilton et al., 2012), but survey research from the USA shows that more informed respondents 
show less concern for global warming (Kellstedt et al., 2008)87. Survey results from Switzerland 
showed that of all their knowledge subscales, it was knowledge about climate change and its causes 
that were most strongly related to concern, but people who were aware of the possible negative 
outcomes of climate change did also tend to worry more about it (Tobler et al., 2012). The effects 
of knowledge may not be straight forward. In studies of public concern about polar issues, ideology 
was found to polarise responses, with education positively affecting concern amongst liberals and 
moderates, and negatively affecting concern amongst conservatives (Hamilton, 2008; Hamilton et 
al., 2012). 
A close relationship with nature predicts higher concern. This finding is consistent with research 
around climate change per se, which shows strong environmental values predict increased concern 
about and engagement with climate change (Kellstedt et al., 2008; Leiserowitz, 2006). This 
relationship has also been found in studies of energy choices and nuclear power (Corner et al., 
2011; Spence, Poortinga, Pidgeon, & Lorenzoni, 2010a), which suggest that concern about climate 
change is symbolic of more general environmental concern. In this study, there may be interaction 
effects between ‘closeness with nature’ and other variables because this variable only becomes a 
significant predictor in step 2 of the regression. There may also be an interaction effect between 
age and other variables, as the significance of the relationship associated with different age groups 
changes in the second step of the regression.  
  
                                                   
87 As mentioned earlier, this study investigated the relationship between concern and self-reported information, not 
objectively measured knowledge. This is important considering that in the present study, self-reported informedness 
and knowledge scores were not related (Section 7.2.1).  
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 B SE Beta VIF 
Step 1 
Constant 14.878 .875    
SLC scepticism  -.569 .033 -.748*** 1.469 
Knowledge      
magnitude knowledge  .000 .005 .002n.s. 1.389 
causes knowledge -.015 .008 -.084n.s. 1.668 
physical impacts knowledge  .006 .007 .041n.s. 2.104 
social impacts knowledge  .015 .006 .110* 1.683 
mitigation knowledge  .004 .004 .040n.s. 1.221 
Experience of flooding or erosion      
Property damage  -.228 .806 -.011n.s. 1.231 
Disruption -.362 .388 -.039n.s. 1.346 
Affected others .269 .282 .038n.s. 1.240 
Relationship with nature  .138 .090 .061n.s. 1.274 
Age (45-54)     
17-24  -.370 .635 -.024n.s. 1.394 
25-34  -.238 .408 -.026n.s. 1.594 
35-44  -.073 .397 -.008n.s. 1.557 
55-64  -.740 .383 -.086n.s. 1.551 
65-74  -1.046 .505 -.084* 1.310 
75+  -2.095 1.094 -.073n.s. 1.153 
Education (no formal quals/GCSE)     
A-Level or higher .269 .307 .033n.s. 1.097 
Gender (men)     
Women .214 .272 .030n.s. 1.150 
Step 2 
Constant 13.590 1.161    
SLC scepticism  -.536 .034 -.705*** 1.637 
Knowledge      
magnitude knowledge  .000 .005 .004n.s. 1.436 
causes knowledge  -.013 .008 -.075n.s. 1.735 
physical impacts knowledge  .006 .007 .041n.s. 2.129 
social impacts knowledge  .013 .006 .097* 1.728 
mitigation knowledge .003 .004 .028n.s. 1.241 
Experience of flooding or erosion      
property damage -.134 .795 -.007n.s. 1.236 
disruption -.362 .383 -.039n.s. 1.352 
affected others  .254 .279 .036n.s. 1.253 
Relationship with nature .198 .092 .088* 1.376 
Age (45-54)     
17-24 age  -.580 .629 -.038n.s. 1.411 
25-34 age  -.313 .403 -.035n.s. 1.606 
35-44 age -.126 .393 -.014n.s. 1.572 
55-64 age  -.814 .377 -.094* 1.557 
65-74 age  -.884 .501 -.071n.s. 1.329 
75+ age  -1.940 1.083 -.068n.s. 1.166 
Education (no formal quals/GCSE)      
A-Level or higher .343 .306 .042n.s. 1.127 
Gender (men)     
 women .277 .272 .039n.s. 1.188 
Expected sea-level change by 2200 .027 .034 .031n.s. 1.276 
Perception of SLC having sudden impacts  .367 .122 .115** 1.193 
Optimism  -.037 .032 -.044n.s. 1.165 
Futuristic difference .031 .074 .016n.s. 1.219 
R2 = .696 for Step 1 (p<.001), ΔR2 = .014 for Step 2 (p<.05)  
n.s. non-significant , *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
Table 22: Hierarchical linear regression for factors predicting concern about SLC on the Severn Estuary 
 
 206 
 
All age groups are less concerned than 45-54 year olds (the reference group), but the only significant 
differences are between this reference group and older age groups, with older age groups being 
significantly less concerned. This would support research that finds older people to be less 
concerned about or perceive a lower threat from climate change (Kellstedt et al., 2008; Whitmarsh, 
2008) and SLR (Hamilton, 2008) than young people. This relationship may reflect the assumption 
that climate change is a future risk (Whitmarsh, 2008). However, other research indicates that 
concern about climate change per se and marine climate change issues in particular is lowest among 
younger people88 (CLAMER, 2011a; Shuckburgh et al., 2012). This discrepancy might be explained 
by recent research that indicates the relationship between age and concern about SLC is not a linear 
one, with middle-aged people showing the highest levels of concern (Capstick et al., 2013).  
The perception of sudden impacts predicted increased concern levels. This is an important finding, 
because as discussed in section 7.2.3, the perception that SLC impacts will be gradual is 
predominant amongst PPP1 and PPP2 participants. Finally, flood experience did not predict 
concern about SLC (Table 22) or knowledge of SLC (Table 18) on the Severn Estuary. This may 
be in part due to the nature of flood events here, which although sometimes extreme, are currently 
quite rare. Terpstra (2011) suggests that emotions after a flood, and the influence that these 
emotions have on adaptive behaviours, fade over time, which could explain the lack of correlation 
between flood experience and perceptions on the Severn Estuary.  
8.6 Summary: predictors of sea-level change knowledge and 
concern 
Regression analyses show that the greatest proportion of variance in SLC knowledge is predicted 
by SLC scepticism, with lower levels of scepticism predicting higher knowledge scores. Those who 
are more concerned, middle-aged people and those living closer to the estuary also tend to have a 
greater knowledge of SLC. Knowledge of causes and social impacts predict greater SLC estimates 
for 2200, and a greater difference in SLC estimates between 2050 and 2200. Optimism and 
scepticism both predict lower 2200 SLC estimates and smaller differences in estimates between 
2050 and 2200. More sceptical people and older people (over 65) tend to be less concerned, while 
those with higher knowledge of social impacts, a close relationship with nature and a perception 
that SLC might have sudden impacts, tend to be more concerned.   
                                                   
88 Shuckburgh et al. (2012) found that young people in the UK (16-24 year olds) expressed less concern than older 
people (35-64) about climate change. (CLAMER, 2011a) found that older people expressed more than younger people, 
especially those in the 55-64 age bracket compared to 18-34 year olds. 
 207 
 
9 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter draws together and discusses the findings of this study. It first summarises how 
experts and the public perceive the risks of SLC on the Severn Estuary, before discussing the 
applied and theoretical implications of the research and suggesting avenues for further work.  
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9.1 Addressing the research questions 
This study has explored public perceptions of SLC using a mental models approach, comparing 
expert perceptions with those of members of the public living around the estuary. The thesis sought 
to answer three questions: 1) how do ‘experts’ perceive the risks of SLC on the Severn Estuary? 2) 
how does ‘the public’ perceive the risks? and 3) what implications do these perceptions have for 
risk communications? The answers to these questions are summarised here. 
9.1.1 How do experts perceive the risks of sea-level change on the Severn 
Estuary? 
It was hypothesised that experts would present a complicated picture of SLC on the Estuary, 
fraught with uncertainties. The conceptual model shows that this is indeed the case. It shows that 
there are countless interactions, feedbacks and thresholds, many of which are unknown or 
uncertain; and that there are both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties in the drivers of and 
responses to SLC. While it was hypothesised that experts would expect sea levels to rise on the 
Severn Estuary, the sheer range of projections was considerable. While all expert participants 
projected a high likelihood of future SLR, there was wide variation in judgements and much 
disagreement regarding how much SLC is possible there. While median estimates of SLR were of 
the same order of magnitude as the IPCC’s Fourth and Fifth Assessment Reports (IPCC, 2007, 
2013)89, the experts in this study typically made high estimates that were much greater than IPCC 
ranges. Thematic analyses of expert interviews indicated that the methods and information that 
experts used, common heuristics and the ways in they think about the future may have affected 
their judgements.  
9.1.2 How does the public perceive the risks of sea-level change on the 
Severn Estuary? 
In general, the public does not feel well informed about SLC. As expected however, results show 
areas of public understanding that are consistent with the expert model. Notably, most respondents 
think that sea levels will rise between now and 2050, 2100 and 2200, and tend to relate these rising 
sea-levels with increased flooding, leading to home and property damage. However, there is much 
uncertainty regarding the magnitudes of future SLC, and perceptions vary as to how much SLC 
constitutes a threat. Indirect impacts such as inconvenience and impacts on health and services are 
                                                   
89 Global average relative sea-level rise estimates in IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) are 26cm to 98cm by the 
year 2100 (model based likely range for four RCP scenarios, compared to 1986-2005) (IPCC, 2013). Global average 
relative sea-level rise estimates in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) are 18cm to 59cm by 2100 (model-
based range for six emissions scenarios, compared to 1980-1999) (IPCC, 2007).  
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of low salience, and there are differences between expert and lay perceptions in each theme of the 
expert model. For example, many lay participants believe that most SLR is caused by melting 
icebergs/sea-ice, do not understand that isostatic subsidence causes local SLR, and do not 
appreciate the importance of thermal expansion. The majority of survey respondents believe that 
the impacts of SLC will be gradual, whereas experts recognise that change might be sudden.  
The research shows that in addition to formal knowledge, a number of factors influence public 
perceptions of SLC risks. For example, the public tend to place a lot of trust in experience and 
local knowledge. They tend to express low concern about SLC, particularly in relation to other 
concerns such as the economy. They feel detached from the issue, seeing it as something that will 
happen in the future, to other people, and perceive that neither the causes of nor responses to SLC 
are their responsibility. While some participants are already engaging with SLC (voluntarily or 
involuntarily) or are thinking about doing so, a number respond with optimism or avoidance. 
Regression analyses show that many of the factors are related. For example, low scepticism and 
high concern predict a greater knowledge of SLC, while optimism and scepticism predict lower 
estimates of future SLC. As well as the similarities in what experts and the public ‘know’ about 
SLC, there are also similarities in contextual themes. Analyses indicated that both groups found it 
difficult to think about the future, varied in their emphasis on historic determinist and futuristic 
difference repertoires, and may have been influenced by optimistic biases when assessing risk.  
9.2 Applied implications of study findings 
9.2.1 Applied implications of EPP findings 
‘The policymaker needs to learn about the full range of outcomes, with 
probabilities attached and disagreements among experts revealed’- (Socolow, 
2011, p. 786) 
 
Probability elicitation results show much greater uncertainty and a greater diversity of opinion than 
is cited in reports such as the IPCC and UKCP09, and show that elicitations are influenced by a 
great many factors. If expert probability judgements are to remain a ‘key metric for communicating 
uncertainty’, notably in the IPCC 5th Assessment Report (Mastrandrea et al., 2010)90, the findings 
of this study endorse previous recommendations (Frame & Stone, 2012; Morgan, 2011; 
Oppenheimer et al., 2007) to make explicit the contexts in which such judgements are made. ‘For 
                                                   
90 At the time of thesis submission, the full AR5 was not available for referencing. While the AR5 Summary for 
Policy Makers (IPCC, 2013) acknowledges the use of expert judgment, it does not provide details of how these 
judgments were made.  
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post-normal science, the decision making process is as important as the research product’ (Dessai 
& Hulme, 2004, p. 120). While it is clearly not feasible to design adaptation strategies that are robust 
to any point on the experts’ distributions, it is important to consider the plural nature of such 
projections. As stated by Zickfeld et al (2007, p. 239) ‘the route to scientific truth is not a matter 
of voting. One of the outliers among the respondents may be correct, and those who appear to be 
in close agreement may all be wrong’. Robust adaptation planning for SLC must therefore be 
flexible (Hulme, Pielke, & Dessai, 2009).  
The complexity of the expert model indicates that communications about SLC will not be straight 
forward, and must be selective. ‘An enormous amount of sheer effort [is] needed for members of 
the public to monitor sources of scientific information, judge between them, keep up with shifting 
scientific understandings, distinguish consensus from isolated scientific opinion, and decide how 
expert knowledge needs qualifying for use in their  particular situation’ (Wynne, 1991, p. 117). 
Furthermore, if communications include irrelevant information then it wastes peoples’ time and 
diverts their attention from the most important aspects (Morgan et al., 2002). The findings from 
PPP1 and PPP2 suggest ways in which communications may be streamlined.   
9.2.2 Applied implications of PPP1 and PPP2 findings 
A number of PPP1 participants expressed a desire to know more about SLC, and results indicate 
there may be a moral responsibility to inform people of SLC risks (the ‘right to know’ function of 
communications discussed by Renn & Levine, 1991). For example, Christine (PPP1) did not know 
whether the sea level on the Severn Estuary was rising or falling and stated that “if sea levels were 
definitely rising, like if they rose an inch last year and were forecast to rise another inch this year, I 
suppose we might think about selling our house and moving a bit higher up”. Although sea levels 
are not rising by as much as an inch per year, this quote indicates that there may be a moral 
responsibility to inform residents of the potential risks they face. Thus, communications are needed 
to raise awareness and understanding of SLC so that individuals can make informed decisions such 
as whether to engage in adaptation and mitigation actions. The following recommendations are 
drawn directly from perceptions elicited during the course of this research. 
Firstly, results show a number of differences between how the public and experts understand the 
basic processes of SLC, indicating that communications should raise awareness of basic SLC 
processes. Indeed, interview participants tended to talk about SLC in terms of causes and effects 
(section 7.2.7), and as PPP1 participant George said during his interview, “without knowing the 
causes of [SLC], people can’t directly attribute what they can do about it”. Gaining a deeper 
appreciation of processes also ‘allows people to follow debates and grasp the rationale for 
alternative policies’ (Pidgeon & Fischhoff, 2011, p. 38). Particularly, raising awareness of thermal 
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expansion and isostatic subsidence may facilitate the construction of attitudes from valid premises 
(section 7.2.7).  
PPP1 and PPP2 respondents tended to express relatively little concern for lagged socio-economic 
impacts such as decreased house prices and people moving out of the area. But those PPP2 
respondents who had a better understanding of the social impacts of SLC were also more 
concerned about it, and predicted greater magnitudes of SLC (section 8.5), indicating that 
communications could usefully raise awareness of the social impacts of SLC. Other research 
has shown that an emphasis on social aspects of climate change is also linked with more positive 
attitudes towards climate change mitigation (Spence & Pidgeon, 2010).  
Severn Estuary residents feel powerless to act on both the causes and impacts of SLC (section 7.3), 
indicating that risk communications could usefully include information about the most effective 
actions that individuals can take (Bubeck et al., 2012; Pidgeon, 2010). This could include raising 
the salience of personal adaptation measures such as installing flood boards, which are currently 
less salient than large scale measures such as flood defences (7.2.3).  
Although the majority of participants thought that sea levels are rising on the Severn Estuary, some 
thought that they are falling, and many were unsure about how much SLC was expected to occur in 
future. Communications could therefore include estimates of future local SLC. They should 
also transparently communicate the uncertainties involved in such projections; uncertainties that 
are recognised by the public to exist (6.2.2). As Expert participant Jack points out, people make 
decisions under uncertainty all the time: “think about buying a house, getting married, all these big 
decisions that you make in your life”. Providing the public with more detailed estimates will equip 
them with the probabilistic information that they might need to employ their “own managed retreat 
policy” (PPP1 participant Fred, section 7.2.3), and may increase trust in communications (Johnson 
& Slovic, 1995). As well as providing such estimates, results show that communications might 
benefit from providing information about what these numbers actually mean (7.2.5). There is no 
use in knowing that sea levels are going to rise by a foot if individuals do not know what a foot 
means in terms of impacts.  
Communications could benefit from using trusted information sources, with whom the public 
can identify (Campbell, 2011; Istre et al., 2002; Renn & Levine, 1991). Amongst PPP2 respondents, 
the most trusted sources of information about SLC are the Environment Agency / Natural 
Resources Wales, although distrust in these agencies was voiced by some PPP1 participants (7.3.3). 
Technical jargon should be minimised (Shuckburgh et al., 2012) and terms such as ‘tides’, 
‘surges’ and ‘tsunamis’ should be defined where it is necessary to use them.   
Finally, as discussed in 2.3.1, public involvement can add substance to communications, providing 
valuable insights and knowledge that may be missed or overlooked by experts (Fiorino, 1990). 
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Results of this study indicate that deliberative approaches91 may prove valuable on the Estuary. 
First, section 6.1.5 shows the importance of and depth of local knowledge that could add substance 
to future communications. Second, survey results show that participants rarely think about SLC 
(6.2.1), and third, interview results indicate that reflection is an important part of understanding 
the issue (7.2.7).  
Although this study has provided a number of recommendations for how communications on the 
Severn Estuary may proceed, the limitations of such communications should be recognised. This 
research has shown that knowledge is not the only factor influencing perceptions of SLC, and while 
communication campaigns can target public knowledge, some of the other things that have been 
shown to influence risk perceptions (e.g. optimistic biases and worldviews) may prove more 
difficult to change. Whitmarsh (2011, p. 699) has shown that ‘more information will not engage the most 
sceptical groups, since information will tend to be interpreted in relation to existing views, and 
entrenched views are very hard to change’. Besides, would it be ethical to target some such factors? 
While optimism may reduce peoples’ capacity for realistic and accurate decision making (Dunning 
et al., 2004; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995) and contribute to a false sense of security (section 7.3.3), it 
would likely be unethical and maladaptive to change!92 Furthermore, there are drawbacks of 
communicating risks (Section 2.3.2), which should also be considered. For example, PPP1 
participant Lynne felt that Environment Agency flood maps, which show the likelihood of flooding 
from rivers or the sea (Environment Agency, 2012), may stigmatise her locale and make it difficult 
to sell her house. Such problems can be lessened by educating the media and the government about 
stigma (Kunreuther & Slovic, 2001), elucidating the role of including such actors in the 
communication process. Indeed, regardless of personal perceptions of SLC, there remain external 
barriers (and facilitators) to action (Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Zsamboky et al., 2011). For these 
reasons, it is not just members of the public who need to be communicated with, but also the 
media, governing bodies and their agencies. 
9.3 Theoretical and methodological implications 
9.3.1 The mental models approach  
This thesis shows that the mental models approach to risk communications (Morgan et al., 2002) 
provides a coherent and structured approach for exploring public perceptions and grounding 
                                                   
91 Deliberative approaches seek to facilitate a two-way debate, information transfer and reflection on issues, and 
have been endorsed as communication strategies in recent studies (e.g. Shuckburgh et al., 2012). 
92 As discussed in section 2.6.3, optimism has been linked to higher levels of engagement coping and lower levels of 
avoidance (Carver et al., 2010; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995), better health, mood and achievement (Peterson, 2000).  
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future communications in empirical findings. The study also demonstrates that the mental models 
approach can be extended to explore contextual factors as well as knowledge related themes (as 
per Cox et al., 2003; Cox et al., 2005), and can be complemented by diverse methodologies such as 
subjective probability elicitations and lay cognitive mapping methods.  
9.3.2 Mixed-methods approaches and internal consistency 
Overall, the qualitative interviews and quantitative survey used in the public phases of this thesis 
complemented each other well. Firstly, the PPP1 interviews provided the basis of the PPP2 survey, 
including some beliefs that were not anticipated before the interviews were carried out (for example 
that sea-level is falling, and that dredging may cause sea-levels to fall). This supports the rationale 
for the mental models approach (Morgan et al., 2002), whereby the interview is a key part in scoping 
public beliefs. The interviews also provided context for some of the survey findings. For example, 
the PPP2 finding that 8% of participants think SLR would be an overall benefit makes sense when 
PPP1 transcripts are interrogated, finding that respondents think SLR may increase habitats, the 
fertility of farmland, the viability of shipping and power generation from a barrage. Furthermore, 
the use of a mixed quantitative-qualitative approach provided triangulation for many of the 
findings, showing internal consistencies within the data. Examples include the high trust placed in 
personal experience by both PPP1 and PPP2 respondents, and the externalisation of responsibility 
for SLC by respondents in both groups. Finally, the findings show the merits of integrating 
qualitative and quantitative methods to contextualise uncertainty judgements, as recommended by 
Stirling (2010). 
Although in general the quantitative and qualitative approaches generated consistent results, there 
were some inconsistencies. While PPP2 respondents ranked friends and family as the joint least 
trusted source of information about SLC on the Severn Estuary, PPP1 respondents often cited 
information provided by friends and family. As discussed in 6.1.5, this difference might be due to 
social desirability bias. Another inconsistency regarded the high level of concern amongst PPP2 
respondents about travel disruption from flooding, which contrasted with PPP1 findings where 
inconvenience was of low salience. This may have been due to the semi-structured nature of the 
PPP1 interviews, whereby participants were not asked about specific impacts unless they 
mentioned them. In addition, PPP1 respondents who had lived around the estuary for longer had 
more complete mental models of SLC (6.1.5), but there was no significant relationship between 
time lived around the estuary and knowledge scores amongst PPP2 respondents (8.5.2). This 
discrepancy could have been due to the different independent variables (knowledge about a finite 
set of specific SLC factors in PPP2 versus and mental model completeness scores relating to a 
greater number of factors during PPP1 interview sessions, which themselves varied in length). 
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Also, the PPP1 sample was very small (N=20), decreasing the statistical power for such 
comparisons.  
9.3.3 External consistency  
The majority of SLC findings in this thesis are consistent with wider climate change research. This 
is illustrated in Table 23, which summarises the main findings and indicates whether they are 
supported by previous research (S), partially supported (~S) or unsupported (US). The consistency 
with previous research is unsurprising considering that PPP1 and PPP2 respondents tended to 
closely link the two issues of climate change and SLC (section 7.2.3). This consistency has 
implications for the communication of SLC, and in understanding public engagement with the 
issue. For example, many of the characteristics of climate change that make it hard to communicate 
- its complexity, long-term and distant nature, and difficult-to-detect signals - also apply to SLC; as 
do many of the factors that are perceived to be barriers to engaging with climate change, such as 
self-efficacy, optimism and scepticism (Lorenzoni et al., 2007).  
 
Table 23: Consistency of PPP1 and PPP2 findings with previous research 
Factor Climate change, SLC and flood 
risk findings (previous research) 
SLC findings (this study) Sup. 
Orienting dispositions   
Sources of 
information 
TV is one of the most common 
sources of information on marine 
climate change issues (CLAMER, 
2011a). 
TV is a popular source of SLC 
information (PPP1).  
S 
Trust in 
information 
sources 
The most trusted source of 
information for marine climate 
change issues is scientific 
publications; while broadsheets, 
books and TV are the most trusted 
media sources (CLAMER, 2011a). 
High trust is placed in personal 
observation in the context of flood 
risks (Whitmarsh, 2008). 
The most trusted sources of 
information about SLC are the 
Environment Agency / Natural 
Resources Wales and scientists 
(PPP2). TV is the most trusted 
media source. Personal 
experience is highly trusted 
(PPP1 and PPP2). 
S 
Education Educational level predicts 
knowledge of climate change 
(Tobler et al., 2012). 
PPP2 participants’ educational 
level does not predict knowledge 
scores (a finding also supported 
by PPP1 interviews (6.1.5)).   
US 
Local 
knowledge 
and 
experience 
Experiences of flooding are 
influential in determining 
perceptions of flood risks 
(Baumann & Sims, 1978; Harvatt et 
al., 2011; Siegrist & Gutscher, 2006; 
Spence et al., 2011; Wagner, 2007). 
Individuals with less experience of 
Alpine flash flood and landslide 
tend to have less complete mental 
models of the risk (Wagner, 2007).  
PPP1 respondents who had lived 
around the estuary for longer had 
more complete mental models of 
SLC. However, there was no 
significant relationship between 
time lived around the estuary and 
knowledge scores (PPP2), and 
flood experience did not predict 
concern about SLC or knowledge 
of SLC (PPP2).  
~S 
Continued… 
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Table 23 Continued: Consistency of PPP1 and PPP2 findings with previous research 
Factor Climate change, SLC and flood 
risk findings (previous research) 
SLC findings (this study) Sup. 
Concern  Widespread concern about climate 
change is commonly reported. E.g. 
among Welsh respondents 36% are 
very concerned about climate 
change and 48% are fairly 
concerned (Capstick et al., 2013). 
70% of European respondents 
reported being concerned about 
SLR (CLAMER, 2011a).  
PPP2 respondents were evenly 
split, with 51% being fairly/very 
concerned and 49% being not at 
all/not very concerned. PPP1 
responses were also mixed. 
US 
Concern 
relative to 
other issues 
Climate change ranks low relative 
to other concerns, particularly day 
to day issues like personal economic 
security (Lorenzoni et al., 2007; 
Zsamboky et al., 2011). 
SLC was of low concern relative 
to other issues (PPP1). But in 
relation to other risks specific to the 
Severn Estuary, PPP2 respondents 
factored SLC relatively highly.  
S 
Scepticism  63% of Americans (Leiserowitz, 
Smith, & Marlon, 2010) and 80% of 
UK citizens (Shuckburgh et al., 
2012) believe climate change/ 
global warming is happening.  
The majority of PPP2 
respondents agree that climate 
change (66%) and SLC (69%) is 
really happening. 
S 
Values and 
worldviews 
Values and worldviews have been 
found to be important in the 
context of climate change (e.g. 
Kahan et al., 2011; Leiserowitz, 
2006; Poortinga et al., 2011). 
PPP1 results indicate that values 
and worldviews are important 
factors in the perception of SLC 
and responses to it.  
S 
Future 
thinking 
Experts think about the future 
using two temporal repertoires: 
historic determinism and futuristic 
difference (van Asselt et al., 2010). 
To my knowledge, no work has 
investigated whether the lay public 
also utilise such repertoires in the 
context of climate change, SLC or 
flooding.  
EPP and PPP1 respondents 
placed varying emphasis on 
historic determinism and 
futuristic difference. More work 
is required to see if this affects 
risk perceptions, though there 
was no significant relationship 
between the future scale and SLC 
perceptions (PPP2).  
- 
Psychological 
distance  
The UK public associates climate 
change with impacts that are 
distant in both time and space 
(Shuckburgh et al., 2012; Spence et 
al., 2012). Psychological distance 
also applies to SLC (Evans et al., 
2012).  
PPP1 participants tended to view 
SLC as something that would 
affect other places worse than it 
would affect their local area, and 
PPP2 respondents tended to 
believe that SLC would affect the 
rest of the world more than it 
would affect them personally. 
However, more PPP2 respondents 
thought SLC would affect the 
Severn Estuary than thought it 
would affect the rest of the 
world. There was a widespread 
belief among PPP1 participants 
that the SLC impacts would be 
felt by future generations rather 
than themselves, while PPP2 
responses were ambivalent. Social 
distancing was uncommon (PPP2). 
~S 
Continued… 
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Table 23 Continued: Consistency of PPP1 and PPP2 findings with previous research 
Factor Climate change, SLC and flood 
risk findings (previous research) 
SLC findings (this study) Sup. 
Emotions Climate change risk perceptions 
and policy support have been 
shown to be influenced by affect 
(Leiserowitz, 2006). People who 
have experienced flooding 
associate it with negative emotions 
(Siegrist & Gutscher, 2008).  
SLC, climate change and 
particularly flooding were 
overwhelmingly associated with 
negative feelings, though some 
participants spoke of SLC as 
being exciting (PPP1).  
~S 
Demographics Women tend to be more concerned 
than men about climate change 
(Shuckburgh et al., 2012), marine 
climate change issues (CLAMER, 
2011a) and SLR (Hamilton, 2008). 
Women may have a greater 
scientific knowledge of climate 
change than men (McCright, 2010). 
Capstick et al. (2013) find that the 
oldest and youngest groups are least 
concerned about climate change.  
Gender and age are poor 
predictors of SLC knowledge 
(PPP2). Middle aged people are 
the most concerned about SLC, 
and older people are the least 
concerned (PPP2). Gender does 
not predict concern about SLC.  
~S 
Risk Appraisal  
Knowledge There is limited understanding of 
the causes of and solutions to 
climate change amongst the UK 
and US public (Bord et al., 2000; 
Leiserowitz et al., 2010; Lorenzoni 
& Pidgeon, 2006). 
There is limited understanding of 
the causes of and solutions to 
SLC (PPP1 and PPP2). However, 
there are some areas of 
agreement between experts and 
publics.  
S 
Responsibility Individuals locate responsibility for 
causing and mitigating climate 
change with others (Capstick et al., 
2013; Lorenzoni et al., 2007; 
Pidgeon, 2012; Poortinga et al., 
2006; Ryan et al., 2012; Spence et 
al., 2010b). The transferral of 
responsibility has also been shown 
to exist in contexts of groundwater 
flooding (Kreibich et al., 2009) and 
SLR (Harvatt et al., 2011). 
Individuals locate the 
responsibility for causing and 
mitigating SLC with others (PPP1 
and PPP2).  
S 
Efficacy Individual action against climate 
change is seen as difficult (Capstick 
et al., 2013; Spence et al., 2010b). 
PPP1 and PPP2 findings indicate 
perceptions of low self-efficacy 
regarding SLC.  
S 
Trust Research notes moderate to low 
levels of trust in the agencies 
perceived to be responsible for 
flood and SLR  (Evans et al., 2012; 
Fernandez-Bilbao, 2012).  
PPP1 and PPP2 findings indicate 
moderate to low levels of trust in 
the government and its agencies 
to protect people from SLR.   
S 
Responses (inactive) 
Optimism  Optimistic beliefs have been cited 
as potential barriers towards public 
engagement with climate change 
(Lorenzoni et al., 2007). 
Many PPP1 participants 
expressed optimism about SLC, 
and optimism was found to 
predict lower SLC estimates 
amongst PPP2 respondents. It is 
not clear whether these beliefs act 
as a barrier towards engagement. 
~S 
Continued… 
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Table 23 Continued 
Factor Climate change, SLC and flood 
risk findings (previous research) 
SLC findings (this study) Sup. 
Avoidance Bickerstaff and Simmons (2009) 
have noted an ‘active silencing of 
risk’ in relation to living with 
nuclear facilities. This is related with 
denial, which has been described as 
a potential coping mechanism for 
SLR and flood risks (Harvatt et al., 
2011). 
Analyses suggest some PPP1 
participants may be actively 
avoiding the issue of SLC.   
S 
Table 23: Consistency of PPP1 and PPP2 findings with previous research 
Sup. column: findings supported (S), partially supported (~S) or unsupported (US) by previous research 
 
9.4 Avenues for future research  
This research has raised a number of issues worthy of further exploration, either through modifying 
the methodology, further analyses of the existing dataset, or related studies. If I were to repeat this 
research, the main addition would be to include PPP2 survey questions about public decisions 
regarding SLC, particularly current active responses to SLC and intentions to mitigate or adapt, as 
suggested by de Bruin and Bostrom (2013). This is because although the study provides insights 
into perceptions of SLC, it does not tell us how these perceptions relate with actions and 
intentions93. I would also improve survey questions to reduce acquiescence bias (section 7.2.3). 
Regarding specific items, a more consistent question format for PPP2 vulnerability questions 
would facilitate an investigation into whether vulnerability is really less salient than other factors, 
as the current format does not allow a direct comparison. Also, the risk/benefit questions (Q3 and 
Q4) would ask respondents to indicate their level of agreement on two different scales, one for risk 
and one for benefit. The current single scale reduces the utility of the results because risks such as 
SLC can be perceived as being both high risk and high benefit. If I had more time to interrogate 
the current data set, further statistical analyses could investigate whether city dwellers feel less at 
risk than rural dwellers, and whether there is a relationship between where an individual lives and 
where they think is most at risk from SLC. These analyses could provide another layer to findings 
pertaining to psychological distance.  
                                                   
93 Such items were not included in the survey due to time and space constraints, and are currently being investigated 
in relation to climate change on the Severn Estuary by Robert Sposato in the Understanding Risk Group at Cardiff 
University. 
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The thesis has raised a number of avenues for further research through new studies. First, further 
research should investigate whether these findings are replicated in other low lying areas or whether 
different themes arise. Such research could focus on similar and disparate environments such as 
other estuaries, island environments, and coastal cities. Second, while the prospect of a Severn 
Estuary barrage is currently small (House of Commons, 2013), such a structure would have wide-
ranging impacts on the Severn Estuary and alter so many of the processes operating in the expert 
model as to warrant the development of a whole new model. Third, as discussed in section 8.1, 
this thesis does not explore in any depth the actions that are being taken or that may be taken by 
members of the public in response to SLC on the Severn Estuary. Fourth, the final stages of the 
mental models approach (communication design) have only been touched upon in this study. 
Further work should develop and test such risk communications.  
The final avenue for future research involves the investigation of other risks. Johnson (1999) 
remarks that the decision over what issues should be communicated with the public is an ethical 
one; why should some be selected over others? Indeed, SLC is one of a number of impacts of 
climate change. Others, such as food security and water resources, may have as great or greater 
impacts on Severn Estuary residents and people around the world. Expert participant Bob stated 
that on the Estuary, “habitats will adapt and communities will adapt... I think we have bigger things 
to worry about”. Perhaps the main avenue for further research is therefore to use similar extended, 
contextualised mental models approaches to explore other specific climate change risks. 
9.5 Concluding remarks 
With climate change, the ‘stakes are too high for ad hoc communication’ 
(Fischhoff, 2011). 
 
PPP1 participant Lynne stated that “all the knowledge in the world isn’t going to stop [SLC] 
happening”. She’s right. If everyone on Earth stopped emitting carbon dioxide today, sea levels 
may still rise by around 1m (Nicholls & Lowe, 2004). But while knowledge may not stop SLC, it 
can perhaps empower people to make their own informed decisions about how to respond to it. 
This thesis has provided the first step towards the provision of such information, by filling the 
research gap in how the public perceives SLC on the Severn Estuary and by providing insights into 
how the risks might best be communicated. But it has also highlighted the importance of contextual 
factors of SLC perceptions, endorsing recommendations that communicators should not only 
listen to the ‘facts’ that people know, but to other aspects as well. 
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